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FROM THE EDITORS
Israel and the United States have both been routinely subject to severe international criticism for the conduct of their respective militaries in irregular combat.
But the Israeli case is unique in important respects. Israel has had to face foes
who not only regularly flout generally accepted laws of war, but do so as part of
a larger strategy of political warfare designed to discredit Israel in the eyes of an
international public that is already disposed to be hostile to the Jewish state. In
“Israeli Targeting: A Legal Appraisal,” Major John J. Merriam, USA, and Michael
N. Schmitt provide an assessment of Israeli policy and behavior in relation to
the restrictions on targeting embodied in the law of armed conflict. Based on an
extensive review of internal Israeli documents and interviews with senior Israeli
officials, the authors conclude that the doctrines and practice of Israel’s military
track closely with those of the American military and are in fact eminently defensible. Professor Schmitt and Major Merriam are the director and associate
director, respectively, of the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law
at the Naval War College. (The previously posted electronic version of this article
has generated considerable discussion, which can be accessed by searching for
“Schmitt Israel Targeting.”)
It is fair to say that serious questioning of the future role of aircraft carriers
within the U.S. Navy has increased significantly over the last several years. In
“Connecting the Dots: Capital Ships, the Littoral, Command of the Sea, and the
World Order,” Robert C. Rubel places these debates within a larger framework by
raising the issue of whether the idea of the capital ship itself is not becoming obsolescent in an operational environment increasingly dominated by long-range
missiles and precision sensors. Rubel makes the underappreciated point that our
habit of speaking of capital-ship-intensive fleets as “blue-water” navies obscures
the fact that most capital-ship-centered battles thoughout history have in fact occurred in the littorals, and that it is precisely here that the weight of land-based
air and missile defenses and sensors tells most heavily against aircraft carriers.
Further, he explores the far-reaching implications of capital-ship obsolescence for
traditional notions such as command of the sea and protection of the global commons. In all of this, Rubel carries on the fundamental reflections on the nature of
contemporary sea power that have appeared over the last decade and beyond in
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these pages as well as in the collected volume Writing to Think: The Intellectual
Journey of a Naval Career (Newport Paper 41). Captain Rubel, USN (Ret.), is the
former dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College.
China’s ongoing effort to reclaim and fortify islands in the South China Sea
raises the most fundamental questions concerning its strategic intentions with
respect to its immediate neighbors as well as the global maritime commons. It
also provides an important context for understanding the strategic logic behind
China’s massive buildup of naval and maritime capability in recent years. A conspicuous element of that buildup has been China’s acquisition of its first aircraft
carrier and its apparent commitment to building at least four additional ships of
this class. In “China’s Aircraft Carrier Program: Drivers, Developments, Implications,” Andrew Scobell, Michael McMahon, and Cortez A. Cooper III assess the
motives behind China’s acquisition and overhaul of the ex-Soviet vessel Varyag
(now Liaoning) and its eventual decision to commit the nation to a serious program of carrier construction. While intangible motives such as national prestige
no doubt have played a role, the authors believe the overriding strategic logic of
the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN’s) evolution into a blue-water navy
has been the decisive factor.
It is well to be reminded that the United States does not have a monopoly
on theorizing about sea power. In “A General Review of the History of China’s
Sea-Power Theory Development,” Zhang Wei provides a succinct overview of
Chinese views of sea power from their initial encounter with Western navies and
naval theorists in the nineteenth century through China’s definitive break with
its traditional “continentalist” orientation in the 1990s and the rapid expansion of
its naval and maritime ambitions and capabilities over the last decade and more.
The author of this article, which was originally published in Chinese in July 2012,
Senior Captain Zhang Wei, PLAN, is a researcher at the People’s Liberation Army
Naval Research Institute.
In this connection, it is fitting that this issue concludes with a long-overdue
tribute to a man who has a claim to be the author of the first book ever published
on naval strategy. In “Fernando Oliveira’s Art of War at Sea (1555): A Pioneering Treatise on Naval Strategy,” Luis Nuno Sardinha Monteiro provides a brief
introduction to this forgotten figure whose work had the misfortune of never
being translated from his native Portuguese (an English version is currently in
preparation). Unlike most military treatises of the early modern centuries, this
work rises above the merely tactical and operational levels of naval warfare and
sounds a number of surprisingly Mahanian themes. Commander Monteiro is an
officer in the Portuguese Navy.
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Finally, with this issue, the “editors” of this column are reduced from two to
one, with the retirement of Pelham (“Pel”) Boyer after twenty-four years of service as managing editor of the Naval War College Review, as well as the Naval War
College Press as a whole. Originally a U.S. naval intelligence officer with Russian
language expertise, Pel assumed this position with very little prior preparation.
He has been very largely responsible for establishing and maintaining the high
standards of editorial production and design that have become a hallmark of
this journal and of our various book and monograph series. His attention to the
many details of his job has been extraordinary, his editorial skill and judgment
unfailing, and his dedication to the mission remarkable. Not least, in his personal
relationships he has ever been the gentleman. We wish Pel fair winds and following seas.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334,
335, 309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401841-2236).
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Rear Admiral Howe became the fifty-fifth President
of the U.S. Naval War College on 8 July 2014. He is
a native of Jacksonville, Florida and was commissioned in 1984 following his graduation from the
U.S. Naval Academy.
Howe’s operational assignments have included a full
range of duties in the Naval Special Warfare and joint
Special Operations communities. He commanded
Naval Special Warfare Unit 3 in Bahrain, Naval
Special Warfare Group 3 in San Diego, and Special
Operations Command, Pacific in Hawaii. His service
overseas includes multiple deployments to the western Pacific and Southwest Asia and participation in
Operations EARNEST WILL , PROVIDE PROMISE , ENDURING FREEDOM , and IRAQI FREEDOM .
His key joint and staff assignments include current
operations officer at Special Operations Command,
Pacific; Chief Staff Officer, Naval Special Warfare
Development Group; Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Policy at Naval Special Warfare
Command; Director of Legislative Affairs for U.S.
Special Operations Command; and Assistant Commanding Officer, Joint Special Operations Command.
Howe graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School
in 1995 with a master of arts in national security affairs (special operations / low-intensity conflict), and
from the National War College in 2002 with a master
of arts in national security.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

Professionalism and Leader Development

MY FIRST YEAR as President of the Naval War College has been

an incredible experience and a real journey of professional discovery. Besides what I’ve learned about the inspiring work of the College, I have
made two additional, significant discoveries over this first year’s journey. These
are things I didn’t fully appreciate when I assumed this command, but wish I had
a long, long time ago.

• The first is that there is an operational imperative—a war-fighting
imperative—that we view our Navy as a profession, and ourselves as members of a true naval profession.

• The second is that to successfully execute our Navy missions as effectively
as possible, there is nothing more important over the long term than leader
development.
In this Forum, I’d like to “unpack” these discoveries, but before I do, two caveats are in order.
First, I hope our readers do not interpret these remarks as preaching from the
“Ivory Tower.” I believe the things about which I’m speaking are far from abstract
considerations. Quite the contrary, I am convinced there are practical and operational implications to the subjects of professionalism and leader development,
and that it is vital to engage in much more explicit discussion of these subjects
than has been typical in Navy culture in the past.
Second, this discussion is not about trying to fix a significant problem we have
today. It is much more about ensuring we are prepared for the challenges of tomorrow. In the past, our institution and our leaders have been largely successful
—in some cases exceedingly successful. Today, however, the world is changing
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/1
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at an increasing rate, and the “VUCA” acronym accurately captures the environment for which we need to prepare our leaders. The operational environment is
volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous and promises to become ever more
so in the future. What has proved successful in the past is not going fully to prepare us for the future. This discussion is about moving from good to great, and
being ready for the increased challenges we will face in the future.
Professionalism. Let’s return to my first “discovery”: there is an operational imperative—a war-fighting imperative—that we view ourselves as members of a
profession in a nontrivial sense of the word. It has come as something of a shock
to me that I have had this realization so late in my career! But that is precisely
what makes me think we owe the Navy and the nation a change in our culture
so that the sense of personal identification with the Navy profession is pervasive
through the fleet at all levels of rank.
Over the years I’ve read multiple articles in Joint Force Quarterly and other
military-related periodicals on the subject of professionalism. At the time, much
of those discussions didn’t resonate with me. I had been exposed to the concept
of the military as a profession in my early years at the U.S. Naval Academy, but,
for almost my entire career, to be professional meant looking good in uniform
and being technically and tactically competent. When I read the Navy Ethos, the
word “professional” was simply an adjective meaning the sailor was squared away
and a good operator.
In my current job, I’ve been reexposed to the basic ideas of what it means to
be a member of the profession of arms. Here’s what I’ve come to understand. Our
Navy has a dual character. On one hand, it is a military department organized as
a bureaucracy. The bureaucratic dimension of our organization is unavoidable for
any organization of our size and complexity. But on the other, it is an organization dedicated to supporting a military profession. It is this dual nature as both
a bureaucracy and a profession that shapes our key challenge as Navy leaders.*

• Bureaucracies originated out of society’s need for efficient, routinized work.
The focus on efficiency drives an organization characterized by centralized
planning and control, little delegation of discretionary authority, and
compliance-based behavior.

• Professions originated out of society’s need for the expert application of
specialized knowledge. For professions to provide that expert knowledge
most effectively, they need autonomy. That autonomy is based on trust: trust
between society and the profession, and trust among the members of the
* A great deal of the language and concepts of this way of thinking is reliant on the Army’s excellent
work articulating the profession/bureaucracy tensions in its service. It is clearly articulated and
laid out in U.S. Army Dept., The Army Profession, ADRP 1 (Washington, D.C.: June 2013), pp. 1–4.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

6915_PresidentsForum.indd 10

15

8/18/15 1:38 PM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 4, Art. 1

P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O RU M

11

profession. This trust is based on shared values/ethos, and demonstrated actions in accordance with these values/ethos.
The dual character of our Navy is important to understand. The attributes
and strengths of both the bureaucracy and the profession are needed to execute
the wide variety of functions across the Navy every day, and tension between the
two is necessary and natural. As the leaders of the Navy, however, our challenge
is to ensure the overarching characteristic of the Navy is—and remains—that of
a military profession.* Why? Because a bureaucratic organization will never succeed in combat; only a professional organization can and will.

• The operational environment—on the land, on the sea, or in the air—is violent and complex, dominated by uncertainty and ambiguity.

• Success in this environment requires much more than tactical competence;
it requires judicious and decentralized employment of that competence at all
levels: tactically, operationally, and strategically.

• And the key enabler of decentralized employment is trust—trust up, down,
left, and right within an organization, and trust between the military and the
nation it serves.
My colleagues that study organizations have taught me that trust is largely
absent from bureaucracies. In fact, such organizations are specifically designed to
function in low-trust environments. By contrast, trust is the central characteristic
of a professional organization. Trust in a profession is built on each member’s
core identity being associated with the profession, and each member’s actions
being guided by an ethic shared across the profession.
It is here, in this difference in the nature of trust in bureaucracies and professions, that I’ve come to understand the war-fighting relevance of professionalism.
I now clearly see the absolute operational imperative to thinking, seeing, being
a profession: only this identity engenders the trust necessary to fight and win in
today’s operational environment.
This updated understanding of professionalism has also improved my thinking
about ethics. I now see ethics through the lens of professionalism. As members of
the maritime profession of arms, our ethic is what guides and steers our actions.
That ethic certainly includes laws, regulations, and policies. But those are a mere
baseline of legal compliance. Far more important for guiding our discretionary
professional judgment are the nonlegal professional expectations established by
our Navy culture, its values, and its highest aspirations. Our ethic guides us to act
always in a manner that supports the values of the nation we serve, and enhances
the trust within the organization, and with our civilian leadership / nation. In a
* Ibid., pp. 1–4.
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complex world, our ethic helps us understand not only what we can or what we
must do but, more importantly, what we should do.
The tension between our Navy’s bureaucratic and professional attributes will
grow greater as we move into times of fiscal pressure and away from sustained
combat. We have a choice in how we see ourselves, in how we think about ourselves, and as we think about what we’re doing from day to day.
As we all attend to our day-to-day assignments, I ask all Navy leaders to make
a conscious effort to let the framework of the Navy as a profession drive our vision, thinking, and decisions. We’ll be a better Navy if we do.
Leader Development. My assignment as President of the Naval War College has
afforded me the opportunity to have a wide variety of discussions on the subject
of leader development. As a result of those discussions, I’ve come to understand
that our traditional approach to leader development is incomplete and insufficient. In retrospect, I now clearly see that I had on many counts failed in my
responsibility to execute the critical role of a leader in leader development. My
rather passive approach of simply serving as a role model was good but insufficient. As I argued earlier, the world is changing at an increasing rate, and the
operational environment continues to grow more complex. We can’t rely only on
experience and observation to develop our future leaders. Nor can we rely solely
on the schoolhouse, mobile training teams, or General Military Training programs. I have come to believe that the single most effective means of improving
leadership across the Navy is “leaders engaging leaders.”
Leaders at all levels must be actively involved in development of those in their
charge. Preparing them for the challenges of the future is not an ancillary aspect
of their “real” job—in some respects it is their most important job. There is no
need for one to be a “leadership expert” to move out with leader development
efforts. One doesn’t need to have all the answers. In many respects, the most important thing we can do to make us all cognizant of our professional identity is
simply ensuring that conversation about leadership, ethics, and the naval profession is a routine aspect of our interactions with each other. Explicitly raising such
issues in the midst of routine operational activity will have a significant impact
on our personnel as they realize it is a shared expectation that professionalism
is part of what it is to be a member of our Navy. And no one is in a better position to do so than leaders at all levels. Leaders engaging leaders—this is the key.
Making professionalism, leadership, and ethics an integral part of Navy life will
do far more to encourage and embed professional identity than any number of
PowerPoint presentations by “leadership experts.”
So these are two key “discoveries” since reporting to the Naval War College:
the operational imperative of seeing ourselves as a profession, and the critical
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role of leaders in leader development. As I look to the future, I believe we need
to do the following:

• Acknowledge that there is an operational imperative for the Navy to recognize the tension between bureaucracy and profession in our Navy, and
deliberately choose to nurture our professional identity.

• Recognize the critical role of “leaders engaging leaders” in our development
efforts and recognize that explicit attention to issues of leader development
and ethics is a vital and important aspect of leaders’ responsibilities at every
level and rank.

P. GARDNER HOWE III

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
(This “President’s Forum” is derived from a presentation on professionalism and
leader development delivered at the Navy Flag Officer and Senior Executive Symposium in April 2015.)
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ISR AELI TARGETING
A Legal Appraisal
Major John J. Merriam, U.S. Army, and Michael N. Schmitt

T

he Israeli-Palestinian conflict is seemingly intractable. It involves contentious issues, such as extended occupation, the status of Jerusalem, a claimed
“right of return” for Palestinian refugees, and recognition of a Palestinian state.
Episodic hostilities have punctuated the conflict, causing heavy civilian casualties
on both sides. The tactics employed have proved highly controversial, with some,
such as terrorism and the direct targeting of the Israeli population, self-evidently
qualifying as war crimes.
Between June and August 2014, Israel engaged in yet another round of intense
hostilities with Palestinian organized armed groups in the Gaza Strip. What began with the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers quickly escalated
into full-scale conflict featuring a rain of rockets from Gaza and Palestinian raids
mounted through an extensive tunnel network. The Israeli military response,
dubbed Operation PROTECTIVE EDGE (OPE), included an intense air campaign
against Hamas and other armed groups and an Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
ground incursion that resulted in firefights across the Gaza Strip. After a series of
failed cease-fires, a precarious end to hostilities was negotiated, one that presently
appears to be holding.
The short but violent conflict was devastating for the civilian population and
infrastructure in Gaza. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that over two thousand Palestinians, more than half
of them civilians, died during the hostilities.1 Israeli losses exceeded seventy, the
bulk of them IDF personnel.2 Both sides suffered hundreds of wounded. As is
normally the case, the conflict generated widespread criticism of Israel by various
prominent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including Human Rights
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Watch, Amnesty International, and Israeli groups such as B’Tselem.3 Much of the
criticism centered on a perception that the Palestinian side suffered disproportionate casualties and damage.
The condemnation was not, however, universal. As the dust settled, military professionals from the United States and several other countries carefully
examined Israeli practices. They found much to commend about IDF operations, particularly the extent to which the IDF exercised restraint and the highly
precise manner in which it conducted strikes. The U.S. Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, noted that Israel “went to extraordinary lengths to limit collateral
damage and civilian casualIf war is politics by other means, then the interpretation of the laws of war will necessarily ties.”4 He praised several IDF
reflect the political environment in which war techniques that have been
the source of controversy in
is waged.
human rights circles, such as
the “knock on the roof ” technique employed to warn Palestinian civilians of an
impending strike.
Operation PROTECTIVE EDGE invites an examination of one facet of international law as it applies to the conflict—the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and a
particular subset thereof known colloquially as “targeting law.” The analysis need
not address the righteousness of either side’s cause, because an important, but
often misunderstood, feature of international law is a strict separation between
the jus ad bellum, the law addressing when states may resort to force, and the jus
in bello, which comprises the rules governing how hostilities must be conducted.5
The latter applies equally to all parties to an armed conflict, irrespective of which
is right or wrong in terms of its origins.6 In other words, it matters not whether
Israel or Hamas (and other Palestinian groups) was the aggressor; both were irrefutably bound to conduct their operations in accordance with the LOAC.
This article examines how the IDF applies the LOAC rules of targeting. Israel
has long refrained from revealing many aspects of its targeting processes and
precise positions on key aspects of targeting law, out of concern that transparency
might be misused to subject Israel to further criticism in international forums.
This approach may be changing. In late 2014, the IDF invited this article’s authors, members of the U.S. Naval War College’s Stockton Center for the Study of
International Law, to Israel to assess its targeting practices and positions.7 Their
research comprised a visit to the Gaza Division Headquarters, including an “attack cell,” and an examination of Hamas attack-tunnel infrastructure. Combat
footage of Israeli strikes on Hamas rocket sites during OPE was reviewed and extensive interviews with IDF legal advisers and ground and air force commanders
at all levels were conducted. The conclusions that follow are offered to elucidate
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

NWC_Autumn2015Reivew.indb 16

21

8/13/15 3:06 PM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 4, Art. 1

M E R R IA M & S C H M I T T

17

Israel’s approaches to targeting law by examining the synergistic relationship
between Israel’s unique operational and strategic challenges and its various positions on the LOAC.
STATE POSITIONS ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
Before turning to Israeli targeting, it is useful to briefly survey the broad contours
of the LOAC. It is a body of law that seeks to maintain a delicate balance between
the military imperative of defeating the enemy on the one hand and the humanitarian one of protecting civilians and other “victims of war” on the other.8 In the
context of targeting, particular principles and rules maintain this balance. Foremost among these is the principle of distinction. Distinction, one of the “cardinal
principles contained in the texts constituting the fabric of [the LOAC],” and thus
“intransgressible,” requires that the parties to a conflict “at all times distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against
military objectives.”9
Rules derived from this principle prohibit the direct attack of civilians and
civilian objects, as well as indiscriminate attacks, such as those launched without
regard to whether they will strike combatants or civilians.10 The rule of proportionality flows from the same animating premise as the principle of distinction. It
holds that even an attack properly aimed at military objectives is unlawful if the
expected collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects is excessive in relation
to the anticipated military advantage to be gained.11 Finally, the LOAC achieves
balance by requiring an attacker to take certain “precautions in attack” to minimize civilian harm, including doing everything feasible in the circumstances to
verify the target is a military objective and selecting targets, weapons, and tactics
that will limit civilian harm so long as they do not involve sacrificing military
advantage.12 There is also a requirement to warn the civilian population of attacks
that may affect them when the circumstances so permit.13
These principles and rules lie at the heart of targeting law. However, it must be
cautioned that targeting is subject to an array of further legal limitations, such as
the ban on wanton destruction; the prohibition of unnecessary suffering (which
disallows use of weapons that result in unnecessary suffering or superfluous
injury to combatants); and the various “special protections” that bar or restrict
attacks on specified persons and objects, such as medical, religious, and cultural
entities.14
Most such rules and principles are set forth in treaty law. The primary instrument governing targeting is the 1977 Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the four
1949 Geneva Conventions.15 Neither the United States nor Israel is party to
the protocol, but both recognize that certain aspects of the instrument reflect
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customary law norms.16 Customary norms develop through the nearly universal
practice of states engaged in out of a sense of legal obligation.17 While customary
law is sometimes hard to discern since it is not enshrined in treaty text, it is no
less the law.
Nonlawyers may find it surprising to learn that states harbor different views
on the LOAC. Despite broad consensus regarding most core principles and rules,
at a more granular level there is a great deal of room for divergence on the scope
and application of the LOAC in actual combat. For instance, distinction requires
that attacks be directed only against military objectives, but what entities qualify
as military objectives? For that matter, what is an attack as a matter of law? What
measures will satisfy the law requiring an attacker to avoid civilian harm when
feasible? What is feasible in a given situation? How much certainty is required
about the nature of a proposed target before it may be struck?18 When are warnings required, and how must they be delivered? On these and many other matters,
a variety of views—often quite divergent—exist.19
The positions states take on such issues are not developed in a vacuum; if war
is politics by other means, then the interpretation of the laws of war will necessarily reflect the political environment in which war is waged. Indeed, if war “is
not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass . . . but always the collision of
two living forces,” the interaction between adversaries in a specific operational
and strategic environment is going to affect how it is fought and consequently
how a state will view and apply the constraints of the LOAC.20 That is plainly the
case with respect to Israel.
ISRAEL’S UNIQUE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT
To understand why Israel adopts particular interpretations of the LOAC and how
the nation applies them in practice, one must comprehend the operational and
strategic dilemmas it faces. First, it is constrained by geography. Israel is a small
country and its enemies—chiefly Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in southern
Lebanon, but also their state sponsors, including Syria and Iran—are close. Its
foes possess arsenals of rockets capable, in the absence of an effective antirocket
capability, of striking all of Israel’s major population centers. When rocket attacks
are launched, a nationwide network of early warning sensors triggers flight to
hardened shelters and, in some cases, widespread evacuation of civilians to lessthreatened regions of the country.21
Given the long history of warfare between Israel and these nonstate actors, as
well as Israel’s relative isolation in international affairs, the Israeli population often perceives itself as “under siege.” This stands in marked contrast to the United
States, which operates globally and from a forward presence precisely to ensure
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that it can confront threats far from the homeland. Barring a “black swan” event
like the 9/11 attacks, the American people have rarely felt personally at risk. For
Israel, by contrast, protection of the civilian population is of paramount importance. From the perspective of its adversaries, the Israeli civilian population is
consequently a center of gravity against which attacks are routinely launched.22
Second, unlike the U.S. all-volunteer professional military, the IDF relies on
conscription.23 Most Israeli families have therefore seen loved ones put in harm’s
way, whether during a period of open hostilities, when facing the constant threat
of terrorism, or simply in the long-simmering and often dangerous environment
attendant to the Israeli presence in the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights, or
Lebanon. One result is an extreme aversion to casualties coupled with a pervasive
fear of IDF soldiers’ being taken prisoner.24 Once more, Israel’s foes have taken
notice, repeatedly launching raids to isolate and capture IDF soldiers to leverage
them for massive concessions from Israel. In this way, the safety of IDF soldiers
represents another center of gravity, and potential vulnerability, exploitable by
its enemies. Again, it may be useful to compare the Israeli perception of these
matters to that of the United States. Whereas the United States only reluctantly
accepted a prisoner exchange of five Taliban fighters for the return of Sergeant
Bowe Bergdahl, Israel routinely exchanges hundreds of militants for a single captured IDF soldier.25 In some cases, the exchanges were made simply to regain the
remains of fallen Israelis. It is a stark contrast.
Despite these vulnerabilities, Israel benefits from certain factors. By virtue
of its interior position, it can quickly mobilize air and ground forces to defeat
threats arising on its borders. It does so with a highly advanced military force
that generally enjoys overwhelming conventional overmatch, particularly with
respect to Hamas. Israel also enjoys the relative luxury of knowing the location
of its next battlefield. Unlike the United States, which must constantly prepare for
expeditionary warfare around the globe, the IDF recognizes that it will fight in
Gaza, southern Lebanon, or the West Bank. This allows it to develop exceptionally precise battlefield and target intelligence—Israeli forces fight on ground that
they have physically occupied in the recent past or continue to occupy to this day
(the West Bank), and it is ground on which they have fought many times before.
Today, Israel’s adversaries no longer engage solely in irregular warfare. Hezbollah in particular has demonstrated the capacity to fight both conventionally and
irregularly in what is now styled “hybrid warfare,” while Hamas is demonstrating
a growing tendency in that direction.26 Still, in the face of conventional overmatch and their opponent’s sophisticated understanding of the battlefield, they
cannot go toe-to-toe with the IDF. Therefore, they create favorable asymmetries
that allow them to exploit Israel’s vulnerabilities and mitigate its advantages; tactics for doing so include fighting from within densely populated urban terrain,
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employing human shields, feigning civilian and other protected status to conduct
attacks, and using civilian objects like homes, schools, and medical facilities to
cache weapons and from which to launch attacks—all violations of the LOAC.
In particular, Israel’s foes hope to draw the IDF into strikes that cause civilian
casualties and destroy civilian infrastructure so as to intensify international pressure on Israel and exacerbate its isolation. The groups also attempt to leverage
the aforementioned centers of gravity. As examples, they launch indiscriminate
rocket attacks against Israeli civilians using cheap, inaccurate, and widely available rockets and use tunnels and the protection provided by operating from
among civilians to get close to IDF positions in the hope of overwhelming or
capturing Israeli soldiers.
This operational and strategic environment undergirds the focus and nature
of IDF targeting. For instance, the IDF attaches great value to destroying rocket
platforms and weapons caches and to locating and destroying tunnels. In the language of the LOAC’s rule of proportionality, such targets are viewed as providing
a very high “anticipated military advantage.” Similarly, the fact that its enemies attempt to frustrate identification by fighting in civilian clothing and from civilian
structures can result in the IDF striking what to outside observers appear to be
unlawful targets. Also, Israel’s deep insight into its likely battlefields—especially
in Gaza—may lead it to attempt such attacks with marked confidence in their
precision.
These examples illustrate how strategic and operational context affects the
manner in which targeting is conducted. As will be discussed, such factors equally influence the value judgments that underlie targeting, especially the exercise of
such discretion as the law allows.
LOAC AND TARGETING IN THE IDF
As noted, AP I captures much of the LOAC applicable to the conduct of hostilities. Despite not being a party to the treaty, Israel (and the United States) nonetheless considers many of the specific rules in that instrument to reflect customary international law. Thus, AP I’s targeting provisions serve as a logical starting
point for examining IDF positions on targeting law.
Military Objectives
Given the principle of distinction’s prohibition on directing attacks at otherthan-military objectives, it is essential to understand what is, and is not, a lawful
military objective. AP I defines military objectives as “those objects which by
their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”27 Israel accepts this definition as reflecting customary international law.
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Simple though it may appear, applying the definition in practice can prove
challenging. Of particular significance in the Israeli context is understanding
what the terms “use” and “purpose” mean. An otherwise civilian object (like a
home, school, medical facility, or factory) becomes a military objective by use
whenever it is converted to military ends. When intended to be so converted in
the future, it qualifies as a military objective by purpose. Application of this norm
can be relatively uncontroversial. For instance, when Hamas uses a school to store
rockets or a residence to command and control its fighters, those formerly civilian objects become lawful military objectives subject to attack.
Israeli targeting has nevertheless come under critical scrutiny with regard to
its application of the military objective definition. Consider tunnels. Hamas uses
purpose-built tunnels for a variety of military ends. Some run under the border
to Israel proper and are devoted to launching raids in an effort to overwhelm IDF
positions or to capture Israeli soldiers. Others traverse Gaza itself and are used to
move fighters and weapons underground and thereby elude detection and attack
by air. These tunnels are clearly military objectives; the IDF appropriately targets
them on the basis of their nature.
Applying the LOAC to Hamas tunnels that run under the border between
Egypt and Gaza proves more complicated. In some cases, the tunnels are sometimes used both to bring rockets and other war material into Gaza and for
nonmilitary smuggling purposes. Except for those employed exclusively for
transporting military matériel, such tunnels must be treated as “dual use” objects;
they may be attacked only when they become military objectives through their
use or purpose.
Questions have arisen about cement plants that produce what Israel alleges are
specially designed concrete supports, the sole purpose of which is tunnel construction. The IDF has repeatedly struck cement plants in Gaza, leading NGOs
to claim that these are unlawful attacks against clearly civilian infrastructure.28 In
the view of the authors, if the factories do in fact produce supports used for the
tunnels that qualify as military objectives, they unquestionably qualify as a lawful military objective by use since they are producing “war supporting” material.
To take another example, the IDF has repeatedly attacked allegedly “nonmilitary” Hamas government buildings. It insists that it does not target such buildings
solely on the basis that they are Hamas government infrastructure. Rather, the
IDF avers that in some cases Hamas military leaders inside the buildings were the
targets, while in others the buildings themselves had a military use irrespective of
any presence therein of Hamas fighters (such as a weapons cache or a command
and control facility). Both situations would render an attack on the buildings
lawful.
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But this does not conclude the legal analysis. When Hamas fighters in a government building are the target of an IDF attack, any damage to the building
or nearby buildings, and any harm to civilians, must be included as collateral
damage when determining the proportionality of the attack and deciding what
precautions must be taken to minimize collateral damage. If the building is itself
the target, harm to the building need not be considered in these assessments.
Environment
There is a great deal of debate about protection of the environment in the context of the LOAC. Article 35(3) of AP I prohibits using means and methods of
warfare that “are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term,
and severe damage to the natural environment.” This article protects the environment as such. Article 55(1), on the other hand, prohibits such attacks when those
effects would “thereby prejudice the health or survival of the population.” Unlike
article 35(3), it is anthropocentric in the sense of protecting the civilian population from negative effects on the environment, rather than the environment itself.
Since Israel is not a party to the protocol, the question arises whether the two
articles reflect customary law binding on nonparties. Neither the United States
nor Israel believes they do.29 First, both reject the premise that there is any set
threshold of environmental harm that would prohibit an attack, such as “widespread, long-term, and severe,” irrespective of any military advantage resulting
from the attack. Moreover, Israel apparently rejects the proposition that the
environment is to be treated as a civilian object, such that attacks against the
environment are prohibited and that environmental harm must be considered
in proportionality and precautions-in-attack determinations. Rather, it is of the
view that the proportionality rule requires an attacker to refrain from attacks that,
by their effects on the environment, would disproportionately harm civilians and
civilian objects.
The distinction is important, particularly in the Middle East where oil infrastructure plays such a prominent role and offers both a tempting target and a
source of grave potential environmental damage if attacked. One need only consider the Iraqi destruction of Kuwaiti oil wells during the 1991 Gulf war to grasp
this point; in a high-intensity conflict in that region of the world, it is reasonable
to anticipate such conduct.30 In this respect, the Israeli position differs from that
of the United States, which is of the view that the environment is a civilian object,
and thus damage to it must be factored into a targeting analysis, even if there is
no ensuing harm to other civilian objects or persons.31
Persons on the Battlefield
Perhaps no LOAC issue is fraught with more disagreement in the modern age
of irregular and hybrid warfare than that of “direct participation in hostilities.”
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Generally, persons on the battlefield fall into one of two categories: members of
the armed forces or civilians. Members of the armed forces are clearly subject to
being attacked at any time, unless they are hors de combat by virtue of wounds,
sickness, or having been made prisoner.32 They are targetable on the basis of their
status. In contrast, civilians are immune from attack “unless, and for such time
as, they directly participate in hostilities.”33 Those who directly participate may
accordingly be targeted on the basis of their conduct rather than their status; civilians may be attacked when they engage in acts that constitute direct participation, and only “for such time as” they so participate. Defining direct participation
and determining when that participation begins and ends have been the source
of ongoing controversy for years.
Beginning in 2003 and concluding in 2008, the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) undertook a multiyear study culminating in the release
of its Interpretive Guidance
on the Notion of Direct ParIt matters not whether Israel or Hamas (and
ticipation in Hostilities.34 The
other Palestinian groups) was the aggressor;
ICRC, wrongly in the view of
both were irrefutably bound to conduct their
many observers, including the
operations in accordance with the LOAC.
United States, takes a restrictive approach to the meaning of “for such time as,” effectively holding that direct
participants may only be attacked during a limited window when they deploy for
combat, conduct combat, and redeploy; they remain immune from attack at all
other times.35 This grants more protection to these fighters than that enjoyed by
regular members of the armed forces—an unsatisfactory result.
In an effort to address this concern, the ICRC was willing to differentiate between civilians who fight as members of an “organized armed group” (OAG) and
those who do so only sporadically and on a more spontaneous or independent
basis.36 According to the ICRC, members of an OAG may be treated as members
of the armed forces for targeting purposes (e.g., targetable at any time), but with
an important caveat—they must perform a “continuous combat function.”37
Support personnel without duties that directly affect the combat capabilities of
one side or the other would not be targetable on the basis of OAG membership.
Again, this results in less favorable treatment for uniformed members of the
armed forces, since all members except medical and religious personnel are undoubtedly lawful targets on the basis of mere military status.
The IDF, like the United States, accepts the concept of OAGs but rejects the
continuous-combat-function limitation.38 Thus, the IDF characterizes members
of Hamas’s military wing (the Izz-al-Din al-Qassam Brigades) as members of an
OAG rather than as sporadic civilian direct participants. By the Israeli approach,
they are targetable at any time, and it is irrelevant whether their duties qualify
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as a continuous combat function. The IDF accepts the premise that groups like
Hamas can have distinct military and civilian wings. It only targets the former
on the basis of an OAG-membership theory and the latter on the basis of direct
participation in the hostilities. A Hamas leader who has both civilian and military
functions, such as command and control, may be targeted owing to his position
in the military wing, notwithstanding the fact that he may also have a role in the
civilian government of Gaza.
With respect to individuals who are not OAG members and thus targetable
only for such time as they directly participate, both Israel and the United States
reject the ICRC’s restrictive view of the “for such time” phrase. Their position is
that a civilian who regularly participates in hostilities may be attacked throughout the entire period of participation, not just during individual acts. Thus, a
civilian who is engaging in repeated acts of participation may be attacked during
periods of rest or inactivity between those individual acts. Additionally, both
countries take a broader view of conduct that qualifies as direct participation
than the ICRC. As an example, Israel and the United States would characterize
an individual who makes homemade rockets or improvised explosive devices as
directly participating in hostilities; the ICRC labels such activities as indirect participation. Similarly, whereas a Hamas member smuggling weapons into Gaza for
general use would not be directly participating by the ICRC restrictive approach,
Israel would label such activity direct participation, as would the United States.39
Human Shields
The LOAC clearly forbids the use of human shields.40 This has not prevented
many states and nonstate actors from regularly using them, since the tactic holds
out the prospect of either discouraging an attack by the adversary or mischaracterizing its strike as an intentional attack on protected civilians or as one that
violates either the rule of proportionality or the requirement to take precautions
in attack. Given the tactics of its enemies and the urban battlefield on which it
usually fights, human shielding is particularly problematic for Israel.
The issue of how to treat civilian shields as a matter of the LOAC is hotly contested. Are they to be fully considered as civilians, or are they direct participants
who do not factor into the proportionality or precautions-in-attack assessments?
There are a variety of positions.
First, one must differentiate between voluntary and involuntary human
shields. The former are civilians who choose to place themselves on, in, or near
a military objective in the hope that an attack will be deterred. The latter are coerced or forced to serve as shields; they make no voluntary choice.
Israel is of the view that involuntary human shields retain their status as
protected civilians. They may not be directly attacked and are factored into
proportionality and precautions-in-attack analyses. Since it is often difficult or
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impossible to know whether a human shield is there by choice or has been compelled to be present (or prevented from fleeing), Israel presumes a human shield
to be involuntary until it has evidence to the contrary. This is an uncontroversial
and mainstream position.
When it comes to voluntary human shields, by contrast, there is broad disagreement. The ICRC view is that civilians only lose their protection when they
are voluntarily physically shielding or blocking a specific military objective, as in
obstructing passage over a bridge.41 Israel takes a different view, one shared by
the United States.42 It asserts that voluntary human shields are direct participants
and in consequence need not be factored into a proportionality or precautionsin-attack assessment as collateral damage, even when shielding against air or
artillery attacks. This is vitally important to the conduct of warfare in an urban
environment against a foe employing asymmetrical tactics. Otherwise, the adversary could prevent attacks by simply stationing enough voluntary human shields
throughout the battlefield near military forces and objectives to render them
disproportionate or require, as a matter of law, the adoption of tactics or weapons
that will avoid harming them. Of course, policy and operational concerns may
drive a decision to take a more restrictive approach.
Placement of Fighters near Civilian Objects
A closely related matter is the more general use of the entirety of the civilian
population and infrastructure to shield military operations. Israel confronts this
in every battle in Gaza, a densely populated urban environment.43 When Hamas
uses civilian objects such as homes or schools as locations from which to launch
military operations, they undoubtedly become military objectives through their
use. They may be attacked, and no damage to the former civilian object counts
as collateral damage.
However, Hamas often makes this more complicated for Israel by converting only a part of a structure to military use; the classic example is a multistory
apartment building in which Hamas fighters use only certain floors. Is the entire
building thereby transformed into a military objective? Or must damage to areas
other than those used for military ends be calculated as collateral damage? If the
IDF possesses a precise weapon capable of striking only a part of the structure,
must it be used?
The IDF takes the position that, as a matter of law, the building is a single
military objective, and therefore damage to other parts of the building need not
be considered as collateral damage; the weapons choice issue only comes into
play if adjacent buildings will be damaged or when civilians will be harmed in
the attack. It must be noted in this regard that as a matter of policy, rather than
law, the IDF insists it seeks to limit damage to parts of a structure not being used
for military purposes.
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This is a defensible view, but one with which one of the authors disagrees. He
suggests that if it is feasible to strike only the relevant part of the structure, then
damage to the other parts must be considered collateral damage and the proportionality and precautions-in-attack rules apply. Application of this approach
hinges on what is feasible, an important term in the LOAC. Article 57(2)(a)(ii)
of AP I requires attackers to “take all feasible precautions in the choice of means
and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event minimizing [collateral damage].” “Feasible” has been held by many states to mean “practicable or
practically possible, including both military and humanitarian considerations.”44
Of course, in many cases, Hamas does not convert nearby structures to
military objectives. Rather, it positions its military assets—rocket launchers, for
example—in close proximity to civilians and civilian objects such as schools and
mosques. These retain their protection from attack and their civilian status, and
Israel correctly considers damage to them in the proportionality analysis.
Uncertainty
When trying to distinguish between military objectives and protected civilians
and civilian objects, the attacker is often left with some uncertainty over status.
AP I, article 50(1), states, “In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that
person shall be considered to be a civilian.” As to objects, a similar presumption
applies in article 52(3), although it is limited to those objects “normally dedicated
to civilian purposes.” Israel accepts both presumptions as reflecting customary
international law, as does the United States.
This raises the question of how much doubt is required to trigger these presumptions. Although Israel often enjoys highly refined intelligence about targets
in Gaza, absolute certainty is rarely present in war, no matter how solid the attacker’s intelligence. But what amount of uncertainty may exist and still make a
targeting decision lawful?
It is sometimes asserted that any doubt, even slight doubt, triggers a presumption of civilian status.45 This is an unrealistic standard and most states that
regularly engage in combat reject it. For instance, the United Kingdom applies
the presumption only when “substantial doubt” still remains after consideration
of all available intelligence.46 The authors take the view that levels of certainty
or doubt cannot be realistically quantified in any meaningful way; the targeting
decision should rather be considered for its qualities—in particular, the quality
of reasonableness.47 The IDF concurs, as does the United States.48 So too have tribunals agreed when considering whether errant strikes constituted war crimes.49
Reasonableness is an admittedly vague standard; what is reasonable to one
observer may seem unreasonable to another. The IDF asserts that reasonableness
depends on context. The value of the target, whether it is fleeting or persistently
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vulnerable, the feasibility of refining the intelligence, and the effect on the wider
military situation of delaying a strike to resolve doubt are, among other things,
factors in determining reasonableness. While this introduces a degree of discretion into the LOAC, in the authors’ view it is unavoidable and, in the final analysis,
sensible. Military commanders must exercise judgment and make tough decisions
in battle, and they must do so knowing that their decisions will stand up to scrutiny later. Only a reasonableness standard can viably account for these realities.
Proportionality
The rule of proportionality has been discussed above several times in different
contexts. Israel accepts the AP I articulation of the rule as customary international law—that is, one may not launch an attack if the expected collateral
damage would be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage.50
Albeit simple and elegant, the rule frequently presents difficulties in application, because it requires a comparison between dissimilar values—avoidance of
civilian harm on the one hand and military advantage on the other. Compliance
requires military commanders to make value judgments, judgments that cannot
be formulated mathematically.
In the conduct of its operations against Hamas, Israel takes as much criticism
on proportionality as on any other point of law. During OPE, which lasted fifty
days, the IDF reportedly struck over five thousand targets in Gaza, resulting in,
as noted, over two thousand Palestinian deaths.51 While many of these were undoubtedly fighters who would not be factored into a proportionality analysis, the
raw numbers still strike many observers as extremely high.
The resulting criticism gains added weight when one considers the fact that
the primary threat posed to Israel was rocket attacks, and the IDF employs the
Iron Dome antirocket system, which may be the most effective defensive system
of its kind in the world. By the conclusion of the war, only a handful of Israeli
civilians had been killed by Hamas rockets. Thus, the legal question is whether
the very effectiveness of the Iron Dome system should require the IDF to accept
less collateral damage from its own attacks. In other words, should Iron Dome’s
success alter the calculation of the “military advantage” of destroying Hamas
rocket launchers and weapons caches?
Every Israeli interlocutor with whom the authors engaged during the project
rejected this approach. They make a four-pronged argument that is compelling
but potentially controversial. First, they point to the inherent military value of destroying the enemy’s primary weapons system. Rockets are deadly and have their
own value that remains extant even in the face of a capable defensive system. Second, they argue that it is illogical and unfair to suggest that a state’s effectiveness
at defending its population from unlawful attacks should be allowed to impair its
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ability to take offensive action. By such an approach, if a state determines that the
optimal way to eliminate a threat is to go on the offensive, it would have to knowingly subject its population to increased risk by refraining from fielding effective
defensive systems. Third, they argue that the rocket threat has a psychological
component that is every bit as potent as its physical one; the fact that Iron Dome
intercepts 95 percent of incoming rockets does not mean the Israeli population is
95 percent less terrorized by the attacks. Finally, those interviewed insisted that
the IDF attacks on rocket launchers were precise; they were unaware of any cases
of civilians being killed by IDF attacks on rocket launchers.
The authors have no way of confirming or denying the final argument and
will not address it. With respect to the other prongs of the argument, they find
them compelling. After all, Sun Tzu exhorts the strategist to “attack the enemy’s
strategy” above all.52 Hamas
has selected indiscriminate
Operation PROTECTIVE EDGE invites an examination of . . . the law of armed conflict and rocket attacks to terrorize
a particular subset thereof known colloquially the Israeli population as its
strategy; a competent Israeli
as “targeting law.”
commander is entitled to defeat this strategy. Moreover, while Iron Dome is good, it is not perfect—some
rockets get through. Nonetheless, it remains the view of the authors that the effectiveness of Iron Dome must have some limited bearing on the proportionality
calculation. It does not render rocket launchers without military value, but it does
decrease the value of attacking them—and if that is the case, then the acceptable
collateral damage during an attack on them must correspondingly decrease to
an extent. This reduction may be minor or even de minimis, but it should be a
consideration.
Proportionality valuations come into play in another respect worth noting.
The IDF places an extremely high value on preventing the capture of its soldiers,
and Hamas endeavors to exploit this using its attack tunnels. In response to frequent abductions over many decades, the IDF reportedly issued what is known as
the Hannibal Directive, which allows specific actions in response to the capture
of a soldier. Although much of the directive is technical and related to command
and control, an important provision apparently authorizes robust measures, including operations that pose a significant risk to the captured soldier himself.53 In
other words, the IDF may chance the death of the captive soldier to prevent the
abductors from escaping the area and being able to exert strategic leverage over
Israel by using the prisoner.
The fact that the IDF is willing to risk the death of its soldiers to prevent capture demonstrates the high degree of military advantage it attributes to denying
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the enemy the benefits of capture. This advantage must be considered when determining the value during proportionality calculations that should be assigned
to targets such as tunnel entrances, cement plants, and other infrastructure that
supports Hamas kidnap operations. As that value rises, the IDF may countenance
a degree of collateral damage during strikes on these targets that could seem excessive to an outside observer who has not considered the strategic implications
of an IDF soldier falling into Hamas hands.
Warnings
Article 57(2)(c) of AP I, which Israel accepts as reflecting customary law, requires
an attacker to provide “effective advance warning” of attacks that may harm civilians, “unless circumstances do not permit.” The latter clause recognizes that
in many cases the element of surprise is essential to the success of an attack,
and thus the warning requirement is by no means absolute. But the IDF goes to
extraordinary lengths to provide warnings to civilians whenever it is feasible to
do so. The manner in which this is done has, curiously, been a major point of
contention.
Israel takes the position that an effective warning is one that is communicated
to civilians who may be affected in a manner that permits them to take protective
measures, including evacuation when possible. The “effectiveness” of warnings
should not be measured by how many civilians actually take advantage of them
but rather by whether they received the warnings and had the opportunity to
heed them. This is especially important because Israel alleges that Hamas repeatedly instructs civilians to ignore the warnings and often actively prevents them
from evacuating a target area.
This practice often places the IDF on the horns of a dilemma. If it warns well
in advance of a strike, the warning may actually hamper the ability of civilians to
comply because Hamas can mobilize efforts to prevent compliance. Conversely,
if the IDF allows only a short time between the warning and the strike, it will be
accused of failure to provide an effective warning.
The methods by which some warnings are delivered have also proved controversial. This is particularly so with the knock-on-the-roof technique.54 The
technique involves striking a target with a small submunition that detonates a
minute or more before the actual destructive attack. The noise and concussion
from the submunition are intended to frighten civilians into leaving the target,
which is then clear to be attacked by a regular bomb or missile. In many cases, the
IDF places an unmanned aerial vehicle over the target and physically counts the
civilians leaving the target area before launching the destructive strike. Human
rights groups are outraged by this technique, insisting that the risk to civilians is
increased and that they are unlawfully terrorized.
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The authors’ view is that the IDF’s measures to warn civilians are incredibly
robust and represent a laudable effort to save lives. As the previous discussion
of the law makes clear, warnings are only required when circumstances permit.
Many military commanders would find it easy to decide that warnings are counterproductive, because, of course, Hamas fighters can also elude attack. While the
knock on the roof may be a frightening way to deliver a warning, it is a creative,
effective, and lawful means of limiting harm to civilians.
Israel’s positions on targeting law are consistent with mainstream contemporary
state practice. While some of them may be controversial, they are generally reasonable and in great part closely aligned with those of the United States. In the
few cases where Israeli practice or positions diverge from those of the United
States (or the authors), they nonetheless remain within the bounds of the broader
contours of the LOAC. Differences can usually be attributed to the unique operational and strategic context in which Israel finds itself. Of particular note in
this regard are the perception that the Israeli population is constantly at risk of
attack and the understanding that IDF soldiers represent irresistible targets for
abduction by its adversaries.
Like the United States, or any other country for that matter, Israel cannot
make legal judgments in a vacuum. Rather, it must apply the law to the conflict in
which it finds itself. The nature of that conflict affects the value judgments military commanders make, as well as the manner in which a state interprets its legal
obligations. War and the law governing it are contextual. The Israeli case provides
further evidence to support this seemingly self-evident proposition.
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THE NEW U.S. MARITIME STR ATEGY
Another View from Outside
Geoffrey Till

A

Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready”
(CS21R) appeared in March 2015.1 It aims to “refresh” the strategy with the
same primary title that first appeared back in 2007 and that has to a significant
extent guided U.S. maritime policy over the past eight years.2 Navies both reflect
and help shape the international context. They matter. So, when the world’s most
powerful navy looks at its strategy and decides on a change, the rest of the world
should pay attention, since the change will reveal at least some of America’s strategic preoccupations and help set the agenda, for a few years at least, for diplomats and other navies around the world. Most especially this will of course apply
in regions as maritime as the Asia-Pacific. How
navies or nations react will depend first on what
Geoffrey Till is emeritus professor of maritime studies at King’s College London and chairman of the
they think has changed and why, and, second, on
Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies. Since
who and where they are.
2009 he has also been a visiting professor at the
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, SinA number of questions immediately arise: What
gapore. He is also adjunct research professor at the
is this new “strategy,” whom is it for, and what’s
National Institute for the Study of the South China
changed? The first of these is relatively simple to
Sea, Haikou, Hainan, China. His most recent books
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circumstances. CS21R identifies some of these changes (such as fiscal constraint
and the rise of China) and, rightly, the need for a “refresh”; these things indeed
need thinking about.
The second question—Whom is it for?—is more complicated. The fact that
CS21R has been issued as a public document shows that it is not just an exercise
in raising the level of strategic thought within the Navy, entirely laudable though
that aspiration would be.3 The drafters of CS21R may have wished to target the
audience in their three maritime services, but they knew there were other very
important domestic audiences too—the rest of the Department of Defense, the
administration, Congress, defense literati, the public, to name just a few. Translating CS21R into several languages reflected assumptions that it would also be
widely read around the world. All these different audiences, with their diverse
interests (and their likely tendency to fasten on those parts of the document that
support conclusions they already have!), had to be catered for to some extent.
The difficulty is that what is said to appeal to one audience will worry another.
Accordingly, balances had to be struck, words chosen with care. That’s because,
in essence, CS21R is for nearly everyone, whatever its drafters may have intended.
But one thing that all these diverse audiences have in common is wanting to
know the answer to the final question—What’s changed? How different is the
“refreshed” version from the original? The answer most of them will come to is
“quite a lot.” For a start, it’s much longer, it looks different, and so far, the video
isn’t as good. CS21R comprises two opening review sections—of the world and of
what the U.S. maritime services need to do. This merges into a complex discussion of their seven missions and five functions (see the figure).
The main focus for discussion in this strategy is the functions rather than
the missions. The missions presumably are thought to flow naturally out of the
review, conducted in Sections I and II, of the international context and how,
broadly, the United States feels it needs to respond. There’s plenty of evidence
to be found in those sections for all of these missions, but they’re not much specifically discussed, and neither,
Seven missions
. . . and five functions
really, is how the functions
will support them. 4 Instead,
• Defend the homeland	  * All-domain access
the emphasis is on the five
• Deter conflict	  * Deterrence
functions themselves. It’s these
• Respond to crises	  * Sea control
that will therefore command
• Defeat aggression	  * Power projection
attention. The final section of
• Protect the maritime commons	  * Maritime security
CS21R shows how the necessary capabilities will be grown.
• Strengthen partnerships
There is now much less di• Provide humanitarian assistance
rect emphasis than there was
and disaster response
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in 2007 on the role of the U.S. maritime forces in contributing to the defense of
the global sea-based trading system. That aspiration is still there of course, being
implicit in the continuing accents on working with allies and partners in a “global
network of navies” to secure international stability and maritime security and on
the continued American determination to safeguard the freedom of navigation
on which Washington thinks the system depends. This reduced emphasis on the
systemic justification for U.S. seapower doubtless reflects the fact that in the 2007
version of the strategy, it did not go down well in Congress—which ultimately
pays the Navy’s bills. There are already signs that CS21R will do better in this
respect.5
Instead, readers will find and many will welcome a more muscular emphasis
on the defense of U.S. national interests at sea.6 “Defending our Nation,” said the
first iteration of the fact sheet that accompanied the strategy, “and winning its
wars is the core task of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps.”7 On the face of it,
there is nothing very remarkable in this. Most of the world’s navies, when push
comes to shove, would say the same thing, but many of them would adulterate the
message a little by giving greater prominence to the task of preventing wars rather
than just winning them. Of course, the strategy’s writers will argue that preventing wars is implicit in the notion of defending national interests and ensuring
stability; also conventional “deterrence” is specifically identified, as the second
of both the seven missions of the sea services and their five essential supporting
functions.
The notion that ensuring stability prevents wars runs like a leitmotiv throughout the glittering but intricate missions/functions structure of CS21R’s Section
III but is not specifically articulated and could, given the limited coverage of the
nature of the missions, easily be missed by foreign observers less well attuned
to American ways of thinking about maritime strategy. There is moreover just
one paragraph on conventional deterrence in a section that has twenty-six others. Each function is justified by being shown to support several of the missions
identified earlier of the U.S. Navy; in every case “defending the homeland” comes
first. This is clearly nation-centric rather than system-centric.
Several additional aspects of the refreshed strategy seem at first glance to point
in the same more muscular direction. First “humanitarian assistance and disaster
response” (HADR) is now relegated from being one of the six main functions of
the U.S. Navy to being a subset of the capacity to project power ashore. This task
had been given a new and special prominence in the original 2007 version of the
strategy and of course has been practiced extensively over the past eight years,
most recently in dealing with Typhoon Haiyun in the Philippines. No doubt the
Navy will continue to perform this function as it always has, but HADR’s conceptual downgrading will nonetheless seem significant to outsiders. This may
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particularly apply in the Asia-Pacific, where many of these disasters take place
and where the HADR task is now given much conceptual prominence.8
The increased muscularity of the new version of the strategy comes out in
other ways too. Oddly, there seems to be less opportunity to talk of the soft-power
advantages of naval diplomacy, an infinitely flexible means of winning friends
and influencing people. Again, in some quarters, the first version of the strategy
was criticized for not being a “strategy” in the sense that it neither delved into
“ends, ways, and means” nor offered much in the way of specific guidance to force
planners on future acquisitions.9 It simply identified the “ends.” If this criticism
was just (and by no means had everyone thought it was), then the deficiency has
been corrected this time.10 The concluding Section IV is all about force design
and building the future force, with explicit targets for the future fleet (Coast
Guard, Navy, and amphibious) clearly identified. It shows how the necessary
technological capacities and human skills have to be grown and developed to
deliver the capabilities needed for the five functions listed earlier.11 It’s all very
logical, businesslike, and “back to basics.” It identifies what it thinks is necessary.
The implication is clear—so now give us the resources!12
The same sense of a shift toward war-fighting and hard-power thinking
emerges in the appearance of a new major function of maritime power, that of
assuring “all domain access,” which now comes first in the list of the U.S. Navy’s
maritime functions and therefore inevitably looks as though it is the most important. In the consultation exercise that accompanied the “refresh” process, many
objected to the focus on this as the primary (or at least first-mentioned) function
of the Navy on the basis that this was not a function but more a precondition for
both sea control and maritime power projection ashore. Perhaps the desire to
focus on the potentially transformational impact of challenges in the domains of
cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum meant that assuring access needed
to be treated as a function on its own rather than subsumed, with much less fanfare, within those two historic functions of seapower.
Of course, this emphasis on all-domain access makes perfect sense within the
Beltway. It has the advantage that by referring to the undoubted, and potentially
critical, rise of sea-denial capabilities around the world, it reinforces the importance and the urgency of supporting the Navy’s budget and plans for future
acquisitions. This is particularly important for the defense of the research and
development budget, given its importance in delivering the kind of capabilities
needed to offset the very possibly very grave consequences of significantly greater
challenges to assured access in the future. Moreover, it links up nicely with the
Joint Operational Access Concept released by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2013
and the recasting of the Air-Sea Battle into the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons. Elevating all-domain access therefore ticks all
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the right Washington boxes, not least that of “jointery” (what Americans might
call “jointness”) in general and of bringing the Army on board in particular. It
also efficiently deals with the complaints sometimes made of the 2007 version
of the Cooperative Strategy—that it didn’t seem quite to fit in with other official
formulations of U.S. strategy of the time. Now it clearly does.
If the budget, joint concepts, and mismatched statements were indeed amid
the reasons why all-domain access was given such preeminence, then it takes us
back to the special and probably unavoidable problem that American strategy
makers have—namely, identifying their critical target audience. When it comes
to strategy making, Washington, with its plethora of government institutions
and thrusting think tanks, still has the aura of imperial Rome. Defense literati
within the capital talk to each other, but the rest of the world listens in, or tries
to. Two thousand years ago, the barbarians of the outer world could only marvel
at the exciting and fast-moving intricacies of imperial policy making while barely
comprehending its nuances. The barbarians could easily oversimplify and misunderstand what was really going on. The same applies now. The prospect and the
dangers of this will need careful handling.
For this reason, all-domain access could all too easily be seen as a response to
the purported antiaccess/area-denial concepts of the Chinese. This would worry,
for example, many (but admittedly not all) of America’s allies and partners in
the Asia-Pacific region. Here, as remarked earlier, much depends on who they
are and where they are. Take, for instance, the Chinese themselves. Their naval
expansion, the new strategy pointedly says, “presents both opportunities and
challenges.” What will they make of the new strategy now for the first time made
officially available to them in Mandarin? Will they see it as a challenge or an
invitation to cooperate in defense of a rules-based order? Most likely, they will
turn the issue around, seeing this new doctrine as presenting them with both “opportunities” and “challenges.” Soft-liners will go for the opportunities, looking for
invitations to cooperate equitably in defense of an acceptable rules-based order;
hard-liners will see it as a straight conceptual challenge and a warning.
To an increasing extent, of course, the Chinese have a developing problem
with the rise in the hitherto modest sea-denial capabilities of their immediate
neighbors and so a professional interest in “all-domain access with Chinese
characteristics,” but for the moment their preoccupation is still largely with the
security of their near seas. Most of the People’s Liberation Army Navy seems
much more likely to see this new stress as something to be circumvented. It, and
some local bystanders too, will interpret the emphasis on all-domain access as
contributing to a slow, dangerous, and unnecessary American drift into a more
adversarial relationship with China and maybe respond accordingly.
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How navies react to the stress on all-domain access depends, as has been said
earlier, on where and who they are and on their immediate strategic preoccupations. Many of them will modestly stand back from it, focusing instead on the
less technologically demanding task of defending their own waters. They will
follow the examples of Japan, Vietnam, and other countries in Southeast Asia
concentrating on building up their own sea-denial capabilities. If so, the kind
of all-domain-access capabilities aspired to in CS21R will tend to be regarded
more as ones to be outflanked and offset rather than ones to be contributed to,
even if the putative adversary is not in many cases the United States. A few morecapable navies, however, are also interested in developing the capabilities for
all-domain access if of a more modest sort. This would mean taking all-domain
access as something of an agenda. Most navies will want to do both, as far as
their resources allow—securing sufficient access for themselves and denying it to
others—just as they always have. Where they wish to strike the balance between
these two and their general attitude to this part of CS21R will reflect their unique
circumstances.
Such diversity of international reaction reminds us that the effect of strategy
lies very much in the eye of the beholder. How effective a strategy is at securing
the ends its framers have in mind depends very much on how people perceive and
react to it. The stress on all-domain access is a clear risk from this point of view.
A bad Chinese reaction to the new strategy could well increase the hesitations in
other regional countries about cooperating with the United States, especially if
they already have doubts of their own about U.S. intentions or reliability. In this
all-too-likely scenario, the stress on all-domain access cuts right across CS21R’s
“foundational principle” about the need to cooperate with navies. To avert this, a
careful and sensitive international strategic communications campaign will need
to follow the appearance of the refreshed strategy.
This brings us to the third but probably most important concern about the creation of all-domain access as what at least looks like the primary function of the
U.S. Navy. It seems to have pushed out the opportunity evident in earlier drafts
of the refreshed strategy to redefine and reemphasize “forward naval presence” as
a means of shaping the strategic environment, winning friends, and influencing
people. Of course, this criticism—if that is what it is—is not completely fair since
the importance of U.S. forward naval presence is identified as one of two foundational principles in CS21R .13 Section II is in fact entitled “Forward Presence and
Partnership” and sits, just as it should in the strategy, after a review of the international context and before addressing the missions and functions of the U.S. Navy
that flow from it. Despite this, the forward-presence box has not been fully ticked,
because apart from the comparatively short introductory paragraph of Section II,
there is no sustained discussion of the advantages of forward naval presence and
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absolutely no attempt to identify it as a good thing, not just for the United States,
but for the world community generally. Instead, we read a series of regional reviews, starting with the Indo-Asia-Pacific, which identify the proposed force levels needed to deliver the required forward presence region by region, ending up
with the Arctic and Antarctic.14 Several of these regional reviews conclude with a
brief paragraph outlining what that resultant forward naval presence is supposed
to deliver, but these ideas are nowhere woven together into a kind of sustained
defense of the aspiration for a forward naval presence as a whole.
At a time of fiscal constraint when it is becoming harder to balance resources
against commitments and when the military-technical, political, and legal challenges to a forward naval presence are clearly growing, this failure to take the
bull by the horns and address the issue directly will strike many as unfortunate. It
could play into the hands of domestic skeptics inclined to doubt the importance
of forward presence, especially if the attempted defense of the capability seems
likely to be expensive, fiscally and programmatically. At the same time, the absence of a justification for forward presence runs the risk of further antagonizing
neutral or suspicious international opinion apt to think the worst of American
intentions, since the determination to maintain a forward naval presence could
simply be interpreted as illustrative of aggressive intent.
A few years ago, for instance, Major General Luo Yuan spoke for more than
just PLA hard-liners when he said that “the so-called forward presence means
that the United States can send its gunboats to every corner of the world. . . . This
way, the United States can even claim the Yellow Sea and the South China Sea
is covered within its security boundary.”15 He and others pointed out that in the
aftermath of the sinking of ROKS Cheonan, were USS George Washington to have
sailed into the Yellow Sea, its aircraft would have been capable of reaching Beijing.
If to this particular concern is added a general strategic culture deeply affected
by the country’s historical exposure to threats from the sea and by the disastrous
consequences for China of a failure to deter naval activities of this sort, Chinese
sensitivity to the unauthorized presence and activity of foreign navies in “Chinese
waters” is understandable. The point is that other countries, not the least India,
Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, share to some extent such hesitations about
the unauthorized forward presence of (other) great-power naval forces.16
Since a forward U.S. naval presence is not in fact regarded by a sizable chunk
of international opinion as a universal good to be welcomed, the failure to discuss and justify it in a doctrinal statement that will be avidly studied around the
world seems a lost opportunity. Hitherto, the principle has largely been defended
negatively by freedom-of-navigation exercises and repeated recourse to Western interpretations of the law of the sea. To win support, it is not enough to say
merely that something is legal; it needs also to be shown to be “right.” The case
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for forward presence needs to be made positively. Sadly, the new strategy does not
explicitly do that. This failure, together with the emphasis on the function of alldomain access, will reinforce the perception, and not just among the paranoid,
that the U.S. Navy is only interested in maintaining a forward naval presence as
a precondition for its capacity to threaten countries. This is, of course, part of it,
but there is so much more to tell.
Paradoxically the case would be relatively easy to make. Much of the illustrative material used to explain the ideas in CS21R indeed could be rebrigaded into
a justification for forward presence. For instance, a forward naval presence, even
off unwelcoming shores, provides 24/7 general assurance for all legitimate sea
users. It facilitates maritime domain awareness, which is a universal good in that
it increases the effectiveness of the international response to all forms of criminal
activity at sea that threaten everybody, directly or indirectly. Forward presence
also supports rapid and effective responses to natural disasters. In contested areas
a forward naval presence can serve as a calming mechanism. More generally, a
forward naval presence is part and parcel of naval diplomacy, allowing events
to be monitored, relationships developed over time, and stability defended. The
bones of a persuasive argument are easily discernible.
At the moment, most countries accept, albeit with a shade of reluctance in
some quarters, that, in Kishore Mahbubani’s words,
the real reason why most international waterways remain safe and open—and
thereby facilitate the huge explosion of global trade we have seen—is that the American Navy acts as the guarantor of last resort to keep them open. Without the global
17
presence of the US Navy, our world order would be less orderly.

For this reason too, the notion of a global maritime partnership, outlined in the
first version of the strategy, positively extended the concept to the world’s other
navies by providing an opportunity for them to join the U.S. Navy “on the beat”;
the idea was generally welcomed around the world, since it addressed problems
held in common, such as the threat of piracy, drug smuggling, international terrorism, human trafficking, and catastrophic natural disasters. Any of these could
directly threaten sea-based trade and other legitimate forms of sea use and indirectly jeopardize the local stability afloat and ashore on which that trade depends.
Hence nations participated in a multitude of cooperative multinational naval
activities designed to curb these shared problems, to build up local capacities
to handle them in the future, and where necessary to engage in security-sector
reform. More discussion of this would have helped sustain the general argument
for a forward presence and so added to the international appeal of CS21R.
The fact that the strategy has been issued in a number of different languages,
including Mandarin, shows that its authors are well aware of the importance of
its international appeal, not least because of the expanding need for the Navy
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to operate alongside those of its allies and partners. Because so much emphasis
remains in the document on the essential role of America’s allies and partners as
a means of narrowing the gap between what must be done by the United States
alone and what can be, the response of regional countries to this new strategy will
be key to its success over the next decade. It is worth repeating the point that the
relative absence of discussion on the advantages of naval diplomacy in winning
friends and influencing people seems a pity.
The reactions of those different navies and the countries and regions they defend will of course vary, in accordance with their strategic situations. Countries
like Japan and the Philippines, wary of China’s rising power, will probably broadly
welcome the new emphasis on the all-domain-access function and the apparent
reinforcement of the “rebalance” suggested by the special prominence given to
the “Indo-Asia-Pacific” region. Both of these indicate the U.S. determination to
stay in the western Pacific despite China’s “counter-interventionary” strategies,
and that resolve would seem to underline for Japan and the Philippines the U.S.
security guarantee.
But even in those two countries there will probably be a small constituency
of opinion that will worry that the new muscularity of CS21R will be found provocative in Beijing and so will worsen the atmosphere. It would be surprising if
Beijing in general and the People’s Liberation Army Navy in particular did not
find aspects of the new strategy provocative, at least in public. China has after
all for the first time been identified as a security concern, and all-domain access
certainly looks like a response to the antiaccess/area-denial strategies with which
the Chinese have been associated.
Countries with currently better relations with China, such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, may share these concerns about what some critics will
undoubtedly consider the offensive tone of the new strategy; they may also be
encouraged in this response by the reduced emphasis apparently given to the
general maritime security concerns that tend to be higher in their national defense priorities. Illegal fishing, human and drug trafficking, and other forms of
criminal activity at sea are actually their most immediate concerns. U.S. support
of efforts against crime (especially in the shape of U.S. Coast Guard activity) is of
course frequently referenced in the early part of the strategy, but explicit coverage of the role is less than it was in the 2007 strategy, because Section III is about
national security rather than the American contribution to the defense of the
system. Maritime security is indeed “a promising area for expanded cooperation
with our allies and partners,” and so the less-explicit emphasis on it given in the
new version of the strategy means there is less to offset its putative muscularity.18
How other navies respond to the whole package will doubtless reflect how they
perceive this shift in its balance.
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The same pattern of response will probably be replicated in other parts of
the world too. Countries with concerns about an overmighty neighbor, such as
Iran or a newly truculent Russia, and in need of reassurance will welcome the
American emphasis on maintaining a forward presence for the same reasons
as Japan and the Philippines, moderated only by concerns about the relative
priority apparently accorded their respective regions when compared with the
Indo-Asia-Pacific. Whether it is intended or not, describing American interests
in geographic regions sequentially looks like a priority list, and Europeans will
note without surprise that they have slipped to position three behind Asia and
the Middle East. Africans come next, then neighbors of the United States in the
Western Hemisphere. That the region closest to the United States and central to
its homeland security comes just fifth in the list suggests that it is not in fact a
priority list; nonetheless, that is how it will be seen.
Finally, reactions to the new strategy will also reflect different constituencies
within countries as well as their positions in various geographic regions. Professional opinion in the world’s other navies will probably neither be surprised nor
in many cases much dismayed at much in this strategy. A great deal of academic
and professional attention has been paid to the rise around the world of militarytechnical constraints on naval maneuver near to land and its portentous implications for the future utility of naval power;19 there has been a natural and parallel
rise in blue-water aspirations and capabilities, not least in the Asia-Pacific.20
Navies with such aspirations (or that privately assume they might have such aspirations one day) will want to maintain access too. Accordingly, the U.S. Navy’s
explicit determination to maintain access and forward presence, and through this
the whole gamut of the traditional naval capabilities that flow from sea control,
will seem to other navies both natural and right—although in some cases, their
professional sympathy for the Navy’s determination to maintain the strategic
value of seapower in general may be kept decently private, if only because of the
concerns of their political masters. Navies that know they will always be limited
in their aspirations to negative sea-denial strategies, in contrast, will naturally be
much less sympathetic professionally to the main thrust of the strategy.
The variation and complexity of the international response to CS21R and its
importance as a means of winning friends and influencing people suggest that
the U.S. maritime services will need to devote significant effort to their strategic
communications plan. The problem is that the necessary audiences are varied,
and to allay their different and often competing concerns and to build up the
required support, the messaging will need to be tailored to particular audiences.
This will require considerable skill and effort.
How the U.S. sea services communicate CS21R may generate the same difficulties the Obama administration faced when launching its pivot/rebalance
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toward Asia. This occasioned huge, almost unending, debate about what it all
meant, with different countries wanting to hear different things and major definitional problems for the administration. While no one would argue against serious
reflection on strategic matters as a means of enhancing the quality of thought,
there is a pragmatic argument against making its conclusions too public, especially when addressed to multiple audiences. Rather than announce with fanfare
such statements of general policy purposes, perhaps one should just get on and
do them! After all, what a policy means is usually best clarified by what the policy
maker does. But this, in the immediate aftermath of the delivery of one of the
world’s most interesting doctrinal statements on twenty-first-century seapower
for years, is probably best left to another article and another time.
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CONNEC TING THE DOTS
Capital Ships, the Littoral, Command of the Sea, and the
World Order
Robert C. Rubel

A

n announcement in 2013 by then–Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel that the
Navy might reduce its aircraft carrier fleet from eleven to eight was an indication not only of harsh budget realities but also of changed operational circumstances at sea.1 In World War II, the aircraft carrier displaced the big-gun battleship as the capital ship. The United States subsequently used its fleet of aircraft
carriers to exercise the command of the sea that it had won in the war to secure
the peace. It stationed them around the periphery of Eurasia, initially to support a
grand strategy of containing the Soviet Union and then, after the Soviet collapse,
to maintain general strategic stability. This use of
aircraft carriers has lasted almost seventy years, a
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will have ripple effects in that ecology. In this article we will explore that ecology
and speculate on how it might change if the capital ship, as a key naval function,
capability, and concept, passes from the scene.
When the aircraft carrier displaced the battleship as the key type of capital
ship, the transition, for all its tactical and operational impact, did not alter the
fundamental character of naval warfare. Decisive offensive power remained
concentrated in a relatively small number of large, expensive combatants. It is
not clear that a large warship of new design is waiting in the wings to replace
the aircraft carrier if indeed it becomes obsolescent. One possibility is that naval
offensive power will reside in various types of missiles that could be widely distributed among a variety of vessels.2 In fact, this process has been under way for
some time in the form of Tomahawk land-attack missiles loaded on destroyers,
cruisers, and submarines. If “missilization” is carried to its logical conclusion,
displacing the carrier and its air wing as the principal offensive power of the fleet,
the nature of naval warfare could change, and that change could have ripple effects in the global geopolitical ecology, one that has been, to this point, generally
favorable to American interests.
This article will not attempt to pass judgment on whether the aircraft carrier
and its embarked tactical air wing are in fact headed for obsolescence, although
there exists just such a debate in the current literature.3 To be clear, and as will
be discussed later, the U.S. Navy might elect to keep some aircraft carriers in
commission even if only in support roles. Also, care must be taken to distinguish
between the “capital ship” as a particular physical object and “capital ship” as a
warfare function. Later, for illustrative purposes, we will explore a world in which
the capital-ship function has been made obsolete by new kinds of weapons and
sensors, whether or not aircraft carriers remain in the inventory.
COMMAND OF THE SEA AND CAPITAL SHIPS
From the galleasses of the Christian armada that prevailed at Lepanto in 1571
to the Gerald Ford–class CVN of today, there has been an intrinsic relationship
between capital ships and command of the sea. Command of the sea, rightly
understood, is simply the strength relationship between two contending navies.4
The one that is sufficiently stronger than the other enjoys freedom of action,
including the ability to move its nation’s army by sea, disperse to protect its commerce, and come to the aid of allies. Such command was traditionally achieved
by winning a decisive sea battle, and the arbiter of such battles since Lepanto has
generally been the capital ship—the largest and strongest ship type afloat, capable
of defeating lesser types. Since 1945 the United States has, by virtue of its eradication of the Imperial Japanese Navy in World War II and thereafter in the absence
of a serious Soviet challenge, enjoyed virtually uncontested command of the sea.
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The U.S. Navy’s dominance has been so complete that some writers question
whether the concept has relevance anymore.5 However, a pair of analysts who
traced the history of the concept from the late fifteenth century through the late
twentieth argue that a particular dimension of command of the sea is operative
especially in times of dominance—the leading nation’s ability to use command of
the sea to enforce the rules of the international order according to its interests.6
Throughout this period, this dimension included the ability to regulate commerce but also to project power ashore. A dominant capital-ship fleet either dispersed to support such operations or lurked in the background, dissuading by its
existence any potential challenger from even trying to build a competitive fleet.
In the post–World War II era, the U.S. Navy’s fleet of aircraft carriers has been
employed in this way. In roles ranging from stopgap application of airpower
against an invading North Korean army in 1950 through support of special forces
in the opening moves of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in 2001, to most recently air strikes to limit the advance of Islamic State forces, the Navy’s carriers have
been dispersed around the periphery of Eurasia as a ready tool for the president.
In a 1954 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings article, Samuel Huntington summed
up the Navy’s postwar situation: “Its purpose now is not to acquire command
of the sea but rather to utilize its command of the sea to achieve supremacy on
land. More specifically, it is to apply naval power to that decisive strip of littoral
encircling the Eurasian continent.”7 The key to the utility of the aircraft carrier
in these roles has been its ability to project power deep inland, taking up station
wherever the situation demanded. The pattern of aircraft-carrier utilization,
combined with deployments and movements to assure allies or deter potential
aggressors, clearly indicates these ships have been dispersed around the world to
exercise American command of the sea.
ANTI–CAPITAL SHIP TECHNOLOGY
Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, a series of technological developments have challenged the dominance of capital ships. The “automotive” (i.e.,
self-propelled) torpedo, the aircraft, the submarine, and the missile have all
presented potentially disruptive challenges. To date, however, the capital ship in
its various forms has survived and retained its utility for seizing, maintaining,
and exercising command of the sea. In World War II, despite some submarine
successes against them, both Japanese and American capital ships, mainly carriers, used speed, maneuver, and offensive reach to neutralize or at least contain
threats. Beyond those at sea, threats emanating from land have always constituted
a mortal danger to capital ships. Admiral Horatio Nelson is supposed to have said
“a ship’s a fool to fight a fort,” referring to the high volume and accuracy of fire
that can be produced by a fort in comparison with what can be generated by a
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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ship. A number of destroyers, cruisers, and even battleships have suffered damage
in duels with shore batteries. In the Pacific War, American carriers before 1944
were careful to remain out of range of Japanese air bases except for covert dashes
into such zones for hit-and-run raids.
The post–World War II world has seen the development of nuclear submarines, long-range shore-based bombers carrying antiship cruise missiles, and,
most recently, land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles with antiship
seekers.8 Yet in the absence of a shooting war involving these weapons, the aircraft carrier has been able to exercise its command-of-the-sea function virtually
unmolested. A close call occurred in the eastern Mediterranean in 1973 when
U.S. and Soviet fleets intermingled during the Yom Kippur War. The Soviet fleet
was well armed with antiship missiles, and a few nuclear submarines were present.9 The author was a junior attack aviator on board USS Independence (CV 62)
in that crisis and can attest to the precarious situation of the U.S. carriers. While
defensive systems such as Aegis and directed energy have since been developed,
the threats have become more challenging. The danger is that the net outcome of
an offense-versus-defense battle cannot be truly known short of actual fighting.
Thus the ability of aircraft carriers, as capital ships, to carry out the commandof-the-sea mission is increasingly being placed in question.
THE LITTORAL
Many writers and theorists have divided the seas into two parts, the open ocean
and the littoral. Conventional lay wisdom on naval matters links large ships with
the “blue water” of the high seas and smaller craft with the “green water” of the
littoral. In fact, most major naval battles have taken place within the littoral or
at least in the vicinity of land features. Large ships, capital ships not excepted,
are designed to cross oceans and to carry a lot of payload; their purpose is not to
“hang out” in midocean. It is instructive to examine three tacit operational rules
for capital-ship fleets that have remained valid since the seventeenth century:
• Keep the fleet concentrated.
• Do not become decisively engaged with land forces unless decisively superior (a more general rewording of Admiral Nelson’s “A ship’s a fool to fight a
fort”).
• Do not sacrifice the mobility of the fleet by tying it to a geographic feature.10
These rules can be broken if conditions are right, but in the presence of a significant opposing force ignoring them has been a recipe for losing ships. We can
skip over the first rule for the purposes of this article and focus on the second
two. The second rule reflects, as generally noted, the ability of land-based forces
to generate a higher rate of fire—or aircraft sorties—per unit time than can ships;
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a land adversary is also less likely, on a force-wide basis, to suffer disabling damage per hit.
The third rule has to do with detectability. A widely maneuvering fleet is
harder to find and target than one that is forced to remain in the vicinity of an
island or other geographic feature. The distance the littoral effectively extends
seaward can be thought of as the distance out to which these two latter rules
retain their salience. New weapons and new modes of search and surveillance
have extended this effective distance considerably in several regions of the world.
Given the strategic mission of exercising command of the sea through power projection ashore, it really is not useful to talk about U.S. aircraft carrier operations
outside the littoral—anywhere. Where no threats are manifest, carriers disregard
the rules with impunity, operating as airfields at sea.11 Palpable threat levels force
their consideration.
Where the relationship of high sea to the littoral comes into practical effect is
in the design of fleet defensive systems. A carrier strike group (CSG) employs a
layered defense scheme in which fighter aircraft establish an outer ring, reaching
perhaps out to three hundred miles. Inside this fighter-engagement zone, Aegis
destroyers and cruisers employ surface-to-air missiles for area defense. Finally,
the innermost zone consists of various point-defense systems on each ship. This
three-layer scheme is best thought of as a strainer, not a shield. The outer layers
are not likely to destroy all inbound aircraft or missiles in saturation raids. They
are supposed to reduce the number of “leakers” to a number that can be managed
by point-defense systems. To function effectively, the scheme requires distance,
ideally hundreds of miles. A preferred operational case against a land-based
threat would be an “approach battle,” in which the CSG launches long-range air
and missile strikes to disable enemy defenses before they can be brought to bear
effectively on the group. By the time the group enters the littoral, the threat level
would be reduced to the point that the two fleet-employment rules could at least
be bent, if not broken. But political circumstances, such as those encountered in
the eastern Mediterranean in 1973, and long-range shore systems, such as antiship ballistic missiles, not to mention cruise missile–armed submarines, force
the CSG out of its preferred mode and make the consequences of breaking the
rules severe.
The difficult logic of littoral warfare prompted Rear Admiral Yedidia Ya’ari of
the Israel Navy to write twenty years ago, “I argue that when warships designed
for the high seas enter the confined waters of the littoral arena, the fundamental
relationships of maneuverability and firepower are upset,” and “The surface ships
now in commission were designed with the open ocean and distant defensive
perimeters in mind; to keep deploying them to a playing field where, under the
most optimistic assumptions, their survival requires as a normal operating mode
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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the highest level of everything, all the time, is unhealthy and unrealistic in the
long run.”12
The objective here is not to advance an argument against aircraft carriers; it is
to illuminate the relationship among American command of the sea, aircraft carriers as the capital ships that are collectively the instrumentality for its exercise,
a favorable world order based on that command, and the nature of the littoral.
These factors are inextricably intertwined, and changes to one inevitably affect
the others.
CONCENTRATION OF RESOURCES AND RISK
If kinetic threats to the aircraft carrier are latent, the budgetary threat is all too
real. USS Gerald Ford (CVN 78) will cost around thirteen billion dollars. That
figure is for the ship alone; the air wing would add another five to six billion.13
Moreover, the carrier aviation “enterprise” absorbs a significant plurality of U.S.
Navy resources, including personnel and infrastructure. Beyond the absolute
numbers, this investment represents an enormous concentration of assets and
therefore risk. However, it has always been this way with capital ships; they require concentration both in investment and, when there is a contending navy,
in employment. If, through their construction and use, command of the sea is
seized, maintained, and exercised, adequate return on investment is realized.
Assuming that Secretary Hagel was correct and the CVN force will be reduced
below eleven, the Navy faces two strategic problems that involve the connection
between capital ships and command of the sea. The first is one of simple numbers. If the exercise of command is strictly associated with capital ships, what
number of CVNs is the minimum needed? Finding the answer requires assessment of which regions require such exercise and which do not. After the Cold
War, the U.S. Navy all but abandoned carrier deployments from Norway’s North
Cape all the way to the strait of Bab el Mandeb, because there was no further need
for the exercise of command in those waters. As the global system evolves both
politically and economically, the need to exercise command may shrink even
more—or it may expand because of Chinese or Russian adventurism. In the case
of contraction, it may be the case that the CVNs can be retained in home waters,
whereby the justification for investment would decline even further. But even
in the expansion case the ability to increase the number of CVNs may simply
evaporate as their cost escalates and defense budgets contract.14
The other issue is whether the CVN itself is able to continue as a capital ship.
Can it operate at an acceptable degree of risk in waters it needs to enter to carry
out its power-projection function? And indeed, can manned tactical aircraft continue to be viable weapons-delivery vehicles in the face of modern air defenses?
Again, these questions have been addressed elsewhere, and it is not within the
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scope of this article to argue the matter either way. However, we will make the
assumption that sufficient uncertainty exists to warrant thinking about what
American naval posture might be like if the answer, with respect both to carriers
and to their manned aircraft, is judged at some point to be no.
In a more general and abstract sense, there is the question whether concentration in any form is a good idea in an age of cyberspace, ubiquitous sensing,
machine intelligence, precision missiles, and, of course, nuclear weapons. Early
in the nuclear age the Navy developed highly dispersed tactical formations and
spread out its home ports so that one nuclear bomb could not destroy too much.
Over the decades of the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s, U.S. Sixth Fleet conducted a series
of experiments to determine whether dispersed formations, emission control,
and deceptive maneuvers could be effective in protecting the aircraft carrier from
air and submarine attack. Progressive tactical development over this span of time
produced an array of methods and equipment that appeared to be effective, at
least for a given number of hours or days.15 Nevertheless, combat power was still
concentrated in the carrier, and losing the carrier, through equipment failure or
bad luck, put the fleet substantially out of business. Today, arguments for dispersal rotate around the networking capability of forces and the range of weapons.
That is, given a battle-force network and long-range weapons, ships can be physically dispersed but operate as if they were in close formation. However, this disposition does not change the basic fact that most offensive power is concentrated
in the carrier. Investment bankers urge diversified portfolios. Concentration of
combat capability, like concentration of investment, may constitute strategic vulnerability, if, in the naval case, it has not already done so. But concentration does
produce various efficiencies in both investment and the application of force, so
the incentives to concentrate will always be there.
BREAKING THE LINK BETWEEN COMMAND OF THE SEA AND
CAPITAL SHIPS
Command of the sea as an operative basis for naval decision making has been
around, whether the term has been explicitly used or not, since at least the
Peloponnesian War, when the land power Sparta based its strategies on the
presumption of Athenian predominance at sea. It predates the development of
the capital ship, perhaps offering a basis for delinking the two concepts. Could
command be maintained and exercised with a distributed force of smaller ships?
Capital ships arose to meet the needs of gun and, later, aircraft technology, both
of which required progressively larger hulls and physical concentration to be
effective against “symmetric” forces—that is, adversaries armed essentially like
oneself. It is not clear that missile, mine, or other unmanned technologies require
concentration; they may in fact require the opposite—that is, distribution—to be
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effective. As a result, distribution of power brings into question the whole idea of
command of the sea as traditionally conceived.
As long as naval power was defined in terms of fleets of capital ships, admirals
shaped their strategies on the basis of how they viewed their strength relative to
that of their enemies. Weaker navies, feeling they would meet defeat in a pitched
naval battle, tried at times to compensate for their deficiencies in capital ships
through the use of distributed small forces to interdict commerce or achieve
some form or degree of denial using raiders, flotillas of small combatants, or
mines against the stronger navy. However, the stronger force, enjoying command, was at liberty to blockade and to conduct amphibious operations directly
against the flanks of the enemy or somewhere that mattered on the periphery.
Using capital-ship power to provide security for such operations has been normal
practice, because it has been effective.
But in today’s emerging operational environment it is not clear that using
capital ships to cover an amphibious landing would be either tactically effective
or strategically wise. An enemy possessing an array of modern missile, cyber,
and unmanned forces might plausibly achieve disabling hits on several capital
ships. If it did, the task force commander would have a difficult decision between
proceeding with reduced security and abandoning the operation. A real-world
example is the Falklands War of 1982. What if the Argentines had put one of the
British carriers out of action? The British commander later admitted that such a
loss would have caused him to cancel the landing of troops.16
The point is that emerging technology appears to give a decisive edge to the
tactical offense at sea—that is, to reinforce the historically normal state of affairs.17 In the early years of the Pacific War, aircraft carriers took advantage of this
condition by attempting to strike effectively first, the paradigm being the battle
of Midway.18 The logic of striking effectively first extends to projecting power
against the shore. One of the criteria for success in the Sixth Fleet experiments on
deception and dispersal was whether carriers remained untargeted long enough
to get in disabling first strikes against enemy airfields.19 The presumption was
that the resulting impairment of enemy strike operations would be sufficient to
reduce the threat to levels manageable by battle group defenses. If initial strikes
cannot be sufficiently disabling, or if the enemy’s offensive power (missiles, say)
is dispersed and hidden, the logic of striking effectively first evaporates, negating
the true value of a capital ship. The capital-ship group or fleet is thus forced to
break the second fleet-employment rule—“Do not become decisively engaged
with land forces unless decisively superior”—and losses can be expected. The
question then becomes whether the operation is worth the loss of one or more
capital ships. Unless the warfare is nuclear or an existential issue is otherwise at
stake, the trade-off is not likely to be advantageous.20
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Capital ships generally should be hazarded only when the potential strategic
gain—command of the sea, national survival, or some other vital interest worth
such risk—is at stake. That said, the U.S. Navy in 1942 twice risked its few available aircraft carriers in the defense of the beachhead at Guadalcanal, and it suffered losses in the process. However, it did so in the knowledge that within a year
Essex-class carriers would start coming off the shipways in numbers. Moreover,
the U.S. carriers were risked only when Japanese carriers were involved. Would
the carriers have been placed in jeopardy had the Japanese dispatched a large
flotilla of submarines and destroyers? The point is that it may not be worthwhile
to employ capital ships even when command of the sea is at risk, as they could be
lost without prospect of meaningful gain.
On the flip side, could distributed and possibly dispersed missile-centric
forces perform the capital-ship function, at least the traditional one of seizing
command of the sea against a similar force? We will explore this question more
shortly, but it appears that distributed, missile-centric warfare obliges navies, the
stronger as well as the weaker, to act as if they did not have command. Thus it is
hard to see how the concept of command of the sea could be delinked from the
function of the capital ship.
A POST–CAPITAL SHIP WORLD
What might happen in a future operational environment in which the seas, or at
least the significant portions of them, become too dangerous for capital ships?21
To envision such a world, we must understand what strategic functions would be
lost. To do that, in turn, we must first recognize that there has been a shift in the
global geopolitical ecology, a shift that has been generated in part by the displacement of the dreadnought by the aircraft carrier and that, reciprocally, has transformed the function of the capital ship. Prior to 1945, the strategic function of
the capital ship was to seize command of the sea by destroying the opposing fleet.
After 1945, following Samuel Huntington’s logic, the carrier’s strategic function
became projecting power ashore. When Huntington wrote, land-attack cruise
missiles were barely embryonic; carrier-based tactical airpower was the principal
weapon of the U.S. Navy, functioning either independently or in support of Marines or other land forces. The carrier’s ability to take station in the near littoral
(that is, close to shore) and function there as an airfield at sea was its key strategic
capability.22 Over the years, Tomahawk cruise missiles have taken over much of
tactical airpower’s deep interdiction and raiding portfolio, but the airfield-atsea function remains the carrier’s irreplaceable core capability. This capability
has made virtually the whole Eurasian littoral accessible by American power, in
whatever form, hard or soft. Loss of the airfield-at-sea capability removes from
the table certain forms of power projection in certain areas.
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Command of the sea confers on its possessor, specifically the United States,
three key strategic benefits: sanctuary for the nation’s war economy, credible and
useful contact with allies, and strategic options in terms of lines of operation.
In addition to breaking, potentially, the sea links with allies, loss of the modern
capital-ship function would narrow the range of strategic options available to the
United States. This restriction would have implications and effects not just in
war but for the dynamics of peacetime competition. Loss of American ability to
intervene in certain areas in certain ways would provide potentially hostile actors
freedom of action locally or regionally that they do not now enjoy. (What, for
instance, would now be the situation in Iraq if carrier aircraft had not conducted
interdiction strikes against Islamic State forces in 2014–15?) Such freedom of
action would increase the chances that the current world order, turbulent as it
is, would deteriorate even more, trending toward worsened anarchy, the rise of
hostile regional hegemons or trade blocs, or other geopolitical pathologies.
If the disputes spawned or exacerbated by this set of adverse trends were to
erupt into war, especially one with a significant naval component, what would
that war look like? Let us assume that the U.S. Navy, as well as virtually all others, will have recognized the shift in conditions and restructured accordingly,
distributing offensive power among submarines, unmanned systems, and smaller
surface combatants. The advantage would still lie with coastal powers that could
build strong antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) systems, but the U.S. Navy would be
more able and willing, owing to the higher risk tolerance of its new force structure, than it might be now to send forces into contested waters, and some A2/
AD systems, such as the antiship ballistic missile, might become obsolete. While
China, for example, might be more able than today to prevent the insertion and
support of U.S. ground forces in-theater, the United States would be more able to
prevent Chinese deployment of ground forces into Taiwan or elsewhere. The East
Asian littoral could become a kind of naval no-man’s-land, a zone in which only
the most stealthy sea-denial forces would be able to operate. Similar situations
might arise in the Persian Gulf and the eastern Mediterranean.
Would command of the sea have any meaning in those conditions? Certain
traditional elements of command would indeed evaporate in some way. Navies—
such as they would be—would operate dispersed not only tactically but also,
perhaps, at the operational and strategic levels, depending on what an opponent
did. Dispersal to avoid being found is an old tactic, but flotillas of smaller ships
might need to be brought together if the enemy forces concentrated. (The German U-boat wolf-pack tactic was, in this sense, the logical response to Allied
convoys.) But in this potential world, one could never be sure where the enemy
might show up, especially one whose offensive power was contained on board
submarines. Strategic dispersal as a benefit of command of the sea thus becomes
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problematic: How does one know when one has command? More than likely, a
prolonged and dispersed attrition fight would be required, during which the risks
of moving ground forces by sea might be unacceptable. At what point would a
supreme commander feel comfortable in dispatching an invasion force?
One possible tenet of future naval warfare (if it is not already true) would be
that if a vessel or force can be found and identified, it can, and most likely will,
be hit. On this basis the naval war becomes a fight for information superiority. In
the 1942 carrier battles, finding first meant striking first, which tended to put a
quick end to each battle, since offensive power was concentrated in a few carrier
decks. In the future, victories would be tactical and incremental, because offensive power would be distributed and hidden. Information superiority would thus
be episodic and require constant effort, the balance perhaps swinging daily. The
oceans would thus become an arena for one big, long, sea-denial fight.
An aspect of command of the sea that would be problematic on both sides of
the equation would be sea commerce. Whereas German U-boats and American
submarines in World War II could prey on shipping with confidence that hitting
what they were shooting at would hurt the enemy, today no such confidence
is possible, because of the convoluted web of ownership of ships and cargoes.
Moreover, oil changes hands on the spot market while it is at sea on tankers, and
the container shipping system has assumed a hub-and-spoke structure in which
the bulk of containers carry subcomponents for products.23 All this means that in
the current shipping regime seizing or sinking merchant vessels may hurt oneself
and one’s allies as easily as the enemy, regardless of the flag of a ship attacked. In
fact, perhaps the only viable form of physical sea-commerce interdiction would
be a close blockade based on a form of unrestricted submarine warfare or mining. However, whether or not commerce interdiction will be feasible in such a
world, command of the sea would not be an issue either way. The old Mahanian
prescription of driving the enemy’s flag from the sea except as a fugitive appears
to be increasingly irrelevant; ships of all types would either be fugitives or be left
unmolested, whosever “side” they were on. It is possible to envision some kind of
“limited” naval war in which each side hunts the other’s naval units but by tacit
mutual agreement allows commercial traffic to continue.24
At this point it would appear that doing away with the capital ship does not
simply break the link between the two concepts but invalidates the concept of
command of the sea. But to penetrate to the most central issue, does asymmetry
in strength continue to matter? If naval strength is a function of how much you
can build and how well you can use it, logic says that a weaker party would seek
to avoid a pitched fight at sea. Yet the dynamics of naval warfare in a non–capital
ship environment may allow weaker powers to challenge the stronger in ways
not possible when capital ships were dominant. Even in a capital-ship regime,
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there are operational options for a weaker navy, including maintaining a fleet-inbeing, raiding commerce, and mounting local denial and disruption operations.
This last option might be expanded beyond the local context as missile ranges
increase, nuclear submarines proliferate, and missiles, mines, and unmanned
systems begin to be hidden on merchant vessels or sown from submarines or
aircraft. Such a dynamic can really be only about disruption, but that might be
enough—for both the weaker and stronger power. What would be gone is the
freedom of action that command of the sea traditionally provided.
However, a complicating (or perhaps mitigating) factor in this scenario is the
issue of sanctuary. None of the three operational options just mentioned for a
weaker navy are viable without some sort of sanctuary, be it a secure base of operations (either defended or hidden) or covertness in deployment, approach, and
attack. In the emerging naval warfare environment such sanctuary is increasingly
problematic, especially secure basing. Submarines armed with land-attack cruise
missiles or land-based ballistic missiles of sufficient range could neutralize or
disrupt almost any naval base, not to mention logistics ships. Even underground
submarine shelters are not immune.
Forces that are significantly weaker than their opponents frequently resort to
the disruptive form of warfare, normally manifested on land as guerrilla warfare.25 Three factors must exist if disruptive warfare (which is usually prolonged
and cumulative) is to be viable: sanctuary, a sustainable tactical mechanism, and
strategic resilience—that is, the ability to keep going despite losses and without
clear evidence of progress toward victory. In the Battle of the Atlantic of World
War II the German submarine force came close to achieving all three; the Allies finally tilted the balance of victory in their own favor by making the U-boat
tactical mechanism unsustainable. They did so by adopting the convoy, forcing
the U-boats to go to where the escorts were, and inflicting enough attrition to
prevent the German navy from keeping enough boats at sea to generate the level
of merchant sinkings needed to ruin the British war economy.
In the future, non–capital ship naval warfare might evolve to the point that
both sides operate as if they were the weaker and both adopt disruptive warfare.
The fight would be very much a distributed, tactical, cat-and-mouse game characterized by incremental attrition, one in which neither side has a clear idea of
which way the balance is tilting. Of course, no such form of warfare would exist
without a cyber dimension or, at least on the U.S. side, long-range bombers being
brought into play. These latter elements would likely spawn, sooner or later, conventionally armed ballistic-missile salvos. Whether or when mushroom clouds
would appear is not knowable, but this extended warfare dynamic might make
their appearance more likely.
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In fact, nuclear weapons represent yet another issue that could decisively affect the future naval warfare environment. Beyond their direct effects on a naval
operation, the issue of whether a war at sea might precipitate an intercontinental
nuclear exchange is increasingly relevant as nuclear weapons and long-range
ballistic-missile technology proliferate. This is not the place for an in-depth
analysis of the question, but we must at least consider whether a naval war devoid
of capital ships, a war that is likely to be more prolonged and cumulative than
in the past, would be more likely or less to be consummated without the use of
nuclear weapons. War games at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island,
during the late 1970s and early 1980s indicated, contrary to the existing opinion
of the time, that a conventional war with the Soviet Union, even with a robust
naval component, would not necessarily escalate into a nuclear exchange.26 At
the time, the Soviet Union had little in the way of capital ships in its navy, but
the U.S. Navy, of course, was flush with aircraft carriers, a number of which were
lost in the games until the American players got savvier about using them. The
only speculation that can be made at this point is that in a “new age” naval war
(by definition, one between major powers) that dragged on for a considerable
time—like, say, the Battle of the Atlantic—there would be more opportunity for
escalation to occur, but it would not be a foregone conclusion.
What does appear to be the case is that in such a world the United States
would have a much harder time even than it does now providing support and
security for an ordered global system. Prevention of the emergence of a Eurasian hegemon might have to be based on a threat of bombardment, nuclear or
conventional. Limited wars on the periphery would be more risky, especially if a
competing naval power—a resurgent Russia, for example—objected. Commerce
might continue, but if it did, systemic disorder or bloc building on the Eurasian
or African continent might promote retrenchment of national business interests
and produce a massive global economic downturn.
CHOICES
The vision that has been presented—one of increased global turbulence and perhaps prolonged and indecisive missile raids, commerce warfare, and slow-motion
escalation—is not very encouraging, but it would seem to follow from the loss
of the strategic airfield-at-sea function and the logic of distributed naval missile
warfare. The thought experiment we have just conducted examines the edges of
the envelope and does not presume to be predictive. Nonetheless, in a scenario
like the one at which we have looked in which capital ships become obsolete,
what options does the United States have?
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Go “All In” to Keep the Capital-Ship Function Viable. To maintain the capital-ship
function, the United States would invest as necessary to keep the CVN viable as
a floating airfield. Directed-energy weapons, radio-frequency obscurants, better
electronic warfare, and a host of other things might add up to an acceptable level
of protection. Additionally, improvements to tactical aircraft survivability or a
shift to unmanned aviation would be required. However, all will be an expensive
proposition, even if it works, and could well curtail other programs and so mean
a significantly smaller fleet. That might in turn require the Navy to change its
forward-presence strategy, perhaps to something approaching a “surge” posture.
Create a “Bimodal” Fleet. Embedded in the development of the 2007 national
maritime strategy was a bimodal fleet concept created by Captain Wayne Hughes,
U.S. Navy (Ret.), of the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California.27 In
his vision the Navy, acknowledging the increasing threat to carriers, creates regional flotillas that conduct routine “presence” cruises and in war attempt to create
safe operating space in the littoral into which the carriers can subsequently move.
The carriers themselves, while they might still conduct peacetime presence and
low-threat operations, in the event of war would seek refuge in the open ocean,
perhaps providing distant support for regional flotillas, until enemy A2/AD
capabilities had been sufficiently neutralized. The Navy might well have to reduce
the number of carriers to afford this option, taking them off center stage as the
key presence platform.
Preemptive Transformation. Here the Navy would either mothball its carriers or
maintain only a few as support vessels, as was done with the Iowa-class battleships. Its key striking power would reside in large numbers of missiles housed
in a wide variety of numerous platforms. The Navy would compensate for the
loss of the airfield-at-sea function as best it could with unmanned systems and
long-range land-based aircraft. Depending on budgets, the Navy might be able to
support a larger fleet (in fact, that would be a necessary element of this option)
and thus in some ways enhance its forward-presence posture. The risk would be
that without mobile tactical airpower from the sea, that presence might not be as
effective.
Debates on the future of the aircraft carrier tend to focus on technical and tactical issues and thereby to beg a number of important strategic questions. This
article has attempted to connect some strategic dots: the capital-ship function,
command of the sea, the littoral, and the world order. Doing so illuminates the
true relevance of the aircraft carrier, creating a basis for devising and judging
options in case the carrier becomes obsolescent. One set of options has been
presented, but many more perspectives are possible. While carrier obsolescence
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is not a foregone conclusion, it is clear that the geopolitical competitors of the
United States are seeking ways to nullify the American capability to influence and
intervene that the carrier confers. Understanding the linkages helps us refine and
enhance the debate about what to do.
We cannot simply wish away the problem of potential obsolescence or argue
by assertion. If emergent antiaccess/area-denial technology does not do the trick,
escalating construction costs coupled with shrinking defense budgets might. We
have to recognize that the aircraft carrier is not just another warship or defense
program. It is the current capital ship and as such has an intimate relationship
with the modern geopolitical terrain—we might even consider the CVN a geopolitical terrain feature in itself. It is intimately connected also with the world order
that the United States has expended so much blood, effort, and taxpayer money
to create and that has been so congenial to American values and interests. The
various sides in the current debate, both “pro-carrier” and “con,” should take this
factor into account.
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CHINA’S AIRCR AFT C ARRIER PROGR AM
Drivers, Developments, Implications
Andrew Scobell, Michael McMahon, and Cortez A. Cooper III

O

ne of the most eye-catching episodes in China’s defense buildup was the 25
September 2012 commissioning of Beijing’s first aircraft carrier. The sixtyfive-thousand-ton Liaoning was launched with much fanfare, presided over by
the president of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), then Hu Jintao, as well as
by the vice president and Hu’s political successor, Xi Jinping. The commissioning
of Liaoning underscored both the remarkable advances in the PRC’s shipbuilding in recent decades and the significant limitations that remain. The vessel
immediately became the largest in the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
Originally launched in 1988 for the Soviet navy, the carrier, at that point known
as Varyag and lying incomplete in a Ukrainian yard, had been purchased by a
Chinese shell company in 1998 and towed to China three years later. The vessel
was fully refurbished in a Chinese shipyard, and an extensive array of systems was
installed. Liaoning is considered a medium-sized carrier that can accommodate
a combination of approximately thirty-six fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft,
with a crew of at least one thousand.
One Chinese security analyst proclaimed the eventual relaunch was on a par in
“strategic significance” (zhanlue yiyi) with China’s earlier acquisition of the “two
bombs [nuclear and hydrogen] and one satellite” (liang dan, yi xing), in the sense
that the commissioning of Liaoning signaled China’s entry into an exclusive club
of great powers. But other naval analysts sought to downplay the event. Retired
PLAN admiral Yin Zhuo stressed that the commissioning of the Liaoning was
only a first step: China, he observed, was very much a “rookie” (xinshou) at operating this highly “complex technical system,” while “other countries” (i.e., the
United States) had more than a century of experience.1 No matter how modest
the beginnings, however, there are strong indications that China has ambitious
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plans: Liaoning is likely to be the first of as many as five carriers that the PLAN
intends to put into service in the coming years.
Some observers discern the emergence of a naval arms race in the AsiaPacific.2 But however military trends in the region are best characterized, it is
clear that countries such as China and India are energetically expanding their
navies. Without a doubt, carrier expansion in the early twenty-first century
will be concentrated in Asia. Beijing and New Delhi each appear committed to
commissioning multiple aircraft carriers in the near future. In addition to China
and India, Japan commissioned a helicopter-carrying destroyer capable of being
reconfigured to handle short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing aircraft. No decision,
by Beijing or any other capital, to pursue such an involved program can be taken
lightly, because it requires a massive commitment of resources and extended time
horizons. An aircraft carrier is an expensive and complex system of systems. Carrier programs require sustained effort, substantial funding streams, and considerable technical and professional competence. Carriers are a luxury few countries
can afford. Even fewer countries have the shipyards, engineering expertise, and
associated infrastructure to build these vessels.
It is ironic that the country that has done more than any other to move aircraft
carriers closer to obsolescence through advances in military technology has invested in its own aircraft carrier program. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA),
for example, has acquired highly accurate antiship ballistic missiles—“carrier
killers.” What is driving China’s carrier ambitions, and what is the likely future
trajectory of its carrier program? What new operational capabilities does a carrier
provide the PLAN? How does the arrival of China’s carrier affect the security situation in the Asia-Pacific? What are the implications of Chinese aircraft carriers
for the United States?
We examine first the drivers, the operational capabilities, and then we consider the future trajectory of China’s carrier program. Last, we evaluate the implications of the carrier program for the balance of maritime power in the western
Pacific and beyond.
DRIVERS OVER THE DECADES
China’s entry into the exclusive aircraft-carrier club played out over several decades in a slow-motion series of low-key and secretive developments, in a pattern
that prompts a range of competing explanations about the drivers of the initiative.
The earliest explanation posited for driving China’s maritime ambitions was
that of bureaucratic interests. These interests were initially identified with the
South China Sea and have been advanced collectively as the key driver for the
PRC’s aircraft carrier program.3 The emergence of an actual program suggested
the growing influence of the PLAN in the armed forces. The navy’s second-rate
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status within the PLA was and is changing. Since 2004, for example, the commander of Beijing’s navy has had a seat on the Central Military Commission
(CMC)—the apex of military power in the PRC, a body roughly equivalent to
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nevertheless, and while the maritime service has
enjoyed an unprecedented rate of modernization in recent decades, the dominant
service in the PLA continues to be the ground force.4 Moreover, as will be seen,
the program’s key champion appears to have been an individual rather than a
bureaucracy.
A second explanation is that the PRC’s carrier program is driven primarily by
nationalism.5 Clearly China’s carrier program has strong public support; there is
considerable pride in the country’s first aircraft carrier. A wave of aircraft carrier
euphoria—or a “Hangmu style” craze—swept the country as people imitated the
pose of two flight-deck crewmen shown in a publicity photo guiding a J-15 fighter as it made a historic shipboard landing on Liaoning in November 2012. Most
Chinese would agree with Major General Zhang Shiping’s insistence that “for
China to become a major world power without an aircraft carrier is completely
unthinkable.” The general, an Academy of Military Sciences researcher, insisted
that “acquiring a carrier was an historical necessity” for China.6
Possession of multiple carriers epitomizes the overwhelming naval dominance
of the United States, and their lack emphasizes the continued weakness of China’s
navy. One of the most jarring moments for China in post–Cold War East Asia
occurred when in early 1996 the United States dispatched two aircraft-carrier
strike groups in response to Chinese saber rattling in the Taiwan Strait. For Beijing, the act harked back to the nineteenth century, when China had been bullied
first by Western powers and then by Japan and forced to sign “unequal treaties”
trampling on national sovereignty and to concede territory. For the Chinese, U.S.
aircraft carrier dominance represents a latter-day variant of gunboat diplomacy
and underscores that China, despite greatly increased military might, continues
to be inferior, impotent in the face of overwhelming U.S. naval power.
A third possible driver of China’s carrier program is an evolving overarching
strategic logic or coherent maritime strategy.7 According to this interpretation,
the PRC is pursuing a grand strategic vision—widely attributed to Admiral Liu
Huaqing (1916–2011) and first set out in the early 1980s—by which the PLAN
would gradually extend its reach outward into the Pacific Ocean in a phased expansion of Chinese seapower. In the first phase, by 2000, the PLAN was to extend
its area of operations in the “near seas” (the South China Sea, East China Sea,
and Yellow Sea) out as far as the so-called First Island Chain—the Kuril Islands,
Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, Borneo, and Natuna Besar. In the
second phase, by 2020, the PLAN aimed to project its operational reach out to
the so-called Second Island Chain—the Bonins, the Marianas, and the Carolines.
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In the third phase, by 2050, China would become a global seapower, and its navy
would hence operate on a par with the U.S. Navy. In fact, the PLAN’s activities
and power-projection efforts have so far kept pace with this timeline.
This road map for the development of China’s seapower grew in significance
as China’s economy underwent rapid growth and its seaborne trade experienced
major expansion during the 1980s and 1990s. China’s maritime strategy gained
greater traction in the twenty-first century as the PRC perceived itself as being
under growing threat from the United States. Particularly since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Beijing has viewed Washington’s behavior around
its periphery as aimed at containing or encircling the PRC.8 From the Chinese
perspective, the United States has become increasingly assertive in the near seas,
especially in the South China Sea.
We suggest that an evolving overarching strategic logic has propelled the
PRC’s carrier program inexorably forward. This analysis of the historical record
suggests that while nationalism was certainly an important contextual factor
and lobbying by PLAN leaders was significant in keeping the idea of a carrier
program alive, ultimately the decisive driver was strategic logic and operational
importance. Indeed, the program’s lengthy gestation and its repeated failure early
on to gain traction are attributable to the absence of a strategic imperative until
quite recently. The emergence of this strategic imperative and the operational
demands for a carrier in the twenty-first century correspond to the emergence of
PLA and PLAN thinking and planning beyond a Taiwan scenario.9
GENESIS OF CHINA’S CARRIER PROGRAM
China’s carrier program has evolved remarkably over five decades. In the span of
forty years the program was transformed from one man’s elusive dream in 1970
to the acquisition and refurbishment of a Soviet-era carrier to the actual commissioning of an aircraft carrier in 2012.
The 1970s: One Man’s Dream
China’s aircraft carrier program languished for many years, for lack of a strategic
imperative. But the idea of an aircraft carrier never died completely, because
of the persistence of a key PLAN leader, Liu Huaqing, who gradually rose to
the highest post in the military hierarchy, assuming the vice-chairmanship of
the CMC in 1989. The origins of the PLAN’s aircraft carrier program are intimately intertwined with the career of this prominent military figure. Justifiably
considered the most important and certainly the most dogged champion of the
program, Liu is often dubbed the “father of China’s aircraft carrier,” as well as
“China’s Mahan.”10 Irrespective of these labels, Liu certainly qualifies as the most
influential military figure in post–Mao Zedong, reform-era China. Significantly,
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Liu was the last uniformed member of the all-powerful Chinese Communist
Party’s Politburo Standing Committee, a seat he relinquished in 1997.
According to his memoirs, as early as 1970 Liu floated to his military superiors a proposal that China begin preparations to acquire an aircraft carrier. His
suggestion does not appear to have received any support within the PLA hierarchy.11 This is hardly surprising, since the PRC had nothing remotely resembling
a blue-water navy in the 1970s; its main threat at the time was overland invasion or attack by the Soviet army, an attack that could come anywhere along the
several-thousand-mile and very exposed common land border. Neither does the
most logical maritime scenario—an attack on or invasion of Taiwan—appear to
have received any serious attention at the time. Thus, there was no compelling
strategic or operational rationale for the development of a PLAN carrier program
in the 1970s, and nationalism did not even come into play.
The 1980s: A Vision
In the decade following Mao Zedong’s death, the idea of an aircraft carrier
seemed a more plausible, if still remote, possibility. While the PRC’s primary
military threat remained land-centric—the Soviet army—the “reform and opening” policy of Deng Xiaoping significantly altered its national security calculus
and defense priorities. As the PRC embraced foreign investment and expanded
international trade, Beijing began to attach much greater weight to maritime
matters. PRC leaders had to be concerned not only with the security of their land
borders but also with coastal waters and beyond—that is, both the “near shore”
or littoral (jinan) and the “near seas” (jinhai).12 Moreover, territorial claims in the
South China Sea and the unresolved matter of Taiwan provided added impetus
for modernizing the PLAN. In the mid-1980s, the PLA shifted its preparations
from imminent all-out global conflagration likely involving nuclear and conventional conflict between China and one of the superpowers to limited, localized,
conventional war-fighting scenarios.
The geostrategic reorientation and doctrinal transformation produced a new
strategic logic that was more conducive to the idea of aircraft carriers. Liu recalls
in his memoirs that in November 1986 he chaired a seminar comprising military
and civilian leaders and experts: “Many comrades expressed the view that from
the standpoint of our strategic mission of safeguarding the country’s maritime
interests, including the recovery of the Nansha [Islands], and the reunification of
Taiwan, the navy should develop aircraft carriers. My own thinking was consistent with this view.”13
The purchase in 1985 of the decommissioned Australian navy carrier Melbourne by a PRC company, ostensibly for scrap, signaled Beijing’s growing
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interest in a carrier program. The vessel was reportedly scrutinized by Chinese
engineers and naval architects, and the flight deck was kept intact when the rest
of the ship was scrapped. In 1982, upon being promoted to commander of the
PLAN, Liu commissioned a research institute in Shanghai to conduct a study on
the feasibility of carriers. Three years later Liu directed the Guangzhou Naval
Academy to initiate a training course for aircraft carrier commanders.14
1990s: A Serious Debate
By the mid-1990s, maritime challenges had moved to the front and center of
Beijing’s national security concerns. The Soviet breakup had created three new
neighbors in Central Asia, but Beijing moved swiftly and deftly to recognize these
states, resolve territorial disputes, and demilitarize border areas. It could then
focus greater attention on the security of coastal regions and on unresolved maritime territorial disputes. The increasing importance of the near seas and China’s
growing dependence on the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) radiating out
beyond the First Island Chain were highlighted by tensions in the South China
Sea (in 1995), a crisis in the Taiwan Strait (1995–96), and by China’s becoming
(in 1993) a net importer of petroleum, most of it by sea from the Middle East
and Africa.
Within a three-year span, Chinese entities bought three Soviet-era aircraft
carriers: Minsk and Varyag (both in 1998) and Kiev (in May 2000). These buys
represented a sizable expenditure—reportedly totaling some U.S.$33.4 million
—and thus a degree of high-level coordination. Moreover, the circumstances
surrounding these purchases were suspicious, in terms of their announced purposes. For example, the buyer of Varyag, the Chong Lot Tourist and Amusement
Agency, reportedly had several retired PLAN officers on its board of directors.
The supposed intent of the company was to turn Varyag into a floating casino
in the gambling mecca of Macau, but the waters around the former Portuguese
colony are too shallow to accommodate the vessel, and no application for a gambling permit appears to have been filed. When in early 2002 Varyag arrived in
China, it docked well away from Macau, in the northern port of Dalian.
This flurry of activity suggests that Beijing was engaged in a major debate
about the viability of acquiring an aircraft carrier. The option being most seriously considered was to complete a carrier indigenously on one of the hulls
purchased overseas, rather than buying a completely fitted, foreign-made carrier.
During the mid-1990s Chinese entities reportedly made a considerable effort to
acquire blueprints for an aircraft carrier from a Spanish shipbuilder that was constructing one for the Royal Thai Navy, showing far less interest in placing such an
order themselves.15 By the end of the decade, CMC chair Jiang Zemin had reportedly given the PLAN the green light to commence work on designing a carrier.16
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2000s: A Decision Is Made
With the dawn of a new century, the maritime domain loomed ever larger for
Beijing in strategic significance. The result, according to an authoritative overview of PLAN history, was a “paradigmatic change” (zhuanxing) in naval thinking from the near seas to the “far seas” (yuanhai).17 PRC aircraft and surface and
subsurface vessels routinely found themselves operating in the same vicinity as
U.S. platforms, often at very close quarters. These encounters prompted a growing number of incidents. Of particular note was an April 2001 episode in which
a PLAN J-8 fighter collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance aircraft some
seventy-five nautical miles south of Hainan Island. To Beijing, the event signaled
a growing, perceived threat of U.S. strategic encirclement and the emergence of
the near seas as a hot zone of U.S.-Chinese contestation.
The decision to go ahead with the construction of an aircraft carrier was reportedly made by the CMC in 2004 or 2005;18 the decision was almost certainly
made in conjunction with CMC chairman Hu Jintao’s December 2004 announcement of revised military strategic guidelines (junshi zhanlue fangzhen) for the
PLA. These guidelines function as a “rolling national military strategy” that
provides the key guidance and direction for planning and force development.19
Addressing the CMC on 24 December 2004, Hu outlined what became known
as the “New Historic Missions,” representing an important modification of strategic guidelines issued in 1993. Two of the broad-brush missions he sketched for
the PLA were protecting China’s “national interests” and safeguarding “world
peace.”20 The former mission has since been defined ever more expansively to
include China’s maritime territorial claims inside the First Island Chain and its
“overseas interests” well beyond. The latter mission provides the rationale for
a greater global role for the PLAN in a broad spectrum of activities, including
patrolling the SLOCs and contributing to international humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief.21 Reportedly, Hu subsequently endorsed the concept of “far
sea operations” (yuanhai zuozhan). Together these developments put in place the
strategic and doctrinal logic for naval force modernization in general and for, by
extension, the acquisition of several aircraft carriers.
Extensive work was under way throughout the middle of the first decade of the
twenty-first century in a Dalian shipyard to complete Varyag as an operational
aircraft carrier. But no official public statement was forthcoming; the PRC was
equipping a major naval surface combatant but keeping mum about the matter.
Noteworthy was the absence of any mention of the PLAN’s carrier project in
China’s defense white papers of 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010. However, in 2006
and 2007 several senior military officials did publicly comment that the PRC
had decided to develop an aircraft carrier program, with the goal of indigenously

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/1

6844_Scobell,McMahon&Cooper.indd 71

76

8/18/15 1:43 PM

72

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College: Autumn 2015 Full Issue

building them. Finally, in March 2009, the PRC minister of national defense,
General Liang Guanglie, declared that the PLAN was preparing to build its own
aircraft carriers.22
2010s: Commissioning a Carrier
In the second decade of the century tensions emerged with the United States and
China’s neighbors in the near seas that seemed only to underscore the growing
importance of seapower to the PRC. In 2010 China accused the United States of
meddling in the South China Sea and then heatedly protested a planned U.S.–
South Korean joint military exercise scheduled for the Yellow Sea. Tensions also
rose in the East China Sea over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Beijing
claims a two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone in all these areas and insists
that other countries cannot operate military vessels or aircraft there without
its prior approval. In November 2013, China announced the creation of an airdefense identification zone in the East China Sea. China also, looking beyond
its immediate maritime vicinity to the Indian Ocean, took note of developments
in India’s aircraft carrier program. In 2009 New Delhi had laid the keel of INS
Vikrant and proceeded with indigenous construction of carriers capable, like
Varyag, of operating high-performance tactical aircraft using a short-takeoff-butarrested-recovery (STOBAR) design.
The evolution of a strategic logic became more apparent: an aircraft carrier
was needed to cope with the PRC’s expanding array of maritime interests. It was
against this backdrop that Varyag underwent its first sea trial in August 2011. The
vessel cruised the Bohai Gulf and Yellow Sea for four days before returning to
port. Further sea trials followed. In late September 2012 ex-Varyag was officially
commissioned as Liaoning. The ship was ceremonially christened by Hu Jintao
barely two months before he stepped down as chair of the CMC. As a result, Hu
will go down in history as the leader responsible for China’s first operational aircraft carrier, even though experts contend that the carrier will not become fully
employable for several more years.
THE TRAJECTORY: A HYBRID NAVY
In the interim, the next three to five years, Liaoning will primarily serve as a training platform, operating mostly within the First and Second Island Chains. Most
PLAN ships have three-digit Arabic hull numbers; Liaoning’s two-digit number,
16, indicates its official rating as a training vessel.
While China now has a carrier with a sea-based tactical aviation capability,
time will be needed for its air wing to become operationally competent and for
the ship itself to conduct proficiency training with destroyers, frigates, and submarines (as Liaoning did in December 2013 for the first time, in the South China
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Sea). Perhaps the most useful benchmark for the operational readiness of Liao
ning is the level of training, equipment, and organization of its aviation component. Properly configuring Liaoning for carrier-group operations will take time,
but establishing the naval aviation component—fully functioning squadrons of
carrier-based aircraft—is likely to take much longer. Since its commissioning,
most of Liaoning’s at-sea time has been devoted to certification of shipboard
air-operations systems and to initial pilot training, using experienced pilots and
test aircraft. But China will not achieve a true aircraft-carrier capability until the
two elements—an organized and trained air component and a fully tested, fleetconfigured carrier—have been coupled. The passing of various signposts may
be evident on this path as they occur, one being the establishment of a tactical
aviation air wing. Incorporation of fully trained and organized, mission-capable,
fleet tactical air wings is not likely until 2018 or later.
Furthermore, to gauge the timeline for the commissioning of China’s second
carrier—expected to be indigenously designed and built—it makes sense to monitor the development of air component training and organization and also full
production of the J-15 aircraft, and perhaps as well the development of the J-31,
potentially China’s future, fifth-generation, sea-based tactical aircraft. Of course,
these timelines will run concurrently with the design of any indigenous aircraft
carrier. The challenge of balancing these two processes may explain the seeming
deliberateness of the PLAN’s pace in designing and commencing construction of
its next aircraft carrier.
Moreover, additional aircraft carriers, almost certainly in the cards, will probably come online gradually, over the course of the next two decades. The longer
a new, indigenously designed carrier is delayed, the more likely the design will
be to adopt a large-deck format and increased capabilities. Such a platform could
accommodate fifth-generation aircraft and incorporate leading technology, electronics, and design features. Also, the most modern computer-assisted-design
tools, construction practices, and facilities that China’s shipbuilding industry has
to offer would be available for the project. The large scope of the design work involved in the conversion (i.e., from the original Soviet “aircraft-carrying cruiser”
configuration) of Liaoning at the Dalian shipyard is likely to provide a “walking
start” for a more modern carrier.
The PLAN does not appear to be building a future force that has aircraft carriers at its core. Such a goal would require a complete order-of-battle overhaul.
There may have been a Chinese realization that the role of carrier-based aviation
would be limited in any potential large-scale conflict with the United States.
Instead, current doctrine and naval modernization suggest that while the PLAN
is aiming for at least three additional carriers, they would be focused on power
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projection—inside the island chains but also in the Indian Ocean, as well as
distant areas where overseas interests in resources are strong, such as Africa and
Latin America.23 Nevertheless, as Yin Zhuo observes, the introduction, for whatever purpose, of carriers demands a major change in PLAN thinking and requires
in the near term a modified “grouping format” of escort vessels with Liaoning at
the center.24 In short, China’s navy appears to have adopted a hybrid approach
encompassing both carrier and surface-action groups for mission-specific operations and the projection of influence.
In addition, such an approach comports with political and fiscal realities. Aircraft carriers are extremely expensive. Whether the hull is acquired from abroad
or built indigenously does not necessarily make much difference in overall
cost; both options are expensive, and follow-on carriers may not be appreciably
cheaper if they are of different designs or possess different subsystems. Moreover,
while the PLAN has increased its power and influence vis-à-vis the other services in the past decade or so, the ground force remains, as noted, the dominant
service and enjoys the preponderance of political clout. The navy must compete
with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, which has greater representation
on the CMC—an unprecedented two seats are held by air force generals.25 While
the defense budget has been growing in double digits annually, overall military
spending is carefully monitored, and continued increases presume further economic growth. In short, the size of the defense budget and constraints on funds
allocated for PLAN acquisitions are limited.
The Operational Demands on Carriers
China’s growing oceanic interests expand the operational demands on the PLAN,
from defending disputed maritime claims to protecting China’s fishing and
merchant fleets.26 The aircraft carrier can provide much-needed air protection
for the surface ships and submarines operating several hundred miles out. The
most obvious region for such operations would be in the southern portions of the
South China Sea, some nine hundred miles from Hainan Island—well beyond the
routine patrol range of PLAN land-based aircraft. Indeed, it is in this area that Liu
Huaqing reportedly felt an aircraft carrier would prove its worth.27
The most pressing operational logic for aircraft carriers relates to the value
they add in wartime. PLA analysts who studied the Royal Navy’s performance
in the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982 concluded that aircraft carriers played a
key role in the British victory over Argentina.28 Today, carriers offer the PLAN
extended blue-water capability—to the Second Island Chain and beyond—and
an improved capacity for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and airborne early warning (AEW). The ASW and AEW missions require multiple carriers; however,
even one fully capable aircraft carrier could represent the PLA’s first steps toward
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extended air (i.e., offensive) and air-defense cover for regional contingencies and
an incremental extension of the air-defense umbrella in tandem with advanced
escort combatants. For the present, ASW and AEW vulnerabilities remain too
great to allow Liaoning to be successfully employed in high-intensity maritime
combat; its size and configuration preclude the launch of the larger aircraft that
would perform these missions. In short, as we have seen, there are limitations to
what Liaoning can do, especially with such limited operational experience.
What difference would one or two aircraft carriers make in a contingency inside the First Island Chain? In a South China Sea clash, Liaoning would provide
extra airpower projection against opposing combatants, especially in the southernmost reaches of that body of water; it would also present adversaries with a
“nice, big target.” One carrier or even two would offer little in an East China Sea
battle. As for a Taiwan contingency, carrier air would not contribute much in the
fight itself, although it might have utility as a diversion in more easily protected
zones away from Taiwan and Japan. Moreover, the use of an aircraft carrier would
severely complicate the PLA’s current doctrinal approach—missile-centric firepower strike and counterintervention operations, supported by advanced information warfare. This would be especially true in a Taiwan contingency.
The choice to retain the original, Soviet-era STOBAR design suggests that
Liaoning’s missions will be more limited than those of U.S. aircraft carriers. A
“ski jump” bow and the absence to date of catapults restrict the size and weight
of an aircraft that can take off from the deck (and accordingly the payload and
amount of fuel it can carry). Thus the onboard air wing will focus on air defense,
protecting the carrier and escort vessels at sea. Finally, Liaoning is conventionally
powered, which limits its range and necessitates regular refueling.
Noncombat Operations
Additional demands are represented by the contributions an aircraft carrier will
be expected to make to peacetime operations. Indeed, this noncombat dimension
has received considerable attention in recent years in China. Moreover, the PLA
neither has recent war-fighting experience nor anticipates significant combat
operations in the near future. Thus Liaoning and any subsequent aircraft carriers can expect considerable noncombat operational employment. Since at least
2008 China’s armed forces have emphasized military operations other than war
(MOOTW) as a doctrinal component. While MOOTW “with Chinese characteristics” has a significant domestic dimension, this body of doctrine also includes
substantial maritime and overseas elements, and the PLAN appears poised to
play a central role in it. Its MOOTW missions could include “flat deck” (i.e.,
large air-capable ship) operations in support of SLOC protection, humanitarian
assistance, and disaster relief. China became acutely aware of the usefulness of
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aircraft carriers during the U.S. Navy’s response to the Southeast Asian tsunami
in 2004. Furthermore, recent PLA experiences with noncombatant evacuations
in such places as Libya have highlighted the value of air and naval assets.
In peacetime, a carrier provides a high-profile presence wherever it steams.
It can symbolize power and commitment without necessarily raising alarm. But
the challenge for China in the not-too-distant future will be how to operate a
carrier close to home without being perceived as threatening by its neighbors. A
carrier is much more likely to be warmly welcomed outside the First and Second
Island Chains than within them. If the challenges of the vast distances involved in
far-seas operations can be met, a Chinese carrier off the coast of Africa or Latin
America would be a strong symbol of national pride and could also serve as a
goodwill ambassador, whether visiting ports or patrolling the global commons.
Program Prospects and Implications
China’s carrier program was powered to ultimate realization by an overarching
strategic logic and still-evolving national maritime strategy. While nationalism
and bureaucratic interests have played—and will continue to play—important
roles in the trajectory of the program, the push for a Chinese carrier could neither
have been sustained across many decades nor have ultimately triumphed without
the impetus of a larger strategic rationale and the emergence of a coherent maritime strategy. The program’s lengthy gestation and repeated failure to gain traction are attributable to the absence of a strategic imperative before the end of the
Cold War. This growing strategic logic and the emerging operational demands
for a carrier in the twenty-first century correspond to an extension of PLA thinking beyond a Taiwan Strait scenario. When the PRC’s military was narrowly focused on operations against Taiwan, an aircraft carrier did not make much sense.
But its operational value is more evident in other scenarios, including protection
of the South China Sea and beyond the First Island Chain. Moreover, strategic
and operational value increases as the PLAN expands its horizons beyond the
First and Second Island Chains.
More than two years after its commissioning, Liaoning is far from fully operational. It is still without a fighter wing, although numerous practice takeoffs and
landings have occurred. It functions essentially as a training vessel and has yet
to venture outside the First Island Chain. Nevertheless, in China the carrier has
captured the imagination of leaders and ordinary people who have come to view
a PLAN aircraft carrier as the ultimate symbol of full-blown Chinese military
power. A carrier signals China’s desire for global power projection—or at least
extended offshore reach.
While the PLAN is still years away from being able to project and sustain significant naval power—let alone in the form of an aircraft carrier—out of area (i.e.,
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beyond the island chains), Beijing is intent on becoming able to play a greater role
in patrolling SLOCs farther afield. Given China’s dependence on imported energy and the importance it attaches to energy security, a logical priority location
for increased PLAN operational activity will be in the Indian Ocean. Although
China has increased the number of overland routes for oil and gas (witness the
construction of pipelines in recent years from Central Asia, Russia, and Myanmar), the PRC remains reliant on seaborne energy, especially petroleum from
fields in Africa and the Middle East.
Liaoning is a visible symbol of China’s growing naval prowess wherever it
steams and is useful in noncombat missions. But in an era of precision-guided
munitions and enhanced over-the-horizon surveillance and reconnaissance, in
wartime Liaoning becomes vulnerable, a sitting (or more accurately, floating)
duck, especially in any conflict involving a highly capable adversary.
China’s carrier program in and of itself, therefore, does not merit alarm by the
Pentagon. It does not fundamentally transform the balance of military power
in the western Pacific. One or two PLAN aircraft carriers will not be especially
useful in the East China or South China Sea. Of course, carriers will extend the
range of Chinese airpower, and their presence will further complicate an already
complex maritime operating environment in the near seas. This prospect does
signal both China’s unmistakable intent to project military power beyond the
First Island Chain and its aspirations to become a global naval powerhouse. And
yet by the time—decades hence—that China does possess multiple large aircraft
carriers and has become adept at operating them, the carrier itself may have become almost irrelevant in the conduct of naval warfare.29
Perhaps the greatest impact for the U.S. military of one or more Chinese carriers will be more perceptual than operational.30 Indeed, the United States and
other countries in the Asia-Pacific have yet to come fully to grips psychologically
with the arrival of a new, increasingly capable, and active blue-water navy in the
region.
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A GENER AL REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF
CHINA’S SEA-POWER THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Zhang Wei [张炜]
Translated by Shazeda Ahmed

The Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) uses primary and secondary
Chinese-language sources to produce original scholarly research that enables current and future
leaders to understand better the complexities of contemporary China’s maritime rise. The below
translation offers non–Chinese readers at least a sense of what can be gained by considering
Chinese texts in the original. Zhang Wei’s article, originally published in the journal Frontiers
(Xueshu Qianyan) in July 2012, is a historiographical survey of the critical Western and Chinese
texts and thinkers who have shaped the concept of sea power in China. It gives insight into the
richness of the Chinese discourse about sea power. Of particular note is the fact that as Chinese
strategists engage in this discourse, they no longer question the utility of sea power; even the
country’s most ardent land-power advocates recognize the strategic and economic importance
of the sea. On the contrary, the primary question now concerns the form and character Chinese
sea power should take. The CMSI hopes this translated article (in which the endnote citations
are original) will inform and strengthen the debate in the West about this critical question.

A

t the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth, the
American Alfred Thayer Mahan produced the three volumes of The Influence of Sea Power upon History and, later, Naval Strategy. At one time, sea-power
theory was popular in Western countries. In particular, it became an important
theory in support of America’s rise. China is a traditionally continental state. The
recognition of sea power within academic and political circles has long wavered
between contradiction, hesitation, dispute, and even rejection. However, with
the deepening of China’s reform and opening
Senior Captain Zhang Wei, of the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) Navy, is a researcher at the prestigious up (gaige kaifang), the ocean’s strategic position
PLA Naval Research Institute.
has risen. It is inevitable that we reexamine, and
The translator is the research assistant at the Naval
extract things of value from, this theory that has
War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute.
had such tremendous impact on the rise and fall
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2015, Vol. 68, No. 4
of great powers.
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HISTORY’S CALL: THE RISE OF RESEARCH ON CONTEMPORARY
CHINESE SEA POWER
After the First and Second Opium Wars, there arose in China a Self-Strengthening
Movement centered on the military. At one point China prioritized the establishment of a Beiyang Fleet. In 1885, while stationed in Germany, the Qing diplomat
Li Fengbao translated New Ideas on Naval Warfare.* This was the first appearance
of the concept of sea power in Chinese translation. In 1890, when Mahan’s first
work on sea power was published, it was quickly translated into German, French,
Russian, and Japanese, among other languages. Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Japanese emperor valued and adopted this theory, which directly influenced the two
countries’ naval development and their respective rises. But in 1900 the Japanese
translation of “Theory of the Elements of Seapower” was published in Shanghai’s
East Asia Times. This was the first time Chinese readers encountered Mahan’s
classic theory of the “six elements” of sea power. It was, of course, associated
with China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War and the navy’s decline. After the
revolution of 1911 Sun Yat-sen discussed Chinese sea-power issues many times,
but he was helpless in the face of the numerous great powers and China’s waning
strength. All he could do was sadly lament the realities of sea power in East Asia.
In the period following the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the
deep pain felt after a hundred years of imperialist invasion and the new wounds
of ideological conflict obstructed the introduction of these Western theories. In
1978, one of China’s most authoritative academic publications, Historical Research, published Feng Chengbai and Li Yuanliang’s “Mahan’s Theory of Strength
at Sea.” They argued that this theory “was a blueprint that established maritime
forces for the sake of imperialism, seized control of the sea, redivided colonies,
and contended for global hegemony. . . . It represented a monopoly of the capitalist classes’ interests and demands. From theoretical and strategic perspectives
it demonstrated the position and function that maritime power occupied in the
struggle for global hegemony.” The essay also criticized “Russia’s twentieth century Mahan,” Sergey Gorshkov, the former commander in chief of the Soviet navy,
and his propagation of “maritime hegemony.” The authors thought Gorshkov’s
ideas followed in the footsteps of the imperialism of the old tsarist regime and
the United States and that building an offensive far-seas navy would become “the
important force behind the counterrevolutionary global strategy to achieve control of the seas, seize Europe, and dominate the world.” They saw this as an “evil
instrument” with which the strong bullied the weak.1 The essay represented the
Chinese people’s basic understanding of Mahan’s sea-power theory at that time.
In 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China launched the era of reform and opening up.
* This is a direct translation from the Chinese. The original German title could not be found.—Trans.
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Chinese people began to use the ocean and reach out to the world. They started
to acknowledge rationally the relationship between the ocean and the survival
and development of the Chinese people. Chinese conceptions of the ocean took
flight, and people began to reexamine sea-power theory. The year 1985 was the
first time the People’s Liberation Army Navy [PLAN] sent ships overseas and
became a genuinely “international military service.” The navy also promoted the
strategic idea of “near-seas defense,” which became a new direction for China’s
naval development. This led to the post-1990s resurgence of research on seapower theory.
In 1991 the Ocean Press published the first volumes of the Ocean Consciousness series, which contained Zhang Wei and Xu Hua’s Sea Power and Prosperity, the first book on sea power openly published in China. The book uses Karl
Marx’s “two types of natural resources” as its theoretical foundation. It begins
with an analysis of the early cultures of Eastern and Western states and of their
natural geographic environments and then compares Chinese and Western civilizational history. The work contrasts China, representing land-based civilization,
with the Mediterranean states, representing maritime civilization. “The former
is based on agriculture, and is controlled by natural economic patterns. The latter, however, is based on commerce, and is controlled by the economic patterns
of commodities.” Zhang Wei and Xu Hua point out that sea power was rooted in
the conflicts of economic interests opened up by trade between maritime states.
States that were successful in maritime trade needed to control sea lines of communication and capture desired markets, while simultaneously blocking other
countries from controlling or occupying them.
This kind of power was required of states. Power belongs to the realm of politics, and politics is full of violence. Thus, a few merchant ships began to carry
soldiers. As ships became more specialized, navies emerged. Therefore, behind
the rise and fall of Mediterranean and Atlantic states “was hidden an invisible
sword—sea power.” Zhang and Xu state, “For the sake of their own economic
and political interests, states use maritime forces (most importantly navies) to
control the ocean, and this is called sea power.” Their analysis is based on several centuries’ history of struggle for control of the oceans. Their book forms,
by linking the oceans and the state’s political, economic, and military interests,
an abstract concept. It does not focus on researching sea power itself but rather
studies its use from the perspective of national strategy. It is a work of high-level,
state-strategic theory. Dialectically, Mahan’s sea-power theory takes the creation
and development of capitalist sea power as its object of inquiry. It is strongly affected by the social class of its author and the age in which it was produced. But
it also has a “rational core”—it accurately recognizes and grasps the patterns of
capitalist production and development with respect to the use and control of the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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ocean. From a high-level, national-strategic perspective, sea power exerts a huge
effect on a state’s rise.2
In 1998, Zhang Shiping’s Chinese Sea Power was published by the People’s
Daily Press. Writing with a strong sense of urgency, the author used the past to
discuss the present. He thought that in human history the states and peoples
that had been and continued to be powerful and prosperous had either once
or later possessed sea power. The Chinese people were the first in the world to
move toward the sea, yet the phrase “sea power” has always been unfamiliar to
them. Zhang Shiping’s book declares that sea power is a category of history and
that its meaning—especially the development of concepts of the ocean—changes
continuously as societies grow. “In the simplest terms, sea power is the freedom
to conduct activities in the maritime domain.”3 The author emphasizes that to
maritime countries or people, possession of sea power is not an objective but a
means, an indispensable way of ensuring the survival and sustainable development of the state and nation. The book divides sea power into purely “military”
and “comprehensive” sea power. Military sea power refers to one party in a war
asserting control of a fixed maritime space for a certain period of time. Comprehensive sea power includes political, economic, and military factors. It denotes
a state’s freedom to act within a fixed maritime space during a specific period
of time. The two are closely intertwined. If a state does not have comprehensive
national power, it cannot possess military sea power; likewise, if a state lacks a
certain amount of military sea power, it cannot have comprehensive sea power.
Zhang Shiping identifies four factors affecting sea power in the world today:
maritime military forces, maritime entities, ocean development, and maritime
legal systems.
In 2000, the Sea Tide Press ceremoniously rolled out Wang Shengrong’s
Maritime Great Powers and the Struggle for Sea Power. The book hails America’s
Mahan as the “founder of ‘sea power’” and the former Soviet Union’s Gorshkov
as having “reconstructed the new concept of ‘state sea power.’” It uses John F.
Lehman’s “revival of Mahan’s ‘seapower’ thought” as a section heading and goes
even farther, systematically explaining the classic theories of “sea power” as
well as methodically researching and discussing the history of the development
of Western sea power.4 The book explains Mahanian sea power as follows. Sea
power is an important historical factor or process. The economic basis of sea
power involves the rights and interests in the sea—that is, economic sea power.
The superstructure of sea power is the power to control the ocean—that is,
military sea power. The cultivation, growth, and development of sea power rely
on six discrete geographical factors: a state’s geographic position, the natural territorial contours of the state, the scope of its territory, the size of its population,
its national character, and its political traits. Wang believes Gorshkov’s “state sea
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/1
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power” concept is richer than Mahan’s sea-power theory—that “sea power is the
sum of the organic composition of developing the world’s oceans and protecting
national interests. Fixed national sea power determines the use of the ocean’s
military and economic value, and [this form of sea power] is the capacity to
achieve the state’s goals.” This work has similarities to Zhang Shiping’s Chinese
Sea Power. They both deeply consider contemporary sea power, and both find
that China must develop sea power, because “in the twenty-first-century world,
people are still ‘dancing with wolves’”;5 also, “in the future the world’s oceans will
still be under the control of strong states that possess sea power.”6
In this period translations on sea power were published one after the other:
Gorshkov’s Sea Power of the State, Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon
History and Naval Strategy, a Mahan collection entitled Sea Power Theory, and
Lehman’s Command of the Seas, among others. Domestic monographs on seapower issues also increased, such as Yang Xinhua and Shi Ping’s Chinese Sea
Power and Historical Culture, Qin Tian and Huo Xiaoyong’s On the History of
Chinese Sea Power, Liu Yijian’s Command of the Seas and Naval Strategy, and Lu
Rude’s Ocean–State–Sea Power, as well as the PLAN Command Department’s
Modern Chinese Navy and Cheng Guangzhong’s On Geopolitics. All of these objectively explained and assessed Mahan’s sea-power theory.
It can be seen, then, that after reform and opening up, more and more Chinese
people became conscious of the ocean and an increasing number of Chinese
scholars considered the nation’s sea-power issues. This was the call of history.
THEORETICAL DIALECTICS: THE NATURE OF CHINA’S
SEA POWER
In English, haiquan is translated as “sea power.” “Sea power” can be also rendered
[in Chinese] as 海上力量 (haishang liliang), 海上实力 (haishang shili), 海上强
国 (haishang qiangguo), etc. As a political term and strategic concept, haiquan
perhaps comes closest to Mahan’s original meaning. This is because the noun
“sea” connotes the ocean; Mahan said that he chose it after much careful thought,
deliberately avoiding the popular adjective “maritime” to compel people to pay
attention and so make the phrase widely used. Translating “power” as quanli
gives a more political cast than the alternative word liliang. It may be that [for the
Chinese] “sea power” has become too politicized or has “bad origins.” Thus, even
as one set of Chinese people vigorously calls for Chinese sea power, another has
misgivings. In the early years of the twenty-first century, China’s peaceful rise is
attracting the world’s attention; the modernization of China’s national defense
and navy is rapidly proceeding, and the “China threat” theory (especially the
“Chinese naval threat” theory) is surfacing again and again in the international
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community. As a result, the question whether or not the nation should develop
sea power has once again stirred discussion in China.
Since 2003, the “sea-power school,” of which Zhang Wenmu is a representative, has attracted a great deal of attention in Chinese academia. Zhang has
published a multitude of dissertations and books on sea power, including On Chinese Sea Power, China’s National Security Interests within the Global Geopolitical
System, Command of the Seas, and The Historical Experiences of the Rise of Major
Powers. He finds the deductive, logical origin of geopolitical theory in resources.
In this context, humanity’s means for controlling geography have evolved from
command of land to command of the sea. This is because with the Industrial
Revolution, mankind’s methods of survival, production, and earning wealth
changed. States’ economic development expanded beyond national boundaries
and formed interdependent relationships with global markets and resources.
The most convenient medium that connects the world is the ocean, and the
easiest, most direct routes are along sea lines of communication. In the age of
capital globalization,* whoever had a large, strong navy and effectively controlled
sea lines held an advantageous position in the division of international interests.
The reality of history is that trade followed gunboats, not contracts. Any major
trading power will also be a sea power. Issues of control of the seas are global issues. What happens in China depends on what happens in the world beyond its
borders. Sixty percent of China’s oil resources come from the Middle East, and an
enormous amount of trade relies on overseas markets. In today’s world, having
laws but not power makes justice unattainable. China must have strong maritime
forces. The navy is an important means for the state to expand its sea power.
Therefore, to adapt to economic globalization and the context in which China is
attempting to rise, as well as to the demands of its national interests and security
strategy, China must greatly develop sea power and establish a strong navy—
specifically, it should construct a far-seas navy, with an aircraft carrier at its core.7
At the same time, many in China oppose expansion of sea power. Xu Qiyu
has pointed out, in “Reflections on the Sea-Power Fallacy,” that people currently
have four misunderstandings about sea-power issues. One is that sea power has
determined history, that it is in a class of its own, and that this is still the case. A
second is that globalization demands that states have more international markets
and resources and that having sea power means a country can guarantee security
for these things. A third misconception is that major powers must struggle for sea
power or they will have no prospects for development. The fourth is that through
the development of naval forces a state can enjoy the sea power of a hegemon and
that this is the foundation of genuinely equal “friendly relations” with hegemonic
* A reference to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.—Trans.
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countries. Xu believes that sea power has indeed played a deeply significant role
in history but that this does not mean that sea power “determines” history. It has
functioned within the context of given periods of historical development and has
never been in a category of its own. He examines sea power from the perspective of an up-and-coming major power—its strategic choices and geopolitical
restrictions, its ability by means of comprehensive national power to support
sea-power development, and its risk of conflict with hegemonic states. In light of
these considerations, he maintains, China should avoid the “sea-power fallacy.”8
In 2005, Ye Zicheng and Mu Xinhai published [the article] “A Few Thoughts
on China’s Sea-Power Development Strategy” in Research on International
Politics. The essay argued that a state having naval forces alone is incapable of
becoming a major sea power; traditional Western concepts of sea power are not
adaptable to the current development of China’s sea power. China’s sea power
encompasses Chinese capacity for and influence over research on and development, use, and control of the oceans. It is not likely that China can become a
major power with sea power, or even a major power that equally values land and
sea; rather it can only position itself as a land-based power that has established
substantial sea power.9 In 2007, Ye Zicheng published “China’s Peaceful Development: The Return to and Development of Land Power” in [the journal] World
Economics and Politics. The essay posits that if China does not regard geopolitics
from a hegemonic military-strategic perspective, then in the end land power will
determine the development of sea, air, space, and information power. China’s
peaceful development is primarily that of a land power, in a certain sense the return to land power. China’s peaceful growth has been oriented throughout toward
its economic development and has not made obtaining power to control land its
primary objective. As a result, China’s peaceful growth has advanced a new concept of land power—one that is focused on land, people, and development, as well
as on the Eurasian continent and on comprehensiveness. Ye argues that building
up inland areas was the first level of China’s land-power strategy and that [today]
the Eurasian mainland should be the focus. China should establish a foothold in
the Eurasian continent to develop strategic partnerships with Europe, Russia, and
India. At the same time, good-neighbor diplomacy should be an important element in China’s land-power strategy. Moreover, Ye pointed out that land-power
development is beneficial in easing the strategic contradictions with the United
States resulting from China’s rise.10 These two essays* can be said to be the representative texts of China’s “land-power school.”
In the land-power-versus-sea-power debate, both sides accept the assumptions of China’s peaceful rise and that China will not pursue global hegemony, but
the strategic choices they emphasize are markedly different.
* That is, that by Xu Qiyu and the one by Ye Zicheng and Mu Xinhai.—Trans.
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The “sea-power school’s” theories certainly do not embrace Mahan’s original
meaning. Zhang Wenmu has said that in English “sea power” denotes “maritime
power,” not “maritime rights.” Moreover, Chinese sea power is a type of maritime right pertaining to Chinese sovereignty—not maritime power, much less
maritime hegemony. In practice, China’s sea power is far from seeking maritime
power; it is in the stage of merely protecting maritime rights and interests.11
Zhang also notes that Chinese sea power unifies its objectives and means, to include “maritime rights” that proceed from China’s national sovereignty and the
“maritime forces” that would bring about and protect such rights. It should not
include the “maritime power” for which Western hegemons generally strive. The
characteristics of Chinese sea power [in Zhang Wenmu’s view] are as follows:
first, the processes of national unification and achievement of sea power are in
lockstep; second, as determined by special geopolitical conditions, Chinese sea
power can be described as limited; third, the development of China’s maritime
military forces combines the limited nature of China’s long-term strategy with the
unlimited nature of its near-term strategy.
The scholar Liu Zhongmin, of the sea-power school, holds that from a geopolitical perspective, China must on the one hand consider how improvements
in security on land offer the strategic possibility of concentrating force for the
purposes of promoting sea power, while on the other hand it must consider the
necessity of developing sea power itself, given the pressures on maritime frontier
security. With respect to the relationship between developing sea power and
comprehensive national power, China should be calculating not how to decrease
the already quite low investment in naval defense but how to increase the contributions of the maritime economy to comprehensive national power. In the relationship between sea-power development and China’s peaceful rise, the former
should not conflict with or hinder the latter.12
The doctrine of the land-power school does not completely reject the idea
that China should develop sea power. Ye Zicheng has said that Chinese sea
power should be defined as the nation’s capacity and influence with respect to
researching, developing, using, and to a certain extent controlling the sea. It
should also address in a detailed way the question of how to “walk the road of
developing sea power with Chinese characteristics.”13 Ye Zicheng has pointed
out that China’s peaceful development is a new type of land-power conception.
If, as it is stated previously, China does not view geopolitics from a hegemonic
military strategic viewpoint, land power should in the end be determined by sea,
air, space, and information power.14 Xu Qiyu too has not completely rejected
sea-power development. He has said that sea power is not simply a military
question but a grand-strategy issue that concerns national security and development. From a grand-strategy perspective, however exalted sea power becomes,
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it is only one means of actualizing grand strategy. In summary, sea power serves
strategy—strategy does not serve sea power.15
In 2006 the Current Affairs Press published the book Roadmap for Asian
Regional Cooperation, which mentions the “theory of harmonizing sea power
and land power.” This book argues that in the process of economic globalization
and regional integration, states should advocate peace and cooperation between
maritime and land-based countries, “adopting peaceful methods to manage and
use geopolitical relationships between states, promoting enduring peace, security,
development and prosperity for individual states, the region, and the world,” thus
realizing “harmony of land and sea” and common development.16
In the context of today’s continuously growing economic globalization and
the rising importance and usefulness of the ocean, and given China’s deepening
reform and “opening up,” rapidly increasing foreign trade, and gradual expansion of overseas interests, debate over the question whether or not China should
develop sea power has become meaningless. This is obviously not the point being
debated by the two camps. The substantive issues are that of the nature of Chinese
sea power and the direction of its development, whether or not it should be a
significant option in China’s national strategy.
Of these, the most basic question is the nature of Chinese sea power; today it
is a given that China should develop sea power as a significant option of national
strategy to support the nation’s rise. But China cannot repeat the mistakes of
Mahanian sea power.
To begin with, times have changed. Mahan’s sea-power theory is from an age
when capitalism led to imperialism and “imperialism was war.” Therefore it possessed characteristics of a time when the state used military force to control the
oceans and promote the expansion of global capitalism and the pursuit of monopoly. However, ours are globalized times, in which peaceful development is the
mainstream. Even though as the world’s sole superpower the United States still
pursues sea-power “fundamentalism,” it too has been forced to change. This is
because a high level of economic interdependence makes any country unwilling
or unable to use military force frequently. The conditions under which a state’s
maritime security rests completely on war and hegemony no longer exist.
Second, the scientific and technological foundations are not the same. Mahan
lived in an age of broad-based development in the field of mechanization. Navies,
because of their integration of surface, air, and undersea operations, as well as
their good endurance, combat radius, and global power-projection capabilities,
became the most important services of the age. Although these advantages are
still maintained by navies in the information age, they cannot be absolute. New
situations emerge as a result of struggles in space and in the electromagnetic
realm, as well as over rights to control information and the Internet. The concept
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of integrated operations guides decisions of military strategy; the technological
foundation on which the supremacy of sea power rested no longer exists.
Third, cultural traditions are not the same. “Power” was at the core of Mahan’s sea-power theory. It possessed characteristics of traditional Western realist
theory. To date it still influences the national- and maritime-security policy of the
United States: develop maritime forces (the most important being the navy) and
attain sea power—control the ocean (the most important [parts] being sea lines
of communication)—control global trade—win global hegemony. But the theoretical paradigms of traditional Chinese military studies include the concepts of
concord (hehe) and harmony (hexie) and the fundamental aspects of peace and
defense. China cannot choose to imitate Mahan’s offensive, hegemonic sea-power
model.
Fourth, there are disparities in state character. Mahan’s sea-power theory was
born in the United States, so it has been revered by Western capitalist countries
and necessarily has the nature and ideological bent of these nations. Today’s
China is a socialist power under Chinese Communist Party rule. This fact has
determined China’s foreign strategy and foreign policy and established as the
preconditions for developing sea power the principles of the “four persists” (sige
jianchi). Under the guidance of “the five principles of peaceful coexistence,” the
“new security” concept, and the “harmonious world” concept, China will extract
the wheat and discard the chaff of sea-power theory.*
China will not repeat the mistakes of Mahanian sea-power theory, but [to
ensure that it does not,] the country needs to reflect on the history of its national
security strategy, how it conceptualizes the ocean, and the conservative, negative side of traditional military studies. In a certain sense, sea-power theory is
an achievement of civilization, and China should draw from some of its rational
elements, including the following: its basic patterns (maritime economic activities that are characterized by a commodity economy and influence the development of productivity, as well as a state’s rise); the philosophical methods it reveals
(when the ocean ceases to be a barrier and instead brings the world together, a
state needs to think about global strategy); and the important reality it exposes
(the essential linkage between a state’s maritime security, national economy, and
politics, and the navy’s important role among these). Lenin once pointed out, “In
the Marxist revolution, the proletariat’s ideology gained historical significance
because it did not forsake the most treasured achievements of the capitalist class’s
generation. Conversely, it absorbed and altered that which was valuable from
* According to a Deng Xiaoping speech of 30 March 1979, the “four persists” are to persist in
supporting “the socialist path, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist
Party, and both Marxism and Mao Zedong thought.” For the full speech, see “邓小平: 坚持四项
基本原则 (1979年3月30)” [Deng Xiaoping: Persist in Supporting Four Basic Principles, 30 March
1979], available at www.people.com.cn/GB/channel1/10/20000529/80791.html.—Trans.
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over two thousand years of humankind’s ideological and cultural development.”17
This is the attitude we too should adopt toward sea-power theory.
HISTORICAL CHOICE: DEVELOP SEA POWER WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS
Sea power is an issue that falls within the purview of national strategy and
national-security strategy, but it does not constitute their entirety. Instead, it
is the maritime component of national strategy and national-security strategy.
The state’s understanding and use of sea power are not a matter simply for the
maritime domain. Rather, sea power is a complete policy, a process of specific
steps to be implemented. It begins with the land and how the land influences the
ocean. Emphasizing the development of sea power is not the same as following
the path that Western powers took to maritime hegemony. Likewise, emphasis
on a return to land power and a land-centric approach cannot be equated to a
capacity for naturally peaceful development. A nation with land power can take
the hegemonic path as well. In reality, a state must base its development on land,
but it cannot ignore the objective existence of sea power. Thus, people should no
longer deliberately separate “land power” and “sea power” but should consider
the two in tandem and conduct integrated planning.
Contemporary Chinese sea power is, in practice, a component of the state’s
comprehensive national power and strategic capacity. It is a means of actualizing China’s peaceful development strategy and national maritime security. It is
concretely realized in national strategic plans for developing, using, managing,
and controlling the sea and in the management systems and maritime forces
themselves. Sea power can be an element of both “hard power” and “soft power.”
China’s sea power should be formed of the following components:
• National maritime strategy. Maritime strategy is comprehensive state planning of maritime matters taking account of such things as the economy, politics, the military, science and technology, law, and culture. It is a product of
state power. It is also a fundamental reflection of the state’s concept of the sea
and of the government’s level of understanding of the sea. National maritimedevelopment strategy and national maritime-security strategy derive from
national maritime strategy. Maritime-development strategy mainly expresses
the general plan for the progression of a state’s maritime economy and
industry. A state’s maritime-security strategy, however, comprises its comprehensive planning for and guidance of security affairs at sea—the sum total of
the state’s maritime-security concepts in the political, diplomatic, military,
economic, and scientific domains.
• Governmental ocean-management mechanisms. The state is the subject of
sea power, and the government is the material representation of the state’s
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015
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power. Therefore, government mechanisms for ocean management should be
a formative part of sea power and should mainly include policy mechanisms,
legislative and executive institutions, and related cooperative
structures.
• National maritime forces. They are the executors and protectors of the state’s
maritime strategy and ocean development strategy; they constitute the major
support for sea power. These forces include civilian-use marine transport
resources (the merchant marine), near- and far-seas fishing fleets, scientific
survey vessels, and marine-resource exploration and development assets,
among others; military forces at sea (of which the navy is central, but that
also include maritime militia reserve fleets); and maritime law-enforcement
forces, which include the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA), the Coast
Guard of the Border Control Department, the China Marine Surveillance
(CMS), Fisheries Law Enforcement (FLEC), and Maritime Customs, among
others.
In the second decade of the twenty-first century, there was a change in China’s
peripheral maritime security environment. The security demands of national
sea lines of communication and of overseas interests surged. As China’s national
power has increased, international society has increasingly demanded that China
take on the burdens of a great power. As a result, China’s sea-power development
stands at a new historical starting point. Today, CMS and FLEC are taking positive actions to safeguard China’s near-seas maritime security. China’s navy has
implemented routine antipiracy escorts in the Gulf of Aden and Somalia’s maritime space, in accordance with a United Nations resolution. The hospital ship
Peace Ark has journeyed to third-world countries in Africa and Latin America to
provide medical care. Combat vessels have entered the Mediterranean for largescale evacuation operations from Libya and to provide maritime security. China
has launched a training aircraft carrier capable of far-seas operations and sent it
on sea trials. The deep-sea submersible Jiaolong has dived to depths greater than
seven thousand meters.
Today, development of Chinese sea power is not a subjective factor but an
important historical choice of China’s national strategy. First of all, in the age of
globalization, humanity’s development largely depends on the oceans. China’s
rise too greatly relies on the oceans. Sea lines of communication and maritime
resources have already become strategic components of sustainable development,
components from which the state cannot depart for even a moment. This consideration shapes sea power’s historical influence on the momentous rejuvenation
of the Chinese nation. This influence is not absolutely decisive, but its relative
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/1
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decisiveness must be faced squarely. We need to expand the horizons of our security strategy, establish a foothold in the world, and strategically manage [jinglüe]
the ocean. Furthermore, we should synchronize the maritime expansion of China’s national interests and the process of its rise, demanding a modernized navy
that provides maritime security and implements necessary, limited sea control
[haiyang kongzhi]. China also requires a navy strong and large enough to fulfill
new missions, as well as adapt to the nation’s great-power status. Because China
faces a global trend toward revolution in military affairs (RMA), it must confront
the immutable laws governing the relationship between “spears” and “shields” in
contemporary international society.*
Chinese sea power must have Chinese characteristics. The first such characteristic is big-picture, highly centralized strategic planning that aligns with China’s
national strategy regarding peaceful progress toward a harmonious world and its
foreign strategy. Second, sea power should embody the core values of socialism
with Chinese characteristics—a socialism that is guided by Marxist tenets, that
has as its objectives eliminating exploitation and achieving justice, and that dialectically combines China’s national interests and the shared interests of humankind. Third, sea power ought to give priority to the maritime economy, maritime
economic forces, and exploration for and use of ocean resources. Fourth, Chinese
sea power should emphasize comprehensive security and cooperative security;
actively develop security cooperation with littoral states and states along sea lines
of communication; and comprehensively deploy economic, political, diplomatic,
military, scientific, and cultural means to achieve maritime security. Fifth, Chinese sea power should reflect the national-security strategy of “active defense.” Its
basic objective should be to assure national maritime security and national economic interests. Additionally, Chinese sea power should emphasize the limited
use of military and paramilitary forces at sea, stressing especially the search for
ways to use maritime forces in peacetime, including as instruments of political
diplomacy. This will have to be an important component of China’s future seapower theory and a highlight of sea-power theory with Chinese characteristics.
In brief, China’s development of an ability to control and manage the ocean
is meant not only to protect national interests but also to safeguard world peace.
This is the crux of the difference between sea power with Chinese characteristics
and sea power in general. Chinese sea power is the application of national maritime forces to developing and using the sea. It is also the process of protecting
national rights and interests and ensuring national maritime security. Above all,
it is the process of developing strategic management of national maritime affairs,
the capability of administering the ocean, and the art of doing so.
* The Chinese characters for “spears” and “shields,” when combined, create the word “contradiction.”
The author’s point is that contradictions are inevitable.—Trans.
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FERNANDO OLIVEIR A’S ART OF WAR AT SEA
(1555)
A Pioneering Treatise on Naval Strategy
Luis Nuno Sardinha Monteiro

T

he era of maritime discoveries was a period of expansive exploration, one
that prompted the emergence of a range of maritime thinking in the sixteenth century, mainly in the countries of southern Europe. Of all the insightful
and innovative works written at that time, as shown in table 1, Fernando Oliveira’s
Art of War at Sea has two distinctive features.1 First, it went beyond the usual
operational and tactical perspectives and entered the domain of strategy. While
Art of War at Sea is certainly a period piece, it is unusual in foreshadowing some
aspects of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century naval strategic thought
in the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Second, as evidenced in table 1, Oliveira’s
volume was the only one to be published at the time of writing.2 As a matter of
fact, it was the first printed treatise on naval strategy. However, it was written and
published in Portuguese and never translated into another language.3 Therefore,
this article aims at presenting Art of War at Sea
Commander Monteiro is currently serving at the
to English-reading audiences, with a focus on its
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allied Comstrategic aspects, thus contributing to the internamand Transformation headquarters in Norfolk,
Virginia. A graduate of the Portuguese Naval Acad- tional naval canon.
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He has taught navigation and strategy and naval
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Fernando Oliveira was born in the small hamlet
of Gestosa, in Portugal, in 1507 and entered a
Dominican convent at age ten.4 He was a disciple
of one of Portugal’s most important humanist
scholars, the noted Dominican André de Resende,
who educated him in Scholastic philosophy and
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TABLE 1
MAIN WORKS ON MARITIME SUBJECTS WRITTEN IN SOUTHERN EUROPE IN THE
SIXTEENTH CENTURY
Date of
Writing

Title

Author (nationality)

Date of Publication

1516–20

Les faiz de la marine et navigaiges (On the Nature of the
Fleet and Navigation)

Antoine de Conflans (French)

1842

1530

Quatri partitu en cosmografía
práctica, y por otro nombre,
Espejo de navegantes (Navigator’s Glass)

Alonso de Chaves (Spanish)

1983

1550–54

Della Milizia Marittima (Of
the Maritime Militia)

Cristoforo Da Canal
(Venetian)

2010 (fourth book was printed
in 1930)

1552–54

Arte da Guerra do Mar (Art of
War at Sea)

Fernando Oliveira
(Portuguese)

1555

theology. Oliveira learned to read and write fluently in Latin and studied the
most prominent classical authors. When he was twenty-five, he broke with his
order and escaped to Spain, where he continued linguistic studies and may have
acquired his interest in shipbuilding.5
After returning to Portugal, Oliveira published a grammar of the Portuguese
language in 1536. This was his first book and also the first Portuguese grammar
ever published.6 It is not clear when and where Oliveira learned navigation, but
it may well have been during this time, as nautical matters were then popular in
Portugal.
By 1541, he was again in Spain and embarked from Barcelona on a ship bound
to Genoa. Oliveira’s ship was captured by the French and taken to Marseille, but
he soon went from prisoner to pilot of French galleys in the Mediterranean, because of his navigation knowledge and the high regard afforded to Portuguese pilots. He returned to Portugal in 1543, where he stayed for two years. In June 1545,
a twenty-five-ship naval force, headed by the baron de La Garde, called at Lisbon
to replenish stores on its way to Le Havre to join the two-hundred-ship armada
that planned to invade England during the naval war of 1544–46. Oliveira was
recruited to serve as a pilot on board the galley of the baron de Saint-Blancard
and won his confidence, as well as that of La Garde, by virtue of some very useful
suggestions about ship design.7
Saint-Blancard’s galley was captured after a skirmish between French galleys
and an English squadron in May 1546. Oliveira was taken to London, but it seems
he was never imprisoned. Most probably, he “was employed as an ambassador
in the negotiations over the French galley and its crew” and became well known
in the court.8 Some historians believe that he gained the esteem of Henry VIII,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/1
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probably because of his “professional knowledge [as] . . . a pilot” and his “experience in galley construction and warfare, [which were] of immediate interest to
Henry at the time.”9
The quickness and apparent ease with which Oliveira gained the respect of
La Garde and King Henry VIII are indicative of his profound erudition and
culture, qualities that made him valuable to those powerful men. Oliveira stayed
in England for almost a year during a period preceding the rise of the country
to mastery of the seas under Queen Elizabeth I. By then, Oliveira was certainly
well aware that sea power was crucial for the integrity of the Portuguese empire.
Nonetheless, during his stay in England he became acquainted with the English merchant classes (which were engaged in extending their overseas trade),
consolidating his beliefs on the importance of sea power for the livelihood of
maritime nations.
In March 1547, shortly after the death of Henry VIII, he was sent back to Lisbon with a letter to the Portuguese king, Dom João III. In Portugal, Oliveira did
not refrain from praising some of the ideas of the arch-heretic King Henry VIII,
prompting the attention of the Inquisition. Oliveira was interrogated at length
and condemned on charges of heretical practices. He remained in jail until 1550
and under monastery arrest for another year.
In 1552 he joined, as chaplain, a Portuguese squadron composed of five small
warships sent to northern Africa to help an allied Moroccan monarch, the king
of Velez. The expedition failed, and Oliveira was taken prisoner for a short time
by the Turks. He recounted (specifically, in chapter 12 of Part II) this failed
campaign in Art of War at Sea, which he produced from 1552 to 1554 upon his
return to Lisbon. The book was published in 1555, and
in it Oliveira criticized some maritime policies of the
Portuguese administration and described chapters of
Portuguese history in a manner not aligned with the
official version. Therefore, he was imprisoned again by
the Inquisition four months after the book’s dissemination; he remained in jail for two more years.
Little is known about Oliveira’s activities from 1557
until his death in about 1585, except that he continued
to parlay his vast experience at sea to produce seminal
treatises on nautical and naval warfare issues. As British
professor Harold Livermore has written, Oliveira was
“a passionate character which had imbibed a strain of
Dominican zeal . . . and combined it with a rhetorician’s
love of words and a marked taste for erudition: these he
Cover of the original edition of Art of War at Sea
applied to the meticulous study of seamanship.”10
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Around 1570 he wrote the encyclopedic Ars Nautica (Art of Navigation) in
Latin, but it was never published. The incomplete manuscript is preserved today
in the Leiden University Library in the Netherlands.11 It has three parts: one
about navigation, cartography, and meteorology; another about naval construction; and a third addressing broad naval logistical and administrative matters.
According to the Portuguese maritime historian Francisco Contente Domingues,
the second part was the first theoretical text on naval construction written by a
Portuguese author and was unparalleled throughout Europe, with its extensive
array of themes and penetrating analysis and explanations.12
Art of Navigation was followed by a companion work on naval construction,
written in Portuguese and entitled Livro da Fábrica das Naus (Book on the Building of Ships). This piece dealt with the same subjects as the second part of Art of
Navigation, but it was more than a translation from Latin to Portuguese of the
earlier treatise, detailing and updating some of its subjects. The book was originally written around 1580 but was only published more than three centuries later
in 1898.13 The manuscript of this treatise is in the National Library of Portugal, in
Lisbon.14 Probably around 1581, Oliveira wrote a History of Portugal, the manuscript of which belongs to the National Library of France, in Paris.15
Oliveira, then, was a clergyman, a sailor, a pilot, a diplomat, a soldier, a philologist, a historian, a naval construction theoretician, and a naval strategist. He
was in fact a true polymath, a man who mastered various fields of knowledge
and pioneered by writing an original treatise on naval strategy, Art of War at Sea.
ART OF WAR AT SEA
Art of War at Sea is organized into one prologue and two parts, each containing
fifteen chapters. The first part, “Intention and Preparation for War at Sea,” is
dedicated largely to broad political and strategic issues, including a reflection on
the nature of war in its ethical, ontological, and moral dimensions. The second
part, “Of Armed Fleets & Maritime Battles & Stratagems,” covers nautical matters
and naval tactics. Table 2 lists all the book’s chapters.
This table of contents shows the comprehensiveness of the volume through
a wide range of subjects, including naval construction, ship commissioning,
navigation, seamanship, meteorology, oceanography, logistics, recruitment,
training, education, command skills, maritime ceremonial, and intelligence. To
illustrate his ideas, Oliveira employed warfare examples from ancient Greece
and Rome, as well as from the discoveries era, with an emphasis on Portuguese
history. Moreover, he recounted personal experiences, such as the capture of his
galley by the English in 1546 and the failed expedition to Velez in 1552. Oliveira
argues that the principal causes for those defeats were deficient leadership in the
former episode and lack of organization, discipline, and training in the latter.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/1
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TABLE 2
CHAPTERS OF ART OF WAR AT SEA
Part I: Intention and Preparation for War at Sea
Chap. 1

That It Is Necessary to Make War

Chap. 2

Of Who Can Make War

Chap. 3

That War at Sea Is Necessary

Chap. 4

Which War Is Just

Chap. 5

Of the Intention and Conduct of War

Chap. 6

Of the Admiral’s Service

Chap. 7

Of Arsenals and Their Provisioning

Chap. 8

Of Wood for Ships

Chap. 9

Of When to Cut Wood

Chap. 10

Of Warehouses and Their Provisioning

Chap. 11

Of Victuals

Chap. 12

Of Sailors

Chap. 13

Of Captains of the Sea and of Their Power

Chap. 14

Of How Soldiers Should Be Selected and Recruited

Chap. 15

Of Soldiers’ Training

Part II: Of Armed Fleets & Maritime Battles & Stratagems
Chap. 1

Of Fleets’ Ships

Chap. 2

Of Ships’ Crews

Chap. 3

Of Provisioning of Supplies, Munitions, and Rigging

Chap. 4

Of When to Set Sail and of Weather Changes

Chap. 5

Of Storm Signs

Chap. 6

Of Winds, Their Regions and Names

Chap. 7

Some Warnings Useful for Sailing

Chap. 8

Of Tides, Currents, and Streams

Chap. 9

Of How Armadas Set Sail

Chap. 10

Of Sea Battles and Some Needed Stratagems

Chap. 11

Of the Place to Engage in Combat

Chap. 12

Of How the Ships That Went with the King of Velez Were Lost

Chap. 13

Of Rules of War at Sea

Chap. 14

Of Some General Rules of War

Chap. 15

Of the Work’s Conclusion
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Therefore, the book emphasizes the importance of those elements for success in
naval warfare.
Influences in Art of War at Sea
Art of War at Sea was inspired by Oliveira’s own experience, having spent long
periods under way in the Mediterranean and in the Atlantic aboard Portuguese
and French ships, and also having become acquainted and, in some cases, even
working with Spanish, Italian, and English sailors and tradesmen, as well as with
Moors.
In addition, Oliveira was a man of his time and therefore influenced by the
Renaissance, a movement characterized by humanism, consisting of the rediscovery, study, and imitation of the philosophy, art, history, and literature from
ancient Greece and Rome. Many Renaissance humanists were clergymen, and
combined the revival of the great classical authors with the promotion of biblical
texts. That was also the case with Oliveira, whose Renaissance humanism and
Christianity are clearly evident in his writing. Professor Livermore even considers that “much of the value of Oliveira’s book lies in the glimpses of reality that
shine through a welter of classical and Biblical allusions.”16
In the prologue of his treatise, Oliveira claimed the pioneering nature of his
work on naval warfare “about which no author, to my knowledge, wrote any
documents before or, if someone wrote about it, I confess it did not come to my
cognizance, only a little thing from Vegetius.”17 However, Publius Flavius Vegetius
Renatus’s influence was far from little. Vegetius was a Roman writer of the fourth
century ad who wrote Epitoma Rei Militaris (Concerning Military Matters), a
treatise about warfare and military principles to explain methods and practices
used during the Roman Empire. The final chapters (31 to 46) of Book IV of Vege
tius’s piece are devoted to naval tactics and constituted Oliveira’s primary source.
Oliveira mentions Vegetius thirty times in Art of War at Sea on such diversified matters as personnel issues, including conscription, qualities required for
soldiers and seamen, leadership, training, organization, and discipline; materiél
issues, including fleet balance, types of ships, logistics, and properties of materials; and employment of military and naval power, including combat readiness,
military and naval tactics, meteorology, and deception. Furthermore, Oliveira
presents (in chapter 14 of Part II) thirty-nine general rules of war, inspired by
Vegetius’s thirty-five general warfare maxims, from chapter 26 of Book III of Concerning Military Matters. While most of Oliveira’s rules were original, some were
adaptations of Vegetius’s maxims. Oliveira drew as well on the work of a number
of other Greek and Roman authors, summarized in table 3.18
The other main sources for Art of War at Sea were the Bible (Isaiah, Jeremiah,
Pauline epistles, and the Gospel according to John) and some medieval Catholic
authors, such as Saint Augustine. A notable Algerian-Roman theologian and
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TABLE 3
CLASSICAL AUTHORS QUOTED IN ART OF WAR AT SEA
Author

Topics of the Quotes

Quintilian

Rhetoric

Aelian

Combat readiness, dissuasion, and military organization

Plato

Combat readiness and dissuasion

Sallust

Combat readiness and dissuasion

Diodorus Siculus

Combat readiness, dissuasion, characteristics of soldiers, and maritime swell

Alexander the Great

Politics

Aulus Gellius

Characteristics needed for seamen and victory in war

Vitruvius

Qualities of shipbuilding wood and ship design

Pliny the Elder

Qualities of shipbuilding wood, nourishment of seamen, winds, tides, and advantages of
teamwork

Julius Caesar

Weapons, influence of meteorology, and maritime signaling

Marcus Varro

Properties of food, characteristics of men, and leadership

Justinus

Unity of command, unity of action, and trade

Cicero

Vicious behaviors

Seneca

Metaphors from Seneca’s tragedies and information on winds and storm signs

Cato the Elder

Seamen and military discipline

Julius Frontinus

Seamen and military discipline

Claudian

Transition from oared vessels to sailing ships

Columella

Maxim from one of Columella’s works

philosopher of the fourth and fifth centuries, Augustine helped craft the just war
theory, which was central to Art of War at Sea. Oliveira also quotes Saint Ambrose (on the appropriateness of priests going to war) and Saint Thomas Aquinas
(on war and religion).19
The bibliography employed in Art of War at Sea reveals an erudite author,
cognizant of an impressive catalogue on the most varied subjects. Most of the
sources Oliveira used are related not to war at sea but to warfare in general and
to generic matters, such as rhetoric, wood qualities, and food properties. This
confirms that he was being truthful in asserting his unawareness of other works
on naval warfare, with the exception of the chapters on naval tactics in Vegetius’s
Concerning Military Matters. Even that source must be qualified, as those chapters correspond to only seventeen pages and were written more than a thousand
years before, when navigation and naval warfare were completely different.20
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Strategic Insights of Art of War at Sea
The British historian Richard Barker opines that “there is little doubt[:] . . . Art of
War at Sea is on a grander scale than any of its predecessors.”21 It was also a book
ahead of its time, as it established some of the basis of modern naval strategy,
according to the Portuguese scholar and naval officer António Silva Ribeiro.22
In fact, while the preceding and contemporary works on maritime or naval affairs focus on operational, tactical, or technical issues, Art of War at Sea offers a
strategic reflection on the importance of naval power as the key to maintaining
a mighty empire, such as the Portuguese held at that time, with territories and
possessions in all five populated continents.
In the sixteenth century the concept of naval power had not been introduced.
Nevertheless, a careful reading of Art of War at Sea shows that Oliveira uses the
expression “war at sea” in a sense that encompassed all aspects of military organization for sea warfare, including construction, commissioning, training, and
operation of warships—that is, what would come to be defined as naval power.
In his prologue, Oliveira emphasizes the importance of war at sea: “In particular for this land’s men, that now use the sea more than any others, thus acquiring
high profit and honor. . . . Nurturing this war [i.e., this power], Portuguese people
have gained lots of wealth & prosperity . . . & have gained honor in a short period
of time, as no other nation in longer periods.”23
Oliveira’s volume throughout reiterates this idea that nations must defend
their interests at sea by the use of naval power, stressing that maritime security
should not be taken for granted.
Because the sea is very licentious and men cannot avoid using it to trade, to fish and
with other purposes, taking supply and profit from it, it is essential to safeguard it,
through fear or severe punishment. . . . Due to all these reasons, it is necessary to
have navies at sea, that safe keep our coasts and passages and that protect from the
surprises that can storm from the sea, which are much more sudden than the ones
24
coming from land.

This view is as applicable today as it was five hundred years ago, because the main
challenges to naval power in the twenty-first century are similar to those of the
sixteenth.
Another prominent feature of Oliveira’s book is the way it addresses some perennial strategic principles, with insights that are still valid and useful. In fact, Art
of War at Sea highlights the importance of a substantial number of factors (noting
the reference in the 2008 Portuguese-language edition cited above):
• National defense: “Good war makes good peace. And therefore the peace
that we now enjoy was conquered by past wars, but careless peace will leave
war to posterity. Peace lovers that now enjoy it should not rest if they want it
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/1
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perpetually, because if the enemies of peace see a soft peace, they will take it
away” (Part I, chap. 1, p. 12).
• Readiness at sea: “It is necessary to be ready to defend ourselves from those
who want to attack, because promptitude, as says Vegetius, is sometimes
more useful than strength in war” (Part I, chap. 1, p. 11), and “Promptitude
gives victory to the diligent and negligence defeats the careless” (pp. 11–12).
• Surprise factor: “Sudden attacks terrify the enemies, but expected encounters
do not frighten them” (Part II, chap. 14, p. 133).
• Time as a fundamental element of strategy: “There is a time to engage in
battle, when we have an opportunity or when the advantage is on our side”
(Part II, chap. 10, p. 118), and “[In battles] the occasion is more important,
than bravery or wisdom” (Part II, chap. 14, p. 133).
• Space as a fundamental element of strategy: “In combats, the location is responsible for a great part of the victory, because those who find themselves in
an inadequate position double their works: some caused by the position and
some caused by the opponent” (Part II, chap. 11, p. 121), “At sea, as well as on
land, there are places . . . that give and take opportunity and benefit to ships
at the time of fighting” (p. 121), and “The location is often worthier than the
force” (Part II, chap. 14, p. 133).
• Dissuasion: “And therefore, favor weapons because they are not as contrary to
peace as they may seem, contrarily they protect peace as the dogs protect the
sheep, although they may seem their foes” (Part I, chap. 1, p. 12).
• Deception: “Let us deceive as much as we can, so that we will be taken as
liars” (Part II, chap. 14, p. 134), and “He who tells the truth to his enemy,
warns that enemy against himself ” (p. 134).
• Intelligence: “The captains must have warning about the opponents’ fleets, if
they are big or not, so that they do not miss or unnecessarily exceed what is
needed” (Part II, chap. 1, p. 68), and “As important as covering our intentions
is trying to know the opponent’s” (Part II, chap. 14, p. 134).
• Unity of command: “The Greek army, while it had only one head and King
[Alexander the Great], conquered and won the world, but as soon as the King
died and divisions arose, everything started falling apart” (Part I, chap. 13, p.
49), and “It is necessary that men of war have a head . . . and one that commands over everyone” (p. 50).
• Unity of action: “Many times, a few aligned people can achieve more than
many non-aligned” (Part I, chap. 13, p. 49).
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• Tailoring war-fighting capabilities to the type of conflict: “Thus, according to
whom we fight, we shall use those weapons” (Part I, chap. 10, p. 42) and “The
warships must also be adequate to the wars they are expected to fight, both in
number and in type” (Part II, chap. 1, p. 68).
• Balanced fleet composition: “Therefore in the fleets it is necessary to have
different ships, ones to bear the weight of war, and others to support and help
those ones” (Part II, chap. 1, p. 69).
To conclude this analysis of the strategic insights of Art of War at Sea, it is
worth highlighting some of the listed general rules of war. These short aphorisms summarize and encapsulate the key takeaways of the book, stressing the
importance of (as found in Part II, chapter 14, pages 133–34, of the Portugueselanguage edition cited above) recruitment (“Mistakes in commissioning endanger the battles”), training (“Exercises make men braver than nature”), motivation
(“When personnel are hesitant, do not enter a fight”), logistics (“Those who do
not supply themselves with provisions . . . will be beaten without fighting”), organization and discipline (“Better order than multitude”), leadership (“The prudent captain is always ready, the skillful one does not miss a good opportunity,
when it shows up”), and meteorology (“It must not be the sea waiting for you, it
must be you waiting for the sea,” and “We shall protect from sea state and weather,
the same way we protect against our enemies”).
These general rules conclude with a maxim, on the contradictory nature of
war: “War requires fairness and deceit, truth and lies, cruelty and pity, preserving
and destroying.”25
Humanitarian Convictions in Art of War at Sea
Another important feature of this treatise is the humanitarian (that is, benevolent) approach to the theory of just war and to the problem of slavery. The just
war theory evolved from the concepts of holy war contained in the Bible, and
justum bellum (just war) theorized by the Romans. It sought to justify aggression
morally through codification of a set of rules that evolved with time. For example,
Augustine averred that Christians should, by definition, be against war. But the
pursuit of peace should include the option of going to war (a just war) if that is
the only option to prevent a grave wrong. Almost nine centuries later, Aquinas
delineated criteria for just war, as needing to be declared by the proper authority,
have a just cause, and involve fighting with the right intention.
Oliveira draws on the heritage of Augustine and Aquinas to write in the
prologue that “the war of Christians that fear God is not bad, it is full of virtues,
because it is done with a desire for peace, without greediness nor cruelty, as a
punishment to the bad and relief of the good.”26 Then, he invoked Augustine to
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define just war as “the one that defends a people from those who want to offend
it without reason . . . and [the war] that punishes the offenses to God.”27
By the mid-sixteenth century, theologians were expanding this theory to
rationalize the fights against pagans and heathens who had never encountered
Christianity—namely, the indigenous peoples of Africa and the New World. However, Oliveira’s work takes a more fraternal approach: “We cannot make just war
to the infidels who were never Christians, like Moors, Jews and pagans, that want
to be at peace with us and did not take our lands or prejudiced Christianity.”28
Oliveira also imposes humanitarian rules of engagement: “You shall not kill
women, children nor beasts, cut fruit trees, burn warehouses, nor damage the
things that men need.”29 These humanitarian convictions prompted him to condemn slavery—a position that was anathema among the widespread acceptance
of slavery as natural in the sixteenth century. Audaciously, Oliveira condemns
slavery as a “bad habit,” arguing that “no human reasoning allows the public and
free practice of buying and selling free and peaceful men, as one buys and sells
beasts, cattle or horses.”30
Art of War at Sea and Mahan
Because Art of War at Sea was neither widely disseminated nor translated, it had
only marginal impact on subsequent naval strategy. Nonetheless, the main ideas
that would later be conceptualized and publicized by some of the most notable
naval thinkers were already present in this pioneering treatise. In particular, Art
of War at Sea is a distant yet direct ancestor of the works of the world’s bestknown maritime strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, who 350 years later brilliantly
theorized about the influence of sea power on history and its importance for
the wealth and prestige of nations. Both strategists shared the conviction that
the prosperity and international status of maritime nations (like Portugal and
the United States) depended heavily on seaborne trade and connected maritime
activities. They believed that those nations should develop robust sea power,
including powerful navies, to achieve their full potential. The main difference
between Oliveira and Mahan is that Oliveira wrote when the Portuguese empire
was starting to decay (his writings constituting a warning about the consequences
on economic and political status of disinvestment in naval power), whereas
Mahan wrote when the United States was initiating an expansionist era (his writings representing a road map to world supremacy, based on a strong sea power
and a dominant navy).
Furthermore, Oliveira and Mahan were both pious Christians, Oliveira a
Catholic and Mahan Protestant. They shared views consistent with the theories
of just war and advocated the use of naval/sea power to disseminate Christianity.
In Art of War at Sea, Oliveira commends the use of naval power for spreading
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Christianity, praising the Portuguese discoveries as “allow[ing] multiplying the
God’s faith & the salvation of men.”31 He also adds that “His Highness [the king
of Portugal] has armadas at sea to augment the Christian faith and to defend his
lands.”32 Mahan offered a similar sentiment in “A Twentieth-Century Outlook,”
an essay for the Harper’s New Monthly Magazine:33 “The great task now before the
world of civilized Christianity, its great mission, which it must fulfil or perish, is
to receive into its own bosom and raise to its own ideals those ancient and different civilizations by which it is surrounded and outnumbered.”34
Although written more than 450 years ago, Art of War at Sea is comprehensive
and relevant, addressing the various elements of establishing, organizing, and
employing naval power. It is innovative in the conceptualization of naval power
as an instrument for countries’ political goals and economic interests. It considers
perennial principles of strategy, with insights that remain valid and applicable.
Additionally, its respectful approach is unique and commendable; its benevolence and prescience guarantee this treatise a place in posterity.
It was, therefore, a book ahead of its time, helping to establish the foundations
of modern naval strategy. However, Art of War at Sea did not enjoy the international dissemination it deserved and has remained in obscurity, having been
written in sixteenth-century Portuguese and never translated. This impediment
will soon be overcome by a forthcoming English translation.35 The translation
will allow the treatise to receive the attention it deserves, owing to its historical
value, the broad range of issues analyzed, and its strategic insights, many of which
ring true today.
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navegantes, ed. Paulino Castañeda Delgado,
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and a study (“A Obra: Estudo Introdutório
à Arte da Guerra do Mar”) by António Silva
Ribeiro, and a facsimile of the original 1555
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RESEARCH & DEBATE

THE NEW YOUNG TURKS

Commander Benjamin Armstrong, U.S. Navy

From the sixth floor of the University of Chicago Gleacher Center you can look
down the river and into the reflected prism of the bustling city’s concrete, steel,
and glass. In the opposite direction you look out across Lake Michigan where the
blue and grey come together at a far horizon. These remarkable vistas welcomed
the second annual Defense Entrepreneurs Forum (DEF) in October 2014. Over
one hundred and fifty military personnel, defense-industry professionals, and
innovation experts came together for three days to discuss the issues and critical
questions faced by American defense in the twenty-first century.
DEF was the brainchild of a small group of relatively junior officers. Coming
out of more than a decade of war, many served with a high level of responsibility
that is uncommon for young men and women. They encountered not just the
issues of life and death that combat brings but also the demands of humanitarian work for entire towns, nation-building responsibilities in large cities, and the
need to come up with creative solutions to the problems they faced. Frequently
this included working with limited resources or for an unresponsive, stagnant
bureaucracy. They knew, with challenges looming in the coming decades, that
Commander Armstrong holds an MA in military the search for critical thinking needed an advocate
history from Norwich University and a BS in history
in today’s military services.1
from the U.S. Naval Academy. He is a PhD candidate
DEF was established to bring together those
in War Studies, King’s College, London. A helicopter
creative
junior men and women, who heartily
pilot, he has flown amphibious search-and-rescue
and special-warfare missions, and has served as
embrace the Silicon Valley definitions of the terms
well in the Pentagon. He is the author of 21st Ceninnovation and entrepreneur, with civilian worktury Mahan: Sound Military Conclusions for the
Modern Era (2013) and 21st Century Sims: Innova- ers in the defense industry and both critics and
tion, Education, and Leadership for the Modern Era
current leaders. Through personal interaction at
(2015).
conferences and encouragement to advocate for
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2015, Vol. 68, No. 4
ideas through professional writing, DEF’s board
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of directors looked to expand the circle of people talking about new ways of addressing the defense world. They aimed to support those who were being constructively critical of military organizations, particularly those inside the system.2
As a naval officer by profession and military helicopter pilot by trade, I was
drawn to these ideas. As a historian by education, I also knew that the processes
they were exploring and the grand narrative they looked to build were not quite
as new and disruptive as some believed. Context, as is said, is king.
Twice I’ve been asked to serve as a speaker at the annual DEF conference in
Chicago, most recently as the opening keynote. My historical talks have looked
to illuminate some of the recurring questions that come along with defense innovation and adaptation.3 But as I have interacted and collaborated with these
inspired defense professionals, I have also come to realize that there is a great
deal of history in the existence of this organization, despite its clearly twentyfirst-century roots.
A COMMENDABLE LITTLE INSTITUTION
Almost two hundred years ago during the presidency of Andrew Jackson, a period emerged in U.S. naval history that some historians have termed an age of
naval enlightenment. The first two decades after the U.S. Navy’s refounding in
1798 were a busy time for naval officers, who saw four wars: the Quasi-War with
France, First Barbary War, War of 1812, and Second Barbary War. The following
Jackson years brought a period of relative peace for the service, opening up a
period of reflection and professionalization.4
With less combat and fewer deployments, officers began considering the
details of their service more closely. The officers assigned to the Brooklyn Navy
Yard took inspiration from the lyceum movement that had spread across Europe.
In 1833 they established the U.S. Naval Lyceum in a small building on the base.
Dominated by junior officers, the group wrote in its constitution: “We, the Officers of the Navy and Marine Corps, in order to promote the diffusion of useful
knowledge,—to foster a spirit of harmony and a community of interest in the
service, and to cement the links which unite us as professional brethren, have
formed ourselves into a Society, to be denominated ‘The United States Naval
Lyceum.’”5
Their effort was twofold. First, they looked to establish a museum of artifacts,
art, and curiosities that naval officers collected from their deployments across the
seven seas. Second, they established the Naval Magazine to discuss the pressing
issues of the day.
For two years the Naval Magazine was at the forefront of naval professionalism and criticism. Subjects for discussion included the military promotion system and rank structure, the introduction of new technology like steam power,
and strategic and geopolitical subjects. Unfortunately, the maintenance of the
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museum and building that housed the lyceum appears to have taken up a majority of the funds, and the magazine ceased publication in 1837. But the ideals of
innovation and reform were alive and well, as one of the magazine’s pseudonymous authors wrote: “The spirit of the times and the necessities of the navy loudly
declare that change is requisite. We cannot remain as we are.”6
The lyceum lived on well beyond the last issue of the magazine, continuing to
host lectures and talks on the vital naval subjects of the day. The museum’s collection grew into an important repository. The New York Times described it as
“a commendable little institution in every sense.”7 The members who established
the organization as junior officers rose through the ranks and became important
naval leaders of the Mexican-American War and the Civil War. They commanded
America’s first steam-powered warships and led the Navy’s growing responsibilities on the global stage. The lyceum established a vital intellectual foundation for
military officers who looked to improve their service.
THE DECADE OF NEGLECT
Following the end of the American Civil War the United States continued a pattern that has been displayed throughout its history by dramatically cutting back
on defense spending. The War between the States, reconstructing the nation in
its wake, and the promise of continued expansion westward guided the American
populace to a continental, internal focus that led to cuts in the Navy’s size and
capabilities. Many naval officers saw it as a decade of neglect.
In October 1873 fifteen of these officers came together on the grounds of the
U.S. Naval Academy. Senior and junior commissioned naval officers, as well as
warrant officers and Marines, they began as a discussion group to debate naval
affairs and national and international issues. They named their society the United
States Naval Institute. Many of the early meetings included discussing and commenting on papers that were prepared and presented by the members. They decided to publish their own journal, containing the best of the papers and some of
the commentary. In December 1874 the journal was first published as the Papers
and Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute and is now known today as
Proceedings magazine.8
Early members of the institute included officers who would have enormous
impacts on the Navy and Marine Corps, and even the nation at large. Stephen
Luce, one of the first officers to present a paper, is best known as the greatest
advocate for, and founding President of, the U.S. Naval War College. His virtual invention of American professional military education had an impact on
strategic thought and military and naval affairs that rippled across generations.
Another early member was Alfred Thayer Mahan, known to most students of
military history for his strategic writing and his famous book The Influence of Sea
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Power upon History. He was one of the institute’s earliest presidents. He began his
publishing career with his essay on naval education in the pages of Proceedings.
From Civil War officers like Admiral David Dixon Porter to the future SpanishAmerican War leaders like W. T. Sampson and George Dewey, the organization
grew rapidly. The articles published in Proceedings questioned the status quo and
raised American knowledge of naval affairs as the country came out of its Manifest Destiny period and returned its attention to the larger world.9
The U.S. Naval Institute and Proceedings began primarily as a place for junior
and midlevel officers to express their ideas and advocate for reform. Over time
they continued that tradition but also became a place for thought leaders, from
senior admirals to established academics, to debate the issues with upstart junior
officers and military critics who looked to move in new directions. The professional society officially adopted the mission “to provide an independent forum
for those who dare to read, think, speak, and write in order to advance the professional, literary, and scientific understanding of sea power and other issues critical
to national defense.”10
REGENERATING SERVICE INTELLECTS
Forty years after the officers met in Annapolis another group gathered in discussion in Hampshire, England. These Royal Navy officers saw the approach of the
Great War and feared that their service was unprepared. They met, as Reginald
Plunkett said, to develop “some means of regenerating Service intellects before
Armageddon.”11 These British sailors were focused on their own officer corps,
which they believed needed a greater understanding of naval affairs and war as
the United Kingdom approached the looming conflict.
Inspired by Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond and the noted civilian strategist
Sir Julian Corbett, they founded what was originally thought of as a correspondence society. The purpose was to bring junior officers together in discussions
for their own self-improvement. In 1913 they began publication of a journal
titled the Naval Review. There was significant official resistance from the newly
established Naval War Staff, and during World War I the Admiralty ordered the
Naval Review to cease publication. However, W. H. Henderson, the editor at the
time, continued to collect material and even circulated some of it to members in
the original spirit of a correspondence society. At the end of the war the Naval
Review began publication again, including the material Henderson had collected,
to ensure there wasn’t a loss of lessons learned from the conflict.12
When publication began again in 1919, Henderson’s opening article specifically took inspiration from the U.S. Naval Institute but looked to take a uniquely
British tack. Concerns that expressing contrarian views would have a negative
impact on the careers of junior officers, who were the target audience, led to a
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unique editorial policy. Where Proceedings has a clear editorial requirement for
authors to write under their own names, and the Naval Magazine encouraged the
use of pseudonyms, the Naval Review elected not to use bylines at all. Articles
were considered “from the membership,” and the editors diligently protected the
contributors.13
The no-name policy had a secondary impact. Senior officers or establishment supporters could write counterarguments without standing on their rank.
Genuine debates about naval subjects were fostered through the process. Over
the course of time the publication, which is still active and vibrant today, has
gone through cycles of official approval as well as censure from the Admiralty.
In World War II there was no censorship, and the “Diary of the War at Sea” published in the journal’s pages has become an important historical record. Today,
the Naval Review has adjusted its editorial policy to allow both pseudonyms and
real names, increasing flexibility for writers and editors while maintaining the
ability to protect new thinkers. Like Proceedings in the United States, it has become the central place for discussions of naval affairs and constructive criticism
from inside the naval sphere.14
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY YOUNG TURKS
At the start of the twentieth century a cadre of revolutionaries in Ottoman Turkey
was first described with the label the Young Turks. Across the past hundred years
the label came to mean a new breed or a young advocate for change. American
politicians in the 1920s and beyond have described the junior officers who drove
debate and writing in the pages of the Naval Magazine, Proceedings, and the
Naval Review as Young Turks. Today, the members and leaders of DEF follow in
the wake of these previous reformers and idealists. The ease of access to publishing created by digital and social media has led to a growing proliferation of new
groups looking to foster ideas and critical debate. Examples include think-tank
Internet forums like the Center for International Maritime Security (based in
Washington, D.C.); blogs focused on strategy, policy, and leadership, such as the
Bridge (also known as the Strategy Bridge on Facebook and Twitter) and War
Council; and more formal web-based publications like War on the Rocks.
These new organizations should look to the history of reform-minded socie
ties of the past to help chart their way. The career dangers from a military culture
that remains conservative and slow to change are still real for internal critics,
despite historical examples of successful reformers. Many senior officers still appear to ascribe to Admiral Arleigh Burke’s invective that “dissent is not a virtue.”
Because of this, questions of attribution and clearly stated publication policies are
important for the new Young Turks to consider. The longevity of Proceedings and
the Naval Review offers both examples and warnings about balancing new ideas
and criticism with explanations and defense of established policies.
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It is inspiring to see those who are interested in looking at their military service, or employment in the defense world, with a critical eye. The field of critical
military studies sometimes focuses on the work of academic, political, or civilianinterest groups to reform our military forces and defense industries from the
outside. These groups can occasionally be seen as antagonistic toward those who
wear uniforms, or even dismissive of them. However, criticism and dissent from
within the armed forces are important drivers of change and adaptation. Publications, formerly in print but now commonly online, where these thinkers express
themselves remain a vital outlet not only for forwarding modern debate and innovation but also for studying the past successes and failures of military criticism.
Finding organizations that, like DEF, aim to bring civilian and uniformed critics together to think of new ideas and harvest solutions will be an important part
of progress in the twenty-first century.
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A CALL FOR RESTRAINT
Posen, Barry R. Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ.
Press, 2014. 234pp. $29.95

Sometimes, less is more. “More” may
seem the order of the day in U.S. security
policy, between ISIS, Ukraine, and other
issues, but MIT political scientist Barry
Posen offers a powerful cry for “less!”
His book Restraint: A New Foundation
for U.S. Grand Strategy calls for doing
less, promising less, and spending less
than the United States does today. The
book is not a plea for isolationism or
disarmament, but it makes a convincing
case that America’s current strategy of
“liberal hegemony” is both wasteful and
counterproductive, creating more problems than it solves. Posen’s strategy is not
entirely novel—it is a form of offshore
balancing—but Restraint is a worthy
contribution. The book offers the most
thorough and theoretically grounded
rationale for offshore balancing to date,
as well as practical diplomatic and
defense planning recommendations, in a
concise and well-organized monograph.

Gulf, but eschewing liberal interventionism or pursuit of global primacy. Why
should America now pull back? First,
Posen argues, the relative economic and
military strength of the United States has
eroded; supplying security while allies
take a free ride is not affordable. U.S.
soft power has also been diminished by
the excesses of liberal hegemony. The
Iraq war, the Kosovo war (the geopolitical consequences of which Americans
underestimate), NATO expansion, “color
revolutions,” and the like convinced China, Russia, and even democracies like
Brazil that America is not a status quo
power, and many nations now affirmatively challenge U.S. activism. Third, nationalism remains a potent force—contra
the predictions of liberals—meaning
that an anti–United States stance is
good politics in many countries, and
that U.S. meddling in other regions
motivates nonstate extremist groups.

Posen has not always been in the restraint camp. A long-standing scholar
of grand strategy, in the 1990s Posen
favored “selective engagement”—maintaining U.S. alliances and forward presence in Europe, Asia, and the Persian

Posen recommends two basic changes
in U.S. military intervention and
military posture. He believes the
United States should avoid intervention
by force in other nations’ politics—
whether preemptive regime change or
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“humanitarian” operations in the middle
of civil wars. The more fundamental
change he advocates is for the United
States to withdraw gradually from security guarantees and permanent forward
basing of American forces. Pulling back
would incentivize allies—NATO, Japan
and South Korea, Israel, Saudi Arabia,
etc.—to provide more of their own
security. Posen recognizes and accepts
that some allies might go nuclear in
response, but he sees such proliferation as less risky than U.S. entanglement, particularly since some allies
treat U.S. support as a blank check for
reckless behavior. In Posen’s world, the
United States would rely on local power
balancing to prevent the rise of regional
hegemons in Eurasia, on nuclear deterrence as an ultimate backstop for the
United States, and on “command of the
commons” both to prevent power projection by others against U.S. interests
and to facilitate American involvement
in Eurasia if that becomes necessary.
Perhaps the most compelling case
against this minimalist approach comes
from fellow realists like Robert Art, who
would agree with the critique of liberal
hegemony but argue that the costs of
U.S. alliances and forward basing are
better than the risks inherent in letting
local powers sort out power relationships on their own. The United States
might be safe from attack, but regional
wars could damage the global economy,
bringing painful recessions to American
citizens. Posen does address that argument, responding essentially that there is
a great deal of ruin in a global economy
(apologies to Adam Smith). True, there
is much alarmism on the subject, particularly around oil shocks, but one still
wonders about applying past examples
of neutral countries doing fine during

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

NWC_Autumn2015Reivew.indb 116

major wars to today’s tightly coupled
supply chains and financial markets.
Posen also offers force structure implications. Many grand strategy proposals
leap directly from foreign policy ideas to
laundry lists of weapons to purchase or
cancel. To his credit, Posen conducts the
intermediate linking step of identifying
military missions and broad operating
concepts (the guidance provided—in
theory—by a National Military Strategy). The core recommendation is to
design a force for securing “command
of the commons,” i.e., sea, air, and space.
This is an idea Posen has advocated for
some time, but is fully appropriate to
offshore balancing. The Navy fares very
well in his recommended force structure,
e.g., keeping nine carriers, while the
Army and Marines take the bulk of cuts.
Overall Posen thinks spending 2.5 percent of GDP on defense would suffice, a
25 percent cut from today’s base budget.
While it is suited to his strategy, some
might criticize Posen’s proposed force
as too conventional in its details—i.e.,
emphasizing aircraft carriers in the
face of growing threats like the Chinese
DF-21 missile. There is room for more
attention to such emerging challenges.
That said, Posen’s strategy would have
little requirement for close-in U.S.
strikes against the Chinese or Russian
homeland versus being able to thwart
an adversary’s attempts to project
power across open oceans at us.
For those familiar with the grand strategy literature, the broad case in Restraint
is in line with those of other offshore
balancers, like John Mearsheimer, Steve
Walt, and Christopher Layne. What
Posen adds is a comprehensive theorygrounded analysis of the problems
of liberal hegemony and merits of an
offshore approach, backed by forty-five
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pages of endnotes. Uniquely, the book
also develops practical recommendations for implementing the strategy
with serious attention to timelines and
regional nuances. Where Layne’s Peace
of Illusions traces historical failings of
the hegemonic approach, Restraint is
a timely, fleshed-out policy proposal.
Ultimately, many policy makers will never get past page 1, where Posen defines
American national security interests as
the traditional sovereignty, safety, territory, and international power position.
Threats to those are modest and Posen
makes a compelling case they are best
managed through limited overseas commitments. On the other hand, many in
Washington believe American hegemony
—euphemized as “leadership”—is in
and of itself a fundamental interest, and
that no economic and physical risks are
acceptable. That one televised beheading
five thousand miles away can so alarm
America suggests this will not change
soon. For those willing to think critically about America’s security needs,
however, Restraint offers a deeply logical
challenge and a thoughtful blueprint.
DAVID T. BURBACH

Stavridis, James G. The Accidental Admiral: A
Sailor Takes Command at NATO. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 2014. 288pp. $32.95

In the early days of the Second World
War, General Eisenhower, the first
Supreme Allied Commander of Europe,
struggled to keep the alliance together.
One of the more interesting anecdotes
about this struggle is when he almost
fired a member of his staff because the
officer was, shall we say, culturally insensitive. The story goes that an American
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officer, a colonel on Eisenhower’s staff,
insulted a British officer by calling him
a British bastard. Ike wasn’t pleased.
Ike threatened to bust him down to
private. Being a bastard, he said, was not
a national characteristic. All were equal
in the eyes of the allies. But admittedly,
handling NATO has not gotten any
easier over the years. Secretary Gates,
prior to his departure, had some choice
words for the alliance, urging more
NATO members to meet the required 2
percent of their GDP on defense spending. America, he noted, continues to
pick up the slack—from Afghanistan
to Libya. Yet the alliance remains.
Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret.),
most recently Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and
commander of U.S. European Command (EUCOM), and unofficially, the
Navy’s advocate of the well-known
John Adams quotation—“Let us
tenderly and kindly cherish, therefore
the means of knowledge. Let us dare
to read, think, speak and write”—has
written an enjoyable memoir of his
time in Eisenhower’s old chair.
Stavridis’s memoir stays away from criticism of U.S. officials and discussions of
contentious closed-door meetings. This
is in contrast to two other high-profile,
former administration officials’ memoirs
—those of Ambassador Christopher Hill
and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta
—which were published around the
same time to much hoopla. While
Stavridis was dual hatted as SACEUR
and EUCOM his reputation around the
headquarters was one of civility and
intelligence, certainly not a bad combination. Stavridis says he wants to show
the reader not what happened during his
four years, but rather why it happened.
He proceeds to take the reader on a tour
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of challenges: from the toppling of Qadhafi to the civil war in Syria, Israeli security, a resurgent Russia, the Balkans, and
finally, of course, Afghanistan. Thus the
first few chapters are a whirlwind of individuals, meetings, and events. Among
all this, he often pauses within chapters
to highlight some of the more important
senior military and political officials
that make up the NATO alliance.
Stavridis spends considerable time
in these early chapters setting up the
facts—stating what happened—and
then trying to balance it against why
it happened and what he learned from
it. The first part of the book, however,
feels rushed and compressed, and even
in his best efforts the balance tilts
toward more numbers and facts and
away from a deep exploration of the
why. If there was one weakness, this is
it. You are left wanting more discussion on how the policy was shaped
in Washington and in Brussels. What
was the dialogue during these many
meetings? And why was it persuasive?
The second part of the book shines.
Here he discusses leadership, strategic
planning, innovation, and strategic
communication. All of these chapters
are excellent and well worth the price of
the book. In one chapter, Stavridis talks
about the actions that led to Generals
McChrystal’s and Petraeus’s resignations—and his own stumbles. It is here
he almost passes the George Orwell test.
Orwell once said, “Autobiography is only
to be trusted when it reveals something
disgraceful. A man who gives a good
account of himself is probably lying,
since any life when viewed from the
inside is simply a series of defeats.” And
for Stravridis it is not all good. Stavridis
explains that he was nominated to be
the Chief of Naval Operations, following
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what was, by many accounts, a successful tour as the supreme allied commander. This was not to be. He describes,
plainly, that some of his official travel
was not properly paid for, and a single
trip was deemed questionable by the
inspector general. He accepted responsibility for his and his staff ’s mistakes,
and made reparations. Although he was
cleared by the Secretary of the Navy
from any wrongdoing, the long investigation was enough to complicate the
political winds that are Washington, and
the Secretary of Defense had to remove
his nomination. While certainly not rising to Orwell’s definition of disgraceful,
nonetheless, it was not his shining hour.
For this reader, the stories of his days
commanding USS Barry, beautifully
captured in his book Destroyer Captain,
remain my favorite. Its style, written in
a journalist’s hand, is intimate and moving—a man that loves the sea yet knows
he is human and only can go as far as his
crew takes him. Still, his new memoir
is a refreshing dose of honesty, intelligence, and reflection—much needed
in today’s Navy and tomorrow’s leaders.
CHRISTOPHER NELSON

Winklareth, Robert J. The Battle of the Denmark
Strait: A Critical Analysis of the Bismarck’s Singular Triumph. Havertown, Pa.: Casemate Publishers, 2012. 336pp. $32.95

From Johnny Horton’s 1960 ballad
“Sink the Bismarck” to James Cameron’s
Expedition Bismarck for the Discovery
Channel in 2002, the sole sortie of the
German battleship in May 1941 has
held the attention of both the general
public and naval historians. The latter
mainly concentrate on the destruction of
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Bismarck on 27 May after a lucky aerial
torpedo hit disabled the ship’s steering
mechanism. Not so Robert Winklareth.
His focus instead is on Bismarck’s “singular triumph” in destroying the British
battle cruiser Hood three days earlier.
A 38 cm shell from its fifth salvo sliced
through Hood’s armored side below
the aft turrets, setting off first the 4 in.
secondary armament magazine and
then the main 15 in. magazine. Only 3
of its complement of 1,421 survived.
So, what is new? Winklareth, a military weapons systems expert, traces all
action at sea in five-second intervals.
He primarily uses translated German
records of the battle of the Denmark
Strait to offer a salvo-by-salvo analysis,
to re-create the speed and headings of
the major combatants, and to determine
the precise firing angles and effects of
the heavy guns. Unsurprisingly, the book
is highly detailed and a feast mainly for
naval engineering and gunnery enthusiasts. It is complemented by countless charts, diagrams, photographs,
and pencil drawings (by the author).
Winklareth’s own battle is with the
(unnamed) historians who claim that
just before the engagement with Hood,
Bismarck, in a mere six minutes, came
up the port side of the heavy cruiser
Prinz Eugen, crossed its wake to its
starboard side, and then recrossed the
cruiser’s wake to take up position on its
port side again (15–16, 258). What he
calls a “reversed photo” error resulted
in this assumption. Few will cross
swords with the author on this matter.
On the other hand, serious historians
of the battle will take umbrage at two
of Winklareth’s strong statements, both
on the first page (11) of the book. His
claim that the battle of the Denmark
Strait “was undoubtedly one of the most
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famous and most important naval battles
of World War II” will raise the hackles
especially of historians of the U.S. Navy
in the Pacific 1941–45. And his second claim, that the encounter between
Bismarck and Hood “is perhaps the most
documented event in naval history,”
will come as news to German naval
historians who are all too aware of the
fact that Bismarck’s war diary (Kriegs
tagebuch) went down with the ship.
With regard to the broader aspects of the
battle of the Denmark Strait, Winklareth
spends a great deal of time sketching
out the past histories of the German and
British navies as well as the major ship
designs of the two powers. The actual artillery duel between the German
battleship and the British battle cruiser,
in fact, consumes but half a dozen pages
of chapter 13. Unfortunately, there is
no attempt to place “Operation Rhein
übung,” the German sortie into the
Atlantic, into the wider context of Grand
Admiral Erich Raeder’s double-pole
strategy of attacking Britain’s maritime
commerce with two modern battle
fleets in the Atlantic Ocean, while a
third fleet of elderly battleships tied
the Royal Navy down in the North Sea.
The reader deserved this analysis.
HOLGER H. HERWIG

Untermeyer, Chase. Inside Reagan’s Navy: The
Pentagon Journals. College Station: Texas A&M
Univ. Press, 2015. 352pp. $25

The Washington diary is something of a
lost art these days. Instead, we have to be
satisfied with books of instant journalism using largely anonymous sources or
memoirs too often tendentiously crafted
after the fact. Chase Untermeyer is a
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wonderful outlier. Apparently, Untermeyer started keeping a diary at age
nine, and has already published excerpts
covering his initial Washington service
as executive assistant to Vice President
George Bush (1981–83). This latest
volume covers the period of his service
in the office of the Secretary of the
Navy (1983–88), during the tenures of
John F. Lehman and later James Webb
as Secretary of the Navy. The result
is an engaging portrait of the glories
and miseries of life within the Beltway.
Though lighthearted and refreshingly
modest, Untermeyer’s book also offers
up telling anecdotes and keen insights
into the practice—or lack thereof—of
civilian control of the United States Navy
at a critical juncture of the Cold War.
Though he had served briefly in the
Navy as a very junior officer, Untermeyer was the classic political appointee.
Born in Texas and educated at Harvard,
he became involved in Texas politics and
was elected to the statehouse in 1976.
After his stint working directly under
the vice president, Untermeyer was
appointed initially as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Installations
and Facilities, and then for some four
years served as Assistant Secretary for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Both
jobs are political plums, offering many
opportunities for ingratiation of the
holder with defense contractors and
members of Congress. Untermeyer
makes no attempt to hide his own ambitions, or the intoxicating effects of
constant mingling with the good and
the great not only in Washington but on
many tours of inspection or protocol in
the provinces. (At one point, he charmingly announces that he has at last become a “toff ”). But he also makes clear
that he took his responsibilities seriously
and was intent on serving the boss well.
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And what a boss! To get the flavor of
John Lehman, it is hard to improve on
this riff of Untermeyer’s at Lehman’s
farewell party at the Naval Observatory
in April 1987: “People have asked me,
what’s the difference between Jim Webb
and John Lehman? And I’ve said that the
thing to remember is that Jim is a former
Marine officer. Tell him to take a hill,
and he’ll take the hill. But with John it’s
a little different. Tell him to take a hill,
and the first thing he’ll do is get together
with Mel Paisley [perhaps best described
as his consigliere] for a few drinks to
concoct the plan. . . . Then John will
start a competition among real estate
agents over the purchase price of the
hill. Next he’ll go to the senator in whose
state the hill is located and make a deal:
the Navy will build the chrome bumperguard assembly for the Trident sub in
his hometown if the senator will slip an
amendment into the Wild and Scenic
Areas Act to purchase the hill. Then,
with the money saved from the competition, John buys another Aegis cruiser.”
Lehman’s methods did not appeal to
everyone, and in fact could be outrageous; but he could claim results. He
nearly achieved the “600 ship Navy”
for which he lobbied so ferociously. But
the Navy leadership was ambivalent
toward him. He had a habit of breaking Navy crockery—for example, by
forcing the Naval Academy to put more
humanities in its curriculum, and by
engineering the retirement of Admiral
Hyman Rickover (the story of Rickover’s
tantrum in his departing courtesy call
with Ronald Reagan is told with great
relish at the beginning of Lehman’s
memoir Command of the Sea). Anyone
concerned about the current state of
civil-military relations in Washington
would do well to read this book.
CARNES LORD
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Armstrong, Benjamin F., ed. 21st Century Sims:
Innovation, Education, and Leadership for the
Modern Era. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2015. 176pp. $21.95

Over a century after first being composed, the writings of Admiral William
S. Sims continue to have relevance to
all Navy leaders. Benjamin Armstrong
has compiled a selection of Proceedings
articles (originally published between
1905 and 1940) and provides an informative perspective of the character
and career of Admiral Sims and the
impact of his initiatives on innovation
and commitment to leader development. Armstrong introduces us to the
young Lieutenant Sims as he begins his
journey of revolution in Navy strategy,
education, and ship design. From the
deck plate to the President of the Naval
War College, we gain an appreciation for
Admiral Sims’s career and his achievements from this compelling collection
of his writings that resonate with the
challenges of the twenty-first century.
Armstrong’s commentary provides us
with insights into each topic’s relevance. From the “Gun Doctor” and
“The Battleships of High Speed” to the
chapter on military character, we view
the development of Admiral Sims as a
military leader as someone who challenges the bureaucracy of the military
institution. In his lecture on military
character, Sims reflects on the qualifications of a military leader and emphasizes
a strong moral character as essential for
the development of a military leader.
While this was written in 1916, this topic
remains critical for the development of
twenty-first-century military leaders.
Sims’s perspective provides a lens for
the reader to evaluate breaches in ethics,
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morality, and decision making in the
twenty-first century. Sims challenges
each person to view character as an element of leadership and effective decision
making. He commands officers that “it is
the duty of every officer to study his own
character that he may improve it.” Upon
reflection, this is perhaps the most important message taken from this volume
of articles, as moral character underlies
and reinforces decision making. Today,
in an era during which our nation’s
military leaders have committed numerous ethical violations, there is a moral
imperative to develop military character
as part of the education process of every
military officer. For it is from the foundation of their moral character that leadership matures and enables our nation’s
military leaders to build a bridge of trust
between the military and our nation.
This collection of Sims’s writings and
Armstrong’s analysis provides a lens
for us to view and share Sims’s perspectives as he moves through the pre– and
post–World War I period. Although
Sims’s career was nearly a century ago,
the issues he addressed remain current,
including acquisition reform, technological deficiencies, and the need to
educate Navy leaders. Armstrong invites
us to accompany Sims on his journey as
he moves across Europe, inspecting and
reporting on the deficiencies of gunnery
and battleship designs. Imagine, if you
will, meeting the young Lieutenant Sims
as he moves around Europe checking
on the newest advances in ship design.
A young Lieutenant Commander Sims
boldly sparks criticism with his critique
of gunnery techniques, technologies,
and platforms, as he sets the course for
a career of innovation. Impervious to
criticism, Sims challenges bureaucracy
and is the first to push for a change in
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gunnery and the development of
continuous-aim fire. He begins to
innovate!
Sims forged the Navy in preparation
for World War I with his focus on
naval gunnery, battleship design, and
destroyer operations. Always the rebel
and revolutionary, his insights were
grounded on firsthand knowledge and
experience. Sims was a critical thinker
whose ability to evaluate technologies
and platform designs was matched by
his determination to fight for those
changes required for military readiness. He abhorred risk-averse behavior
and what he termed “military conservatism,” referring to the “dangerous reluctance to accept new ideas.”
From Sims’s perspective, the opportunity for officers to conduct war games
served to enhance the development of
critical thinking skills and innovative
operational solutions. He would enjoy
exploring advanced technologies, such
as drones, networks of autonomous,
unmanned systems, and artificial
intelligence, and would integrate these
technologies into military war-fighting
capabilities. Sims would be the first
to accept and adopt these technologies to gain a military advantage.

vigilant with regard to maintaining
military readiness. While I would not
presume to know how he would handle
each of the military crises in today’s military operational environment, I would
offer that Sims would applaud the Naval
War College’s commitment to excellence
in education and its commitment to developing revolutionary innovative naval
warfare concepts through war gaming.
In conclusion, Sims serves as a model
for all leaders and challenges us to
examine our personal and professional
development. How do we compare in
our dedication to duty, our commitment to discipline and moral courage,
our ability to innovate, and our ability
to challenge ourselves continuously by
learning? One could argue that we need
a young Lieutenant Sims today if we are
to remain a world power. The question
is, Would we recognize a Lieutenant
Sims in the twenty-first-century Navy?
This is a welcome addition to the 21st
Century Foundations series from the
Naval Institute Press, informative,
inspiring, and a must-read for those
interested in leader development. The
bibliography provides further reading recommendations to enhance
the reader’s interest in this topic.

As President of the Naval War College,
Sims exemplified a career dedicated to
the education and development of Navy
leaders. Throughout his career, Sims
emphasized the need for the development of leaders with strong moral
character, who were capable of strategic
thinking and effective decision making.

Kaiser, David. No End Save Victory: How FDR
Led the Nation into War. New York: Basic Books,
2014. 408pp. $28

Sims continues to inspire and challenge
a new generation of Navy leaders. Sims
would remind us that the main objective of the Navy is to prepare for war! He
cautions us to be aware of our own fleet’s
vulnerabilities and tasks us to remain

David Kaiser’s No End Save Victory
stands out as the best of several books
published in 2014 that examine FDR’s
leadership during the interlude between
the fall of France and the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor in December
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1941. In contrast to Lynne Olson’s Those
Angry Days: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and
America’s Fight over World War II, Susan
Dunn’s 1940: FDR, Willkie, Lindbergh,
Hitler—the Election amid the Storm,
and Nicholas Wapshott’s The Sphinx:
Franklin Roosevelt, the Isolationists,
and the Road to World War II, Kaiser
extends his analysis beyond the domestic struggle between Roosevelt and the
isolationists. While his analysis includes
discussions of congressional politics,
neutrality legislation, the America First
Committee, and the election of 1940,
it encompasses additional dimensions
that shaped FDR’s foreign and security
policy ranging from the role of ULTRA
and MAGIC intercepts to naval and
military advice regarding capabilities
and force development. Kaiser presents a
wide-ranging analysis of policy, strategy, capacity, and mobilization during a
period when danger loomed but much
of the public opposed direct military
intervention in the ongoing conflicts
in Europe, China, and the Atlantic.
His cast of individuals and institutions
includes not only the familiar top tier of
figures and committees but the military
planners, labor union bosses, business
leaders, and second tier of executive
officials who translated FDR’s visionary
ideas into tangible plans and policies.
Kaiser is particularly skillful in three
areas. Most strikingly, his narrative does
a marvelous job of capturing the flavor
of FDR’s decision making. While highly
organized individuals such as Secretary
of War Henry Stimson and Army Chief
of Staff George Marshall could be
driven to distraction by the president’s
intuitive—sometimes meandering—
approach to strategy and planning, the
reader gains an understanding of what
Roosevelt was doing. He was exploring
and creating options. He was testing
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ideas and concepts, sometimes dropping
them and sometimes merely pocketing
them for later use at the appropriate
time and place. Kaiser repeatedly points
out how Roosevelt prodded subordinates
to provide him feedback on various
germinating concepts months and
sometimes years before they became
policy, with Lend-Lease, the destroyersfor-bases deal, the occupation of Iceland
and Greenland, and the oil embargo of
Japan among the concepts he examined
discreetly and informally well before he
unveiled his intentions to cabinet members, congressional leaders, and allies.
Second, Kaiser makes clear that FDR
was thinking in terms of victory over
the Axis powers even while Marshall,
Hap Arnold, and others remained
focused on hemispheric defense and
building up American forces in 1939
and 1940. Even before the outbreak of
war in Europe, Roosevelt grasped the
importance of airpower, pushing for a
huge air force “so that we do not need to
have a huge army.” Likewise, the TwoOcean Navy Act passed in the summer
of 1940, providing the U.S. Navy with
the means to mount offensives in the
Pacific even while supporting AngloAmerican amphibious assaults in the
Mediterranean and France in 1943–44.
Lastly, Kaiser takes on the latest generation of literature postulating that FDR
sought to find a “back door to war”
against Germany by implementing an oil
embargo of Japan that he knew would
provoke a Japanese military response.
Kaiser weighs the evidence very carefully, and while he concludes that FDR
was fully aware that implementing the
embargo might lead to war with Japan,
FDR was reacting to MAGIC intercepts
that indicated that the Japanese occupation of southern French Indochina
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was designed to prepare the way for the
conquest of Singapore and the Dutch
East Indies. FDR, aware that Japan had
plans for continued expansion, simply did not see why the United States
should supply Japan with the means
for its southward drive. Kaiser puts it
as follows: “The American embargo
did not lead the Japanese to decide on
a southward advance. That decision
had taken place before the American
freeze of Japanese assets” (258).
Kaiser’s work is a must-read for those
interested in strategy, policy, and
the preparation for war. Kaiser rates
Roosevelt’s performance very highly.
While the book lacks a bibliography,
the endnotes confirm that the work
rests on a thorough use of both primary
and secondary sources. Those seeking
to understand how Roosevelt prepared
the United States for a war he viewed as
inevitable will find this book insightful, delightful, and multilayered.
DOUGLAS PEIFER

Fisher, David. Morality and War: Can War Be Just
in the Twenty-First Century? Oxford Univ. Press,
2012. 320pp. $30 (paperback)

David Fisher’s recent book, Morality and
War, offers an account of the philosophical foundations of the just war tradition
that integrates various contemporary
forms of ethics into a new approach
he calls “virtuous consequentialism.”
He argues against moral skeptics and
antifoundationalists, insisting that some
account of the underpinnings of morality must be given if moral prescription
is to maintain its normative force and
not collapse into relativism. For Fisher,
thinkers as diverse as Isaiah Berlin and
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Michael Walzer succumb to a false
dichotomy; the impoverished moral
vocabulary of the twentieth century
forces them to oscillate between two
extremes—an infallible totalitarianism and a groundless liberalism. In this
picture, any attempt to define what is
required for all humans at all times and
everywhere to flourish is seen as the
attempt to subjugate one’s own choices
to an irrationally inerrant worldview,
which in the postmodern age is criticized as feigning objectivity for the
interests of prevailing power structures.
Countering this, Fisher adopts an
Aristotelian approach to moral theory.
Aristotle’s teleology allowed him to
understand the life of virtue as both
necessary for all human flourishing
and pluralistic in its manifold expression. Both the athlete and the artisan
might flourish as human beings just
so long as they possess the virtues,
even if it is understood that courage,
justice, and the rest are expressed in
very different ways between the two;
and a soldier’s courage is the same even
when comparisons are made between
drastically different times and places.
Yet despite this endorsement of Aristotle, Fisher believes that no single
moral theory—Aristotelian virtue ethics,
utilitarianism, deontology—adequately
accounts for the complexity of our
contemporary moral lives. Therefore,
his project combines consequentialism with virtue ethics because he sees
each as having something the other
requires to make sense of contemporary
morality. Fisher argues that to know
what the right thing to do might be in
a given situation we must reflect on
how our actions conduce to human
flourishing but also understand our
actions’ consequences. That is, virtue
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theory provides but one piece of what
is required and cannot fully account for
the richness of our moral experience.
Fisher’s hybrid approach results in a
theory about war that rejects a firm
distinction between the morality of
the individual and that of the political
community. He answers Plato’s question
“why be just?” by saying that one should
be just because it is in one’s self-interest.
However, Fisher advocates an understanding of self-interest that goes beyond
what he thinks is a post-Enlightenment
preoccupation with selfish individualism and takes into account our communal nature as social animals. Justice
is necessary for the proper functioning
of society, and since man is fundamentally a social animal then justice is
required for his own flourishing. Just
as utilitarianism’s cost-benefit calculations are otiose when explaining how
mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters
relate to each other in families, so too,
Fisher argues, for societies as a whole.
Still, consequences matter; and Fisher
wants to demonstrate that no theory of
virtue is complete that ignores them. He
thinks our communal nature enables
virtue ethics and consequentialism to
become united in a way that helps answer questions about justice—including
justice in war. Fisher’s approach reinterprets the moral precepts of the just war
tradition and argues not only for their
adequacy but for their necessity in the
contemporary moral evaluation of war.
The result is an interesting and admirably lucid attempt to fill the gaps
in contemporary moral theory while
rendering it serviceable to the just war
tradition. Morality and War is, therefore,
an important contribution to a growing body of literature that attempts to
make various aspects of Aristotelian
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ethics serviceable to normative reflections about warfare. It is no wonder
that Fisher’s book won the prestigious
W. J. M. MacKenzie Book Prize by the
Political Studies Association in 2013.
Fisher, who died in March 2014, had a
distinguished career in the British Civil
Service, serving as a senior official in the
Ministry of Defence, the Foreign Office,
and the Cabinet Office, before taking
up a post at King’s College London as
a Teaching Fellow in War Studies. His
ability to combine practical know-how
with theoretical sophistication was a
rarity, and Morality and War demonstrates this with aplomb. For example, he
concludes his book by offering several
practical proposals, focused mainly
on the UK Ministry of Defence, that
seek to help improve justice in war.
Despite these abilities, Fisher’s approach
is ultimately inadequate. His rejection
of a thoroughgoing Aristotelian view,
one without references to modern
moral theories such as utilitarianism, is
motivated by important misunderstandings and misappropriation of Aristotle.
While Fisher’s insistence that a reinterpretation of the just war tradition must
include aspects of the recently resurgent
virtue ethics approach is refreshing,
his rejection of key tenets of Aristotle’s
views—from the doctrine of the mean
to the unity of the virtues—led Fisher to
adopt modern consequentialist doctrines that sour what promised to be
a thoroughly Aristotelian approach to
the ethics of war. As such, many virtue
ethicists would argue that Fisher’s
theory offers a distasteful blending of
traditions without sufficiently exhausting the resources Aristotle offered.
Furthermore, Fisher’s charge that no
contemporary moral theory can
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adequately account for the complexity
of our contemporary moral lives rests
on epistemological presuppositions
that take the moral speech acts of the
present as an epistemic starting point
rather than as resulting from historical contingency. Finally, Fisher leaves
questions about the adequacy of the just
war tradition in accounting for contemporary warfare largely unexamined.
JOSEPH M. HATFIELD

Emerson, Stephen A. The Battle for Mozambique:
The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle, 1977–1992. Solihull, U.K.: Helion, 2014. 288pp. $35

Stephen Emerson has written the definitive work on the war in Mozambique between Frelimo (Front for the Liberation
of Mozambique) and Renamo (Mozambican National Resistance) that began in
1977 and ended with the signing of the
General Peace Agreement in October of
1992. It would be an impressive effort to
capture just the fight between these factions vying for control of Mozambique,
then newly independent after 450 years
as a Portuguese colony: Emerson goes
much further. He describes the complex
environment in which this struggle takes
place—overshadowed by a larger Cold
War and bordering countries like South
Africa with its own fight over apartheid, as well as the war against white
minority rule next door in Rhodesia.
Emerson traces the beginnings of
Frelimo and its armed struggle against
Portugal. Despite its success in gaining
independence from Portugal in 1975
after over a decade of war, Frelimo
struggled with postindependence nation building. Formed by opponents of
the Marxist-aligned Frelimo, Renamo
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initially achieved operational effectiveness by obtaining arms, logistics, training, intelligence, and planning support
from a Rhodesia seeking to counter
Frelimo’s support of Robert Mugabe and
the Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU) forces. Mugabe’s eventual
success in establishing an internationally recognized Zimbabwean state cost
Renamo its major benefactor. In the
1980s, however, Renamo gained a new
partner in its fight against Frelimo from
the South African government of P. W.
Botha looking to create instability in its
“frontline states” as a way to stave off
support for the African National Congress. This patronage allowed Renamo
to continue its fight against Frelimo—
now the ruling party of an independent
Mozambique—for another thirteen
years.
The conflict’s ebbs and flows affected every part of the country and
its inhabitants. Between 800,000 and 1
million Mozambicans were killed in the
fighting, and more than 2 million were
displaced. The war’s effects included
a plundering of natural resources and
environmental disasters made worse
by drought. An end to the Cold War
and South Africa’s apartheid regime—
coupled with leadership changes in
Frelimo itself and all-around war
exhaustion—eventually enabled peace
talks and a successful settlement.
The Battle for Mozambique benefits
from Emerson’s decade of research. It
reflects his access to formerly classified
Rhodesian military documents coupled
with the firsthand accounts gleaned
from hundreds of hours of interviews
with both former Frelimo and former
Renamo fighters as well as Rhodesian
and South African military and civilian personnel. The descriptions of
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operations and battles are graphic and
bring a reality not seen very often.
A longtime resident of southern Africa,
Emerson is a renowned scholar of
African affairs, having served as Chair
of Security Studies at the U.S. National
Defense University’s Africa Center for
Strategic Studies, and as head of the
Africa regional studies program at the
U.S. Naval War College. His knowledge
and experience make The Battle for Mozambique: The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle,
1977–1992 a must-read for anyone
seeking to understand the history and
challenges of the African continent.
ROGER H. DUCEY

Epstein, Katherine. Torpedo: Inventing the
Military-Industrial Complex in the United States
and Great Britain. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press, 2014. 328pp. $45

Kate Epstein’s book about the relationships between the torpedo and the
creation of the military-industrial
complex builds on her earlier work
about naval tactics, in particular her essay in the April 2013 Journal of Military
History about “torpedoes and U.S. Navy
battle tactics” before World War I. (See
Katherine C. Epstein, “No One Can
Afford to Say ‘Damn the Torpedoes’:
Battle Tactics and U.S. Naval History
before World War I,” Journal of Military History 7, no. 2 [April 2013], pp.
491–520.) Here she goes after much
bigger “fish”—excuse the pun. Epstein
wastes no time in getting to her primary
thesis in this fascinating monograph
about the development of the torpedo
as a weapon system in the United States
and Great Britain. She begins boldly:
“Thus, in addition to the part they
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played in the origins of the militaryindustrial complex, torpedoes were at
the nexus of the international arms race,
globalization, and industrialization after
World War I.” Epstein takes the reader
on a journey back in time to relate a
story little told and even less known.
The modern self-propelled torpedo,
invented and improved in the last half of
the nineteenth century by the Englishman Robert Whitehead, was naval
warfare’s first “fire and forget” weapon.
Like breech-loading rifles and artillery,
also products of the nineteenth century,
it changed the landscape of war in its
environment—the maritime domain.
Just as breech-loading rifles increased
the lethality and scope of land warfare,
so too did the torpedo, but on unimaginable scales in a very short time
period. As Epstein notes in her introduction, “Over a fifty-year period the speed
of torpedoes had increased by roughly
800 percent, and their range by 5,000
percent. They were the cutting edge of
technology.” When combined with other
so-called disruptive technologies, like
the airplane and the submarine—that is,
technologies so unique that they break
sociopolitical, commercial, and military
paradigms—they had the potential to
and, in fact, did throw existing notions
of sea power, naval tactics, and even
maritime strategy into question. It was
no accident that the great maritime
strategists—A. T. Mahan and Sir Julian
Corbett—emerged during the period
of the torpedo’s rise to prominence
as sailors recast their thinking about
naval tactics in the modern age in part
because of cutting-edge technology.
Epstein builds on the work of historian
William McNeill and his arguments
about the emergence of “command
technology” in the nineteenth century,
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which she defines as “technology commanded by the public sector from the
private sector that was so sophisticated
and expensive that neither possessed
the resources to develop it alone.”
Because the public sector could not
deliver expensive new technology on its
own, it “had to invest in [research and
development] by the private sector.” Her
larger argument about the emergence
of military-industrial complexes in the
United States and Britain hinges on this
relationship, and torpedoes represented
what one might call an agency technology, providing a forcing function for
public and private sectors to overcome
the difficulties in solving complex
military problems—problems that could
only be solved in partnership. Throughout the book Epstein emphasizes, constantly, the contingent nature of these
developing relationships—that the actors
did not conform to some script. They
simply wanted to solve difficult, complex
problems, and their decisions shaped
how the military-industrial complexes
and both countries developed as a result.

technological ideas—the British came
out ahead in developing better torpedoes
in the long run. It also seems counterintuitive that the British would do better
than the weaker Americans in developing a weapon that threatened Britain’s
naval hegemony, but that is precisely
what happened. The British did better
in developing the “weapon of the weak”
than the relatively weak Americans, who
would have seemed to have had more interest in such weapons. The British went
further, realizing savings in the long
run as they envisioned a future without
battleships, using flotillas of torpedo
craft and battle cruisers to protect their
interests. This future essentially came to
fruition during and after World War II
as the new battle cruiser—designed to
patrol the global commons and protect
British maritime interests—evolved
into the aircraft carrier. As for torpedo
flotillas, what emerged during the Cold
War were submarine and antisubmarine fleets of very large size both to
dispute and to protect those same sea
lines should all-out war break out.

In her closing Epstein makes conclusions that get to the heart of today’s
discussions about American decline,
technological challenges, and innovation
and that may seem counterintuitive
—especially in light of the challenge of
China and antiaccess and area denial
(A2/AD) strategies. These may be of
some comfort to the pessimists out there
who claim America is in an irreversible decline. The British had a larger
research and development infrastructure in both public and private sectors
precisely because they were the naval
hegemon of that era. Even though many
of their decisions vis-à-vis technology
seemed more cautious than those made
by American naval officers—who were
somewhat credulous in embracing new

The one critique this reviewer has of the
book involves the impact of the RussoJapanese War on torpedo development
during the period covered by this book.
Japan’s opening torpedo attack on the
Russian fleet in 1904 at Port Arthur
was not exactly a “coming-out party”
for the weapon system: 85 percent of
the Japanese torpedoes missed their
targets. Perhaps the Americans and
British thought they had solved the clear
problems that torpedoes presented in
their design and use, but a mention of
this key episode in the development of
the torpedo—a flop on opening night if
you will—would seem merited. Nonetheless, Epstein’s book goes places and
discovers truths that few other books
on naval history have. Although it is not
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an easy read, the arguments it makes
are of vital interest to naval strategists,
innovators, and those interested in
the complex relationships and processes that are now part and parcel
of the national defense paradigm.
JOHN T. KUEHN

Friedman, B. A., ed. 21st Century Ellis: Operational Art and Strategic Prophecy for the Modern
Era. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014.
150pp. $21

21st Century Ellis is a solid contribution to the Naval Institute’s 21st Century
Foundations series and the scholarship
regarding the touted U.S. Marine Corps
visionary Lieutenant Colonel Earl “Pete”
Ellis. The strength of this volume lies
in the compilation of most of Ellis’s
scholarly works. B. A. Friedman has
assembled five articles written by Ellis
in the decade between 1911 and 1921
(a total of about 110 pages) into four
chapters. Ellis’s text is supplemented by
Friedman’s introduction and additional
commentary highlighting the value of
Ellis to both his contemporaries and
current executors of the operational art.
Friedman arranges the essays by subject
rather than chronologically. This allows
the reading of the book by section without any loss of flow or context. Chapter
2, the shortest, reviews Ellis’s First World
War experience in France on the staff of
John A. Lejeune. Chapter 3 is substantially longer but unlike the preceding
chapter is perhaps of more applicability
to modern practitioners. Two lectures
prepared by Ellis during his tenure as a
faculty member at the U.S. Naval War
College examined the challenges of
fighting a naval campaign in the western

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/1

NWC_Autumn2015Reivew.indb 129

B O O K R E V I E WS

129

Pacific. Composed in 1911–12, these
proved prescient in their assessment of
the tension building between Pacific
naval powers and the war they would
fight after Ellis’s death. There is great
legitimacy to the editor’s claim that “Ellis predicted war with Japan in 1912.”
Chapter 1 may be most relevant to
Marines of this century. Ellis draws
from his substantial experience fighting
counterinsurgency in the Philippines
during the early years of last century. His
seventeen-page article “Bush Brigades”
provides a solid foundation for any
twenty-first-century warrior preparing
for service in Iraq or Afghanistan. The
editor summarizes how Ellis’s tenets
are strongly reflected in the Marine
Corps’s Small Wars Manual as well as
today’s counterinsurgency doctrine,
while lamenting the “ill use of many of
these tenets” in more-modern conflicts.
A current practitioner would benefit
by paying attention to Ellis’s words.
The final chapter built around Ellis’s
work, chapter 4, is the longest and the
major impetus behind Friedman’s effort.
Ellis is frequently viewed by Marines
as the man who laid the template for
modern amphibious operations. Read
in detail, Ellis’s article “Advanced Base
Operations in Micronesia” reinforces
that view. Ellis systematically takes a
reader through the requirements for an
advance across the Pacific to be successful. Many of these tenets informed
Marine Corps development prior to
the U.S. entry into the Second World
War, laying the groundwork for highly
successful amphibious operations in
both the Pacific and European theaters.
While successful in providing a new
generation of military practitioners easy
access to Ellis’s work, 21st Century Ellis
could have more successfully achieved
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the book series’s stated purpose of asking
“the right questions.” With the operational factors of time, space, and force
still vital to success, few questions with
which the Marine Corps must struggle
in the twenty-first century relative to
Ellis were asked. The editor’s acceptance
of “Air-Sea Battle” as a valid concept
relative to Ellis falls short. The editor’s
comments fail to question shortfalls of
the current Navy–Marine Corps team
to sustain the logistics necessary for any
large-scale amphibious operations in the
maritime environment of the Pacific—
a setting whose scope and scale have
not changed since Ellis’s day. Questions
should be asked about whether current
equipment procurement can fulfill the
tenets Ellis was prescient in defining
should they become required again in
this century. This solid work of scholarship, produced by a junior Marine Corps
officer, missed a chance to challenge
current Marine Corps efforts by failing
to ask tough questions the way that
Ellis did a century ago. So, for practitioners of war, read this book, but keep
a paper and pen handy to scribe your
own tough questions for the future.
DAVID C. FUQUEA

Friedman, Norman. Fighting the Great War at
Sea: Strategy, Tactics and Technology. Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014. 416pp. $85

This title is the most recent “tour de
force” from this prolific and authoritative naval historian. It is a massive
undertaking in almost every way, from
its imposing 12ʺ × 10ʺ coffee-table
format to its 360-plus pages (over 400
with notes) filled with dense, small print
and lavishly illustrated with contemporary photographs. People familiar with
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Friedman’s other works will understand
that it is no exaggeration to say that the
detail that he provides in these captions alone could form the framework
for any number of smaller, themed
books were they to be collected and
organized differently. So, coffee-table
format it may be, but this is a serious
work, covering all aspects of the maritime war in an encyclopedic fashion.
The endnotes alone run to forty-plus
pages and, while we may lament the
imprecise citations in some areas, the
notes are filled with further ideas to
stimulate still more work in the future.
In many ways this is a book that only Dr.
Friedman could have attempted; most
others would have shied away from the
immensity of the task and back into
the comfort of a focused analysis on a
smaller, more easily bounded theme.
Friedman, however, has an almost
unique ability to sweep across the disciplines, picking out the main points and
delving into both the historical and technological detail where necessary. A case
in point is his exposé of the loss of the
three British battle cruisers at Jutland, a
tragedy that he lays squarely at the feet
of the poor magazine practices prevalent in certain quarters of the Grand
Fleet at the time and not, in spite of the
official sanction, the result of any undue
design flaws in the ships themselves.
Such an approach is not an easy one,
and some may feel that the book sits
rather uncomfortably between the true
historical monograph or narrative and
a specialist reference work as a result.
Technically speaking, it is neither. The
text is not chronological and is too dense
and concentrated to be read easily from
cover to cover, while the inconsistent citations, although far better than in other
works, will likely still aggravate the serious scholar. Enticing and unattributed
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comments like “in the words of one
senior officer . . .” or “Jellicoe’s pre-battle
correspondence reveals . . .” can make
for a frustrating start for a researcher.
What the volume does do very well is
to provide a technically well-informed,
strategic, and tactical analysis of the
main events from a maritime practitioner’s perspective. As Friedman
himself explains in his introduction,
“It is not a full, operational history, but
instead it explores various themes in
the naval history of the war, many of
them technological and tactical.” He
opens, logically enough, by examining
the prewar strategic aspirations and
expectations of the main protagonists,
following with two very useful chapters
on the resources available to each side
and their expectations with regard to
the new technology. Somewhere here in
these first four chapters, however, there
is arguably one of his few omissions, and
this would be a more detailed coverage
of Admiral “Jackie” Fisher’s interdependent and comprehensive series of
reforms drawn out for the Royal Navy
between 1902 and 1907. While admittedly taking place well before the period
covered by the book, they (and Fisher’s
character) were hugely influential in
shaping the navy that fought the Great
War—from the ships that it built to the
intellectual leanings and the polarization of attitudes within the officer corps.
Given the depth with which Friedman
covers the other, related subjects and the
controversies surrounding the advent of
the “all-big-gun” ship to which he later
refers, this would have been a useful
foundation and might have enriched
the rather truncated and one-sided
discussion on the rationale for the battle
cruiser that comes later in chapter 8.
The second half of the text examines the
nature of the ships themselves, starting
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with the capital ships and the fleets
into which they were organized, before
moving on to consider the newer forms
of warfare, including inshore warfare,
amphibious warfare, submarines and
their counters, trade protection, and
mine warfare. This is where Friedman
excels, his eye for detail and technical acumen allowing him to describe
accurately the precise ways in which
new technologies altered the very
nature of the maritime problem. As has
often been said, while the big fleets and
the capital ships that make them up
may underwrite the notion of a nation’s claim to sea control and act as its
overall guarantor, it is the smaller craft
that actually exercise it. So it was with
the Great War, and Friedman amply
recognizes this point, affording each
and every aspect of the naval problem
good coverage, thereby cementing the
comprehensive nature of his work. Here
again, though, the interrelated nature
of some of his chosen themes, and in
particular the first eight chapters, which
deal with differing aspects of essentially
the same capital-ship dilemma, can lead
to a tendency toward repetition, which
is unfortunate, even if understandable.
The overall message, though, is timeless
—as valid today as it was one hundred
years ago. Friedman concludes that the
strategic flexibility conferred by allied
sea power was the decisive factor, allowing the allied powers to continue to trade
and to run the world’s economic engine
for their benefit across the maritime
trade routes while denying the same luxury to the Central powers. As Friedman
explains, the fact that Ludendorff was
not beaten in the west was ultimately
irrelevant. Ludendorff ’s lack of viable allies by 1918 meant that he had no other
options but to hold on in the west: a path
that was as futile as it was exhausting.
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The only bright light was the submarine
offensive, which, for a while at least,
looked as though it might threaten the
British trade security. Once the allies
recognized the threat, their subsequent
mastery over the sea gave them all the
options they needed to maintain an
unpredictable and intolerable pressure over their adversary, an advantage
that could only lead to one outcome.

prior to Patalano’s welcome contribution, only three English-language books
have been dedicated to the subject:
Jim Auer’s The Postwar Rearmament of
Japanese Maritime Forces, 1941–1971
(Praeger, 1973); James Wolley’s Japan’s
Navy: Politics and Paradox, 1971–2000
(Lynne Rienner, 2000); and Euan
Graham’s Japan’s Sea Lane Security,
1940–2004 (Routledge, 2005).

In summary, this is not a book for the
casual-interest reader. It will, however,
suit those who have a background in
the basics of the period and in maritime warfare generally, and who wish
to know more. Dr. Friedman’s research
credentials are impeccable, and the
huge amount of factual detail he has
unearthed will be sure to delight many.
While not definitive in any individual
theme area, there is nothing comparable
in either depth or scope out there, and
for this reason, if no other, this book
is likely to become a standard work on
the naval aspects of the Great War.

Post-war Japan as a Sea Power is particularly important because it offers unique
insight into JMSDF history by exploring
its organizational and cultural identity.
Patalano investigates the extent to which
the modern JMSDF draws on the experience and culture of its predecessor, the
Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), through
access to previously unavailable archival
materials, specifically records from the
service’s education system, recruitment
data, and internal JMSDF guidance
documents such as the New Instructions issued by each incoming chief of
staff from 1961 to 2012. On top of this
bedrock of archival research, Patalano, a
professor at King’s College London who
averages several months a year in Japan,
took advantage of his well-developed
relationships with JMSDF officers of all
ranks to conduct both focused interviews and group surveys. Patalano’s
extensive research reveals how heavily
the IJN legacy influences the structure,
role, and strategic outlook of the JMSDF.

ANGUS ROSS

Patalano, Alessio. Post-war Japan as a Sea Power:
Imperial Legacy, Wartime Experience and the
Making of a Navy. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015. 272pp. $112

The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense
Force (JMSDF) is one of the world’s
most powerful naval forces. As Alessio
Patalano points out in his new history
of the JMSDF, Post-war Japan as a Sea
Power, its surface force is twice the size
of that of the Royal Navy’s, and Japan
has three times as many submarines as
France. However, the JMSDF has been
the focus of surprisingly little writing by international historians. In fact,
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When Japan sought to establish a
maritime security force in the aftermath
of World War II, its leaders studied the
IJN—both its dramatic rise and catastrophic defeat. Patalano explains that
the founders of the JMSDF, many of
them IJN veterans, determined that the
prewar navy had been plagued by its
narrow professional focus. They concluded that IJN leaders and planners had
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failed to match naval strategy to national
security requirements. The result was an
impressive fleet designed to defeat another major navy rapidly in blue-water
action, when a more flexible force capable of securing and defending vital maritime interests might have served Japan
better. The force structure and mentality
of the IJN led to dramatic success for
Japan in the early stages of World War II,
but those gains could not be sustained,
and Japan’s poorly guarded sea lines of
communication became a vulnerability
that American submarines exploited to
decimate Japan’s merchant marine and
undermine the Japanese economy.
As a direct result of this experience,
writes Patalano, the founders of the
JMSDF sought to ensure that Japan’s new
navy would have a broad, maritime focus
rather than a narrow naval one, and that
new generations of naval leaders would
anchor their maritime strategies in
Japan’s national policy objectives. These
leaders also worked to make the JMSDF
immune to the internal rivalries that
wracked the IJN in the 1930s by centralizing the JMSDF’s command functions
under a single Maritime Staff Office
reporting to a single chief of maritime
staff firmly under the control of civilian
bureaucrats. The JMSDF’s study of the
IJN’s failure to secure its sea lines of
communication during World War II
influenced the prioritization of sea-lane
defense during the Cold War. Additionally, interservice rivalries that weakened
the efforts of the Imperial Japanese
Army and Navy during World War II
were addressed postwar by the consolidation of initial officer training to foster
interservice cooperation and camaraderie. Yet the IJN is more than a mere
cautionary tale—its esprit de corps and
traditions live on in the modern JMSDF.
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Patalano’s outstanding work falters only
when the author attempts to explain
the JMSDF’s current tactics as a function of its IJN heritage. While the IJN’s
influence on the JMSDF is undeniably
proven by the book’s analysis, the links
between the JMSDF’s identity and its
tactics are not clearly traced. It is the
reviewers’ experience and assessment
that JMSDF tactics are generally either
adopted directly from the United States
or the product of analytical efforts to
maximize the effectiveness of the force’s
combat systems vis-à-vis perceived
threats. While it is logical that culture
and identity elements are strong influences on those analytical processes,
Patalano’s argument lacks tangible
examples to delineate this connection
clearly. The link between JMSDF strategic culture and IJN heritage is clear,
but the relationship between the IJN
and modern JMSDF tactics is tenuous.
Well articulated, broad in scope, and
drawing on sources not previously accessed by Western researchers, Patalano’s
work delves into previously unexplored
territory essential to making sense of
Japanese decision making in the maritime domain. Given rapidly developing
events in East Asian waters, Post-war
Japan as a Sea Power deserves attention from anyone seeking to understand
maritime affairs in the Asia-Pacific.
CARLOS ROSENDE AND JOHN BRADFORD

Oliver, Dave. Against the Tide: Rickover’s Leadership Principles and the Rise of the Nuclear Navy.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014.
178pp. $27.95

Hyman Rickover almost single-handedly
delivered nuclear power to the United
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States Navy and, when this was combined with submarine and missile
technology, gave the United States the
assured second-strike capability that was
the bedrock of Cold War deterrence.
Rickover also ruled his nuclear navy for
decades, setting unrivaled standards
for safety and performance while also
becoming one of the most controversial
military officers of the twentieth century.
Dave Oliver, a retired rear admiral and
veteran submariner who joined the Navy
in the nuclear navy’s adolescence, had a
career that provided him both a unique
opportunity to observe Hyman Rickover,
and a chance to think deeply about what
might be referred to as “the Rickover
method.” This book purports to examine
that method, with a particular emphasis on Rickover’s leadership style and
how he changed naval and submarine
culture. Oliver does this by focusing
on large themes, such as “planning for
success,” and “innovation and change.”
He populates each chapter with descriptions of Rickover in action and more
than a few personal anecdotes that in
some cases simply beggar the imagination. The result is a fast-paced volume
that reads much more like a memoir
than a scholarly study of leadership or
management. From this perspective,
Against the Tide is a success. The book
also has value as a window into a branch
of the Navy that, for reasons good, bad,
and inevitable, was insulated, isolated,
and opaque to most outside observers.
Readers who approach this work with
the hope of learning how to achieve
similar results to Admiral Rickover’s will
be disappointed. In part this is due to
Rickover’s unique story, his consistent
refusal to produce any form of comprehensive autobiography or memoir, and
the complexity of his career. Rickover
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is a hard man to understand truly and
perhaps impossible to replicate. Oliver
points out that Rickover himself occasionally deviated from his own first
principles, but fails to explain why that
happened. In another case Oliver argues
that Rickover was able to anticipate the
future far more accurately than almost
all his peers, but offers no suggestion
about how this gift might be replicated.
Here too, questions arise. One of the
examples used to demonstrate this prescience involved the admiral pulling an
answer for a technical problem from a
stack of solutions, written long ago, that
he kept in his desk. The scene is dramatic, but leaves the obvious question;
if Admiral Rickover, with his ability to
anticipate the future, foresaw the problem, why didn’t he fix it beforehand? In
another example, toward the end of the
book Admiral Oliver offers the observation that “hard work and focus can succeed for anyone.” Yet in earlier chapters
he makes a very convincing argument
that Rickover’s controversial interviews
and ruthless “culling of the herd” of
prospective and serving nuclear officers
was warranted because some of those
men, including one from his own wardroom, no matter how hardworking and
focused, lacked what it took to be a successful officer on a nuclear submarine.
Oliver, when all is said and done, openly
admires Admiral Rickover. He tries to
maintain a balanced approach when
it comes to identifying and analyzing
Rickover’s blind spots and personal
weaknesses but still minimizes some of
Rickover’s less commendable attributes
—while engaging in occasional hyperbole when it comes to describing
the admiral’s detractors. For example,
Oliver refers to Admiral Rickover’s
“adversaries” as “attacking with the
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viciousness and mindlessness of a pack
of stray dogs.” The imagery is bold,
but the truth is that, as later described
by Oliver, some of those adversaries
were principled officers with different and often broader portfolios and
perspectives whose opposition to
Rickover was anything but mindless.
To its credit, this book touches on and
invites thought and discussion about
more than a few attributes of senior
leadership, including personal accountability. Rickover was quick to dismiss
subordinates who he felt had failed his
program—yet the degree to which he
would be willing to sacrifice his own
position and power is less clear, particularly when even many of his supporters
feel the admiral clung to power too long
and eventually became a detriment to
the program he had created. Another
area involves personal and professional
ethics. Oliver seems to make the point
that when the stakes are high enough,
the ends do justify the means and a successful outcome justifies questionable or
even illegal actions. This invites a subsequent discussion involving the deepest
questions of what it is to be an officer
and member of the profession of arms.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of
Admiral Oliver’s book is the revelation that the author identifies Admiral
Rickover as a manager and not a leader,
contrary to what Rickover desired and
believed. Today, Admiral Rickover is
among the leadership biographic cases
senior students study at the Naval War
College and the question—Was he a
leader or manager?—always comes up.
While there are some students who agree
with Admiral Oliver, the majority identify Rickover as a leader. However, all
are agreed Rickover should be credited
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for daring greatly, building to last, and
being most worthy of continued study.
RICHARD J. NORTON

Dubbs, Chris. America’s U-boats: Terror Trophies
of World War I. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press,
2014. 206pp. $24.95

Chris Dubbs, a Gannon University
executive, followed a fascination with his
discovery of a First World War German
submarine wreck in Lake Michigan. He
pursued meticulous research through
collections of First World War U-boat
accounts and recorded American attitudes on the war and the public fascination with submarines. Throughout the
book, he grabs the attention of readers
as he skillfully recounts the arrival of the
German freighter submarine Deutschland in the United States to reopen trade
with Germany, the horrors that U-boats
caused during the war, and the end of
the war, when the allies claimed U-boats
as war prizes. His well-cited account
of events in the United States, at sea,
and in Europe between 1916 and 1920
entertains readers with riveting images
of German submarines and crews, the
perils of war at sea, and public reaction
and debates on the war. Dubbs offers
an informative and historically accurate
description of the impact U-boats had
on the evolution of warfare and the subsequent employment of submarines as
offensive weapons in war. He concludes
his book with a note on the entrance
of the United States into the Second
World War, when Admiral Harold Stark,
Chief of Naval Operations, ordered U.S.
submarines to commence unrestricted
submarine warfare against Japan,
thereby disregarding the moral outrage
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against sinking ships without warning.
USS Swordfish (SS 193) consummated
the intent of that order nine days after 7
December 1941 when it torpedoed a Japanese freighter. Swordfish, commissioned
on 22 July 1939, was certainly designed
and constructed based on exploited
First World War U-boat technology.
Dubbs has never served in our Navy or
been identified as a naval warfare analyst; however, his account of submarine
technology and warfare describes in
compelling detail the phases of a revolution in military affairs brought about by
offensive employment of submarines.
Dubbs details capability/countercapability phases and the evolution of
technology that began a revolution in
military affairs. While this aspect of
the book is not Dubbs’s main focus, it
serves as a textbook lesson for naval
innovators and strategists in understanding the narrative on submarines
and submarine warfare that continues
today in the form of the U.S. Navy’s
undersea warfare dominance.
Dubbs offers details on how Germany,
with the initial advantage of superior
submarine technology, executed a strategy designed to intimidate the United
States and then threaten American
and allied shipping at sea and American cities along the Atlantic coast.
Imagine a Chinese high-speed freighter
submarine arriving at the Port of
Los Angeles to deliver bulk consignments of rare earth minerals. Imagine
there were no known accounts of the
Chinese freighter submarine being
constructed or warnings of its passage until it surfaced west of Santa
Barbara Island. Imagine its arrival in
LA, with fanfare, public fascination,
and U.S. government mortification.
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This hypothetical arrival of a Chinese
freighter submarine today is comparable
to Dubbs’s account of the 1916 prewar
arrival of Deutschland. Deutschland
commenced its surface transit through
the Chesapeake Bay bound for a call
on the Port of Baltimore on 9 July
1916. Deutschland delivered not only
rare dyes from Germany but strategic communications that the British
blockade of Germany was ineffective
against German submarines and that
German combat U-boats could arrive
undetected along the Atlantic coast.
Deutschland’s technology and apparent ability to transit the Atlantic
established the first phase of a revolution in military affairs. It demonstrated
superior German U-boat operational
and functional capabilities to wartime
enemies and potential adversaries.
Other accounts of German U-boat
capabilities strengthened the initial
demonstration of a strategic capability
that provided Germany with a means
of achieving strategic ends. Dubbs’s detailed accounts of U-boat exploits, while
compelling reading, also inform presentday arguments for operating forward
with superior war-fighting capability.
Throughout the book, maritime warfare
is recounted in deep detail including
tactical maneuvers and operational
effects that have strategic consequences
in warfare. Phases of a classic revolution
in military affairs are brought into focus
as submarine operations versus antisubmarine warfare illustrates a response
cycle to the introduction of unrestricted
submarine warfare in the Atlantic.
Wartime incidents described by Dubbs
are certainly significant revelations for
some readers and provide persuasive
details related to military-political affairs for strategists. Those narratives
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alone are well worth a serious reading
of Dubbs’s wartime U-boat operations.
The revolution in military affairs created by U-boats in the First World War
had a dramatic effect on the public,
the conduct of the war, and the near
attainment of German strategic aims.
According to Dubbs, German U-boats
were a major focus in negotiating
the armistices that ended the war.
Dubbs chronicles the debate by American Navy leaders on the benefits of taking U-boats as war prizes. They had to
be convinced that there were benefits to
crewing U-boats with American submariners and crossing the Atlantic. Dubbs
also introduces American submariners
in his account of these events. Those
officers would later emerge as leaders of
the submarine force in the Second World
War. Their efforts to inject First World
War U-boat technology into U.S. submarines formed the basis for the U.S. Navy’s
undersea warfare dominance today.
America’s U-boats is an important book
for naval warfare professionals and
submariners. It conveys a near-complete
history of the origins of submarine warfare and the revolution in military affairs
that submarines have delivered to maritime and strategic warfare then and now.
WILLIAM F. BUNDY

O’Connell, Aaron B. Underdogs: The Making of
the Modern Marine Corps. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press, 2012. 400pp. $18.95

In Underdogs, Aaron B. O’Connell (U.S.
Naval Academy) presents a cultural history of the U.S. Marine Corps from 1941
to 1965. A lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve, O’Connell explores
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how mistrust among the Marine Corps,
other military services, and civilian
policy makers often motivated Marines
to distinguish themselves. In response,
Marines cultivated relationships with
formidable allies in the U.S. Congress,
media, and even Hollywood to disseminate their narratives to the public, which
ultimately benefited the institution. Students, scholars, and general readers interested in military culture or the Marine
Corps should find the volume useful.
O’Connell’s purpose is to explain the
Marine Corps’s rapid growth from an
undersized force of fewer than twenty
thousand Marines in 1939 to a force
peaking at nearly five hundred thousand
Marines in 1945 and settling around two
hundred thousand Marines by 1965. His
thesis is that culture forms a vital tool
for military organizations. O’Connell
argues three main points: that Marine
Corps culture was unique, that it helped
the group thrive, and that it impacted
American society as well. To his credit,
O’Connell presents both positive and
negative implications of these dynamics, highlighting subjects ranging from
esprit de corps to alcohol abuse.
The author supports his arguments with
extensive sources, examining archival
material such as military and government records, personal papers, letters,
and diaries, as well as published sources
such as newspapers, magazines, films,
and recruiting commercials. He makes
good use of the Marine Corps Gazette
and Leatherneck to present stories
that Marines told. He also scrutinizes
surveys, public opinion polls, memoirs,
and oral history transcripts. A major
strength of the volume is the inclusion
of interviews that O’Connell conducted
with Marine veterans, which personalize the broader narratives of the book.
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First, O’Connell explores the massive
expansion of the Marine Corps that occurred during World War II and the resulting stories that comprised the group’s
culture. He explains that Marine Corps
culture functioned much like a religion
in that it “bound people together in a
system of shared obligations and beliefs.”
World War II reinforced those ties, since
most Marines served in the Pacific, and
the Corps suffered more than twice the
casualty rate of other military services.
Second, he considers the dissemination
of these stories to American society
between World War II and the Korean
War. Brigadier General Robert L. Denig’s
public relations specialists, known colloquially as Denig’s Demons, eventually worked with nearly five thousand
newspapers across the country. Other
examples included the Toys for Tots
program, which started in 1947, and the
Marine Corps’s collaboration with Hollywood in Republic Pictures’ Sands of
Iwo Jima, which included participation
by more than one thousand Marines.
Third, the author studies the Marine
Corps’s mobilization of political power
in the U.S. Congress. He explores avid
supporters of the institution such as Paul
H. Douglas (D-Ill.) and Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis.) and explains how their
efforts protected Marine Corps missions
and budgets. O’Connell rightly points
out the irony that Marines’ political
efforts often “argued against militarism
and excessive military influence in
politics, even as they became the most
politically activist branch of the armed
services.” For example, a nebulous group
of influential supporters known as the
Chowder Society led Marine Corps congressional efforts from relative obscurity.
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Next, O’Connell explores American culture and civil-military relations after the
Korean War. He analyzes stories about
participants in the iconic Marine Corps
battle at the Chosin Reservoir during
the winter of 1950 and then investigates
problems resulting from Marine Corps
culture after the Korean War. Central
among these difficulties was the 1956
Ribbon Creek scandal. This incident
caused the deaths of six Marine recruits
and resulted in the court-martial of
Staff Sergeant Matthew C. McKeon
for marching them through swamps
around Parris Island, South Carolina.
Finally, the author considers the influence of culture on military strategy. He
details the rise of Marine air-ground
task forces (MAGTFs), which had
both positive and negative implications. This novel structure provided
scalable and relevant power projection
capabilities focused on low-intensity
conflict, but also risked militarization by making deployments easier to
initiate for civilian policy makers.
Underdogs is a valuable addition to an
understanding of military culture and
illustrates how military organizations
are unique. O’Connell contributes useful
concepts such as “narratives of Marine
exceptionalism”; “cultural discipline”;
and “cultural politics,” which relate
culture to military institutions, militarization, and power. Ultimately, Underdogs
explains how and why the Marine Corps
created a distinctive identity after World
War II and illuminates the dynamic
and symbiotic relationship between the
Marine Corps and American society.
WILLIAM A. TAYLOR
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John Bradford is the Regional Cooperation Coordinator on the staff of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. He
holds a bachelor’s degree from Cornell University and earned a master’s degree from the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore as an Olmsted Scholar. He has written articles
for publications that include Asian Policy, AsianSecurity, Asian Survey, Contemporary Southeast
Asia, Naval War College Review, and U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.
William F. Bundy directs research and teaches graduate warrior-scholars in the Center for Naval
Warfare Studies. He received a PhD from Salve Regina University and served in the Navy as a
career submarine officer, having served in seven submarines, including attack, nuclear attack, and
nuclear fleet ballistic missile submarines. He had command in a conventional attack submarine.
David T. Burbach is an Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College,
where he teaches courses on force planning, national strategy, and regional security. Dr. Burbach
received a BA from Pomona College, and earned a PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Roger H. Ducey is an Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College.
Previously he served as the senior Air Force adviser to the Naval War College. He retired after
almost thirty years of service. He holds a bachelor’s of business administration from the University
of Miami and master’s degrees from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and the U.S. Naval
War College.
David C. Fuquea joined the Naval War College’s Maritime Staff Operators Course faculty as an
associate professor following his retirement from the United States Marine Corps as a colonel after
twenty-nine years. He conducts research and writes on modern amphibious warfare and the U.S.
naval war in the Pacific, and has published in the Journal of Military History, the Naval War College
Review, and Proceedings.
Joseph M. Hatfield is an active-duty naval intelligence officer and received a PhD from the University of Cambridge. He currently is assigned to the United States Naval Academy faculty and
teaches political science.
Holger H. Herwig holds a dual position at the University of Calgary as Professor of History and as
Canada Research Chair in the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. He has published more
than a dozen books, including the prizewinning The First World War: Germany and AustriaHungary 1914–1918.
John T. Kuehn is the General William Stofft Chair for Historical Research at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). He received a PhD from Kansas State University. He
retired from the U.S. Navy in 2004 at the rank of commander after twenty-three years of service
as a naval flight officer. His latest book is Napoleonic Warfare: The Operational Art of the Great
Campaigns.
Carnes Lord is Professor of Strategic Leadership at the Naval War College, director of the Naval
War College Press, and editor of the Naval War College Review. He received a PhD (classics) from
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Yale University, as well as a PhD (government) from Cornell University. His latest books are The
Politics of Aristotle (editor and translator) and Proconsuls: Delegated Political-Military Leadership
from Rome to America Today.
Yvonne R. Masakowski is an Associate Professor of Strategic Leadership and Leader Development
at the U.S. Naval War College. She received a PhD and a master’s degree from the City University
of New York, and a master’s degree from the University of Connecticut. She is a contributing editor to the Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making.
Christopher Nelson is a career naval intelligence officer and graduate of the University of Tulsa
and Naval War College. He is also a graduate of the Maritime Advanced Warfighting School in
Newport, R.I.
Richard J. Norton is a professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College. He is a
retired naval officer and holds a PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. His most
recent publications include articles in the Naval War College Review and Marine Corps University
Journal.
Douglas Peifer is a professor and chair of the U.S. Air War College’s Department of Strategy. His
latest book, Naval Incidents and the Decision for War, is forthcoming from Oxford University Press.
He is currently researching the historical record of “gunboat diplomacy,” air control, and coercive
airpower.
Carlos Rosende is an active-duty naval officer in USS Stethem (DDG 63), forward deployed to
Yokosuka, Japan. He holds a bachelor’s degree from the U.S. Naval Academy and his research and
writing have been featured in Naval History and U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.
Angus Ross is a retired Royal Navy officer; graduate of, and Professor of Joint Military Operations
at, the Naval War College. A graduate of the Naval War College, he received a second MA from
Providence College and is currently working on PhD studies, looking at naval transformation
prior to the First World War. His recent published works include articles in this journal and others
on the dilemma facing both the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy in the wake of the Dreadnought
revolution.
William A. Taylor is Assistant Professor of Security Studies at Angelo State University. A graduate
of the United States Naval Academy and former Marine Corps officer, he received a PhD from
George Washington University. He is author of Every Citizen a Soldier: The Campaign for Universal
Military Training after World War II and the forthcoming volume In Defense of Democracy: American Military Service from World War II to Operation Enduring Freedom.
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IN MY VIEW

THE INDIAN NAVY AND THE PIVOT

Sir:
Apropos the article by Harsh V. Pant and Yogesh Joshi titled “The American
‘Pivot’ and the Indian Navy: It’s Hedging All the Way,” in the Winter 2015 Naval
War College Review. The authors argue that India has been overly cautious in
demonstrating its support to the U.S. “pivot strategy,” based on the lack of any
visible response by the Indian Navy in the region.
In my view, India’s primary interests lie in the Indian Ocean and India’s defence
relations with the regional littorals in the West Pacific are driven by their own
interests in the safety and security of their maritime trade in the Indian Ocean,
rather than by India’s interests in the Pacific. A case in point is Japan, which receives almost all of its oil imports through the Indian Ocean. It would therefore
be inaccurate to view the extant level of India’s navy-to-navy relations with Japan
and Australia as a sign of India’s interest in the Pacific or a measure of India’s
contribution to the American “pivot” in the Indo-Pacific. I think that task will
always remain for the regional littorals, including Australia, Japan, Philippines,
Singapore, and Vietnam, to back the U.S. Navy in the region or their respective
areas of interest. Emergent navies, such as the Indian Navy, like to engage with
other modern navies, such as the USN, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force,
or the Royal Australian Navy, for various reasons, including “bench-marking” of
their operating standards, learning and emulating best practices, or keeping pace
with the latest technologies, besides developing a comfortable level of operational
interoperability that could be put to use in time of crisis.
The emergence of the Indian Navy as a net provider of security in the Indian
Ocean does, however, support the American “pivot,” since by easing its operational burden in the Indian Ocean region it allows the USN, as well as other Pacific navies, to focus assets in the Pacific theatre. Moreover, notwithstanding the
extant level of naval exercises, the Indian Navy, as highlighted by the authors, has
over the years built close trust and interoperability with the USN. This is more
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important than the nature of exercises per se, a fact underscored in the 2007 U.S.
“Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” which aimed at developing
cooperative partnerships with like-minded nations over time, because in moments of crises, “[while] forces can surge when necessary . . . trust and cooperation cannot be surged.”

SHISHIR UPADHYAYA

Commander, Indian Navy (Ret.)
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REFLEC TIONS ON READING

COMING SOON TO YOUR COMMAND’S LIBRARY: HOW WE FIGHT

Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the program man-

T

ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.

he Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program (CNO-PRP) recently began distributing How We Fight: Handbook for the Naval Warfighter
to all CNO-PRP libraries around the fleet. In describing the 166-page, full-color
handbook, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, USN, says in his foreword:
“How We Fight” is a concise, single volume that explains the basic, unique, and
enduring attributes associated with being a Sailor, going to sea, and conducting war
at sea. It highlights the fundamentals of the environment in which the Navy operates, our uniquely maritime characteristics, our history in this domain, and the way
of Navy warfighting. This book should serve as a companion piece to other sources
of literature enabling Sailors to understand the essence of being “a Sailor” as they
develop their skills as seagoing professionals.

The introduction to the handbook further explains its purpose:
Every Sailor is a warfighter first. The U.S. Navy exists to protect our nation and our
access to the world. Our duty is to prevent and deter wars and, if necessary, fight and
win them. The protection we provide the American people extends far beyond our
homeland and includes the defense of our national interests and allies.
As a Service, the Navy is unique in that its continuing maintenance—directed by the
U.S. Constitution—reflects the fact that our nation’s economic prosperity is based in
a large part on international trade in products and resources, the majority of which
travels by sea. We protect that access every day in peacetime. In conflict, we are dedicated to victory.
Those are facts we all know. We also know that our Navy is designed to operate
forward in the far regions of the world. Much of our time, both in peace and conflict,
is spent on deployment in the areas of potential crises, promoting, safeguarding and,
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when required, defeating an enemy and restoring the peace. We protect American
interests on a global basis, something with which we are very familiar.
We know that we must “be ready”—fully prepared to conduct warfighting operations
while forward deployed into regions of potential crisis and conflict.
[The purpose of this book] is simple—to articulate in a single volume the elements
that determine the way we operate, as well as some of the overall concepts that guide
our methods. We are shaped by so many factors: the maritime environment, our
Service attributes, our history, and our current and projected future missions.
These are the factors we examine in these pages. The book is meant to put all these
pieces together and define who we are and what we do in a comprehensive, yet readable fashion. For some, it is a good review of material they have long known. For
others, it may hold ideas with which they are not as familiar or have never examined
intently. For civilian readers, it helps to explain what the U.S. Navy is truly about:
what it does for our nation, what molds its culture, and what makes it unique among
our joint U.S. Armed Forces.

The CNO-PRP managers at the Naval War College will ensure that a number
of hard copies are made available to every ship, squadron, and major activity
in the Navy for inclusion in their CNO-PRP lending libraries. An electronic
(e-book, ISBN 978-1-935352-42-6) version will be available for download from
the official Navy website at www.navy.mil and from the CNO-PRP website at
navyreading.dodlive.mil. Command procurement officials can purchase additional hard copies (ISBN 978-1-935352-41-9) from the Government Publishing
Office (GPO) bookstore at bookstore.gpo.gov. Individuals (including private
citizens) who desire to add this book to their professional libraries may purchase
copies from GPO using personal funds.
We strongly encourage everyone to read How We Fight: Handbook for the Naval Warfighter. It tells a story of honor, courage, and commitment that spans the
centuries and provides a vision for the future.

JOHN E. JACKSON
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